Re Md Tanvir

Read the full judgment text of CACV 157/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 1 August 2019.

1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam given on 18 March 2019 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 20 April 2018 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 23 January 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Cited by 2 cases · Cites 1 case

Case No.CACV 157/2019[2019] HKCA 808
Court
Court of Appeal
Date01 Aug 2019
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CACV 157 /2019

[2019] HKCA 808

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 157 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 755 OF 2018)

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RE: MD TANVIR Applicant

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Before: Hon Barma JA, G Lam and ST Poon JJ in Court

Date of Hearing: 23 July 2019

Date of Judgment: 1 August 2019

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon ST Poon J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam given on 18 March 2019 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 20 April 2018 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 23 January 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Background

2.The applicant is a national of India.  He entered Hong Kong on 9 April 2016 as a visitor and was allowed to stay until 23 April 2016.  He overstayed and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 31 May 2016.  He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 28 June 2016. 

3.The applicant’s claim was based on his fear that he would be killed or harmed by two men, namely Shaheed and Ashtaq who had a loan dispute with him.  It was the applicant’s case that he borrowed money from Shaheed and Ashtaq to set up his mobile phone business in 2014 but they supplied goods of poor quality to him that caused him to suffer a great loss in his business.  As he was unable to repay his debt to Shaheed and Ashtaq they harassed the applicant and his family and threatened to kill the applicant. After a fight between Shaheed and the applicant and his friends, the police had been looking for the applicant.  Shaheed had a relative named Hakim who was a member of the Legislative Assembly and he sent people to look for the applicant and threatened the applicant’s family members that they would kill the applicant and his brother if they failed to pay up.  The applicant did not feel safe to stay in India and decided to leave.  The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the judge at [2] to [15] of the CALL-1 Form.

4.By a Notice of Decision dated 23 January 2017, the director decided against the applicant’s claim.  The decision covered the BOR 2 risk[1], BOR 3 risk[2], the persecution risk[3], and the torture risk[4].

5.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board.  After a hearing on 5 February 2018, the Board dismissed the appeal on 20 April 2018 (“Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision covered all four grounds for non-refoulement protection.

6.At [11] of the Board’s Decision, the Board held that certain aspects of the applicant’s claim were exaggerated, inconsistent with his previous statements, inherently inconsistent or defies logic.  The Board did not believe that the applicant will suffer from any of the proscribed harm upon his return.  The Board was also satisfied at [17(j)] that state protection was available and at [17(k)] that internal relocation would be viable.

The judge’s decision

7.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 2 May 2018 which contained the following grounds for judicial review:

(1)  The Board unlawfully fettered his discretion by refusing the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that they did not satisfy the requirement;

(2)  The Board acted in a procedurally unfair manner in dealing with the applicant’s appeal;

(3)  The Board’s Decision was unreasonable or irrational in the public law sense, or was a result of procedural errors or unfairness; and

(4)  The Board failed to meet the greater care and duty owed to a self-represented claimant.

8.In the affirmation in support of the leave application dated 2 May 2018, the applicant advanced the following grounds for judicial review which are summarised as follows:

(1)  The applicant was given the appeal bundle only a few days before the Board hearing. As such, he did not have sufficient time to prepare for the appeal due to language problem and lack of legal representation.; and

(2)  The Board relied on news which are outdated. This lack of credible source of information led to the erroneous conclusion that it was safe for him to return

9.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the director and the board, the judge refused to give leave for judicial review.  The judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [35] to [48] of the CALL-1 Form:

“35. Judicial review is concerned with the reasonableness, lawfulness and fairness of the decisions and the process of reaching such decisions by the authorities.

36. A non-refoulement claim involves ‘life and limb’; any decision will bear significant consequences on an applicant. Therefore, high standards of fairness must be achieved. The court should look at an applicant’s case under ‘rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny’. Nevertheless, it is said in Re Islam Rafiqul: –

“The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal.  The primary decision-makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board.  Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director).  The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.” 

37. The Applicant mentioned he was not legally represented when he appealed to the Board. He had been represented by the Duty Lawyer Service up to the Director's decision dated 23 January 2017.

38. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly stated that an applicant of non-refoulement claim does not have an absolute right to free legal representation at all stages of the proceedings. The Applicant failed to show how his case would be undermined or prejudiced by the lack of legal representation only in the later stages of the screening process.

39. The Applicant raised his language problem. In the current application, he managed to find a lawyer to help him to prepare Form 86 and the affirmation. Apparently, the Applicant could find someone to assist him with interpretation/translation and dealing with English documents at all material times. Furthermore, the Applicant was assisted by qualified interpreters when he was represented by the Duty Lawyer Service and in the screening process before the Director and the Adjudicator. The Applicant had much exaggerated his language problem.

40. The Applicant complained he received the appeal bundle only a few days before the Board hearing.

41. According to para. 9.6 of the ‘Principles, Procedures and Practice Directions of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’ and para. 12.6 of the ‘Practice and Procedural Guide of the Administrative Non-refoulement Claims Petition Scheme’, the Director shall send copies of the hearing bundle to the Board and to the Applicant no later than 5 working days prior to the date of the hearing.

42. The Applicant received the appeal bundle on 29 January 2018 before the Board hearing, which was scheduled for 5 February 2018. That was 7 calendar days (or 6 working days) before the hearing. The bundle was served on the Applicant in time.

43. The appeal bundle would consist mostly of documents that had been seen or submitted by the Applicant during the first-tier screening of his claim. The Applicant's case was not difficult. There was no evidence to show the bundle was difficult or voluminous.

44. A few days certainly were not a long period but could still be sufficient for reasonable and diligent preparation on the part of the Applicant. The Applicant failed to show he really needed more time to prepare for his appeal. He had not complained to the Adjudicator or asked for adjournment during the appeal hearing.

45. The Applicant said he answered all the questions honestly in the Board hearing. That would mean he knew well what was asked and how to answer. He was not confused.

46. There was no evidence the Adjudicator relied on outdated cases or information not officially recognised or simply hearsay.

47. I have reviewed the Adjudicator’s decision under ‘rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny’. The Adjudicator had proper basis for her finding, conclusion and decision which were not Wednesbury unreasonable. She made no errors of law and there was no procedural unfairness. The Adjudicator had engaged in joint endeavour with the Applicant in the screening process. The Applicant had been given reasonable and sufficient opportunities to state and elaborate his case. The Adjudicator was acquainted with the facts. She considered the Applicant’s claim carefully and applied the law correctly. The Adjudicator had adhered to the high standards of fairness required of the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Conclusion

48.   The Applicant's complaints are not reasonably arguable. He has no realistic prospects of success in the sought judicial review.  I therefore refuse to grant him leave for judicial review.”

Grounds for appeal

10.In the Notice of Appeal dated 28 March 2019 the applicant advanced the following grounds of appeal:

“the Plaintiff will face hardship if he is to return back to his home country and that the [Board] has significantly relied on the source of news which is not officially recognized, or it is simply hearsay. They have also relied on some cases which are outdated considering the dramatic changes. The lack of credible source of information has resulted in them making groundless speculations.”

11.In his skeleton submissions dated 13 June 2019, the applicant referred to a number of cases on high standard of fairness without explaining how they are relevant to his appeal.

Discussion

12.The only ground of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal complains of errors on the part of the Board, but does not identify any error on the part of the judge.  It is therefore not a viable ground of appeal.  As we have often stated, in an appeal to this court, it is necessary to identify errors made by the judge, as an appeal is not simply to be treated as a further opportunity to make an application for judicial review.

13.As for the cases referred to in the skeleton submissions, the applicant failed to explain how they are relevant.  There is no viable ground of appeal in the skeleton.

14.There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.

(Aarif Barma) (Godfrey LAM) (S T POON)
Justice of Appeal Judge of the Court of Judge of the Court of
  First Instance First Instance

The applicant acting in person



[1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383.

[2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap.383

[3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

[4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under CACV 157/2019