Re Abbas Syed Manzar

Read the full judgment text of CACV 99/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 22 August 2019.

2. Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484) (‘ HKCFAO ’) leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal will only be granted if the question to be determined involves great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be determined by the Court of Final Appeal.

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Case No.CACV 99/2019[2019] HKCA 960
Court
Court of Appeal
Date22 Aug 2019
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CACV 99/2019

[2019] HKCA 960

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 99 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 1092 OF 2018)

__________________________

RE: ABBAS SYED MANZAR Applicant

__________________________

Before: Hon Cheung, Chu and Au JJA in Court

Date of Decision: 22 August 2019

__________________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________________


Hon Cheung JA (giving the Decision of the Court) :

1)   Leave to appeal to Court of Final Appeal

1.1On 21 June 2019, this Court handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung given on 15 February 2019 in which he refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review (‘Decision of the Judge’).

1.2The facts and issues in the appeal before the Court of Appeal, as well as the Court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.  We will not repeat them here.

1.3The applicant now applies, by a notice of motion dated 28 June 2019, for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.

1.4The applicant complains that in respect of the Director’s Decision (as defined in our judgment) the judges did not apply the ‘principle of irrationality’ (Wednesbury unreasonableness) and the principle of procedural unfairness for ignoring that the Director’s Decision needs to give reasons.  He reiterated that the Judge did not apply the law properly and that there was procedural unfairness.  All of these complaints lacked any meaningful particulars.

1.5The notice of motion was attached with a 2‑page letter to the Court and 26 pages of documents.  The 2‑page letter begins with the applicant regurgitating his background story to the Court.  He reiterated that he was being chased by other organizations that persistently hunt down the Shia sect which he belonged to.  He repeated that he will be killed if he was sent back and that the Court must trust him that he will be killed if he was sent back.

1.6The 26 pages of documentary exhibits are information on threats against the Shia muslims, or alleged personal achievements, or references of the applicant as a poet.  Parts of the documents were disclosed before the Judge, while parts of the documents are new documents never shown to the Judge.

1.7This is not an occasion for the applicant to regurgitate arguments either already advanced, or for him to advance new grounds not dealt with by the Judge.  We would only reverse the decision of the Judge if there were errors of law, that the Judge failed to take account of relevant matters, or the decision was plainly wrong: United Muslim Association of Hong Kong v Yusuf Yu [2018] HKCA 451 at [38] and [39].  None of these exist for these documents attached to his notice of motion.  We also do not see the documents only disclosed now can satisfy the 3 part test as laid down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489.

2)  Legal principles

2.Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484) (‘HKCFAO’) leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal will only be granted if the question to be determined involves great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be determined by the Court of Final Appeal.

3)  Our view

3.1The matters stated by the applicant in his notice of motion and attachments do not constitute grounds for granting leave to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine in accordance with section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  Nor is there any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised in his notice of motion and attachments.

3.2We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the ‘or otherwise’ limb under section 22(1)(b).

4)  Disposition

4.For these reasons, the notice of motion dated 28 June 2019 is dismissed.

(Peter Cheung) (Carlye Chu) (Thomas Au)
Justice of Appeal
Justice of Appeal
Justice of Appeal

Applicant, unrepresented, acting in person

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