Sidhu Balbir Singh v. The Adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 601/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 September 2019.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claim Appeal Board (“the Board”) in dismissing his appeal against the refusal of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) to re-open his non-refoulement claim due to his persisted failure to return or submit his Supplementary Claim Form (“SCF”)within the required time.
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HCAL 601/2018 [2019] HKCFI 815 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 601 of 2018 BETWEEN
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
It is further directed that:
Observations for the Applicant: 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claim Appeal Board (“the Board”) in dismissing his appeal against the refusal of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) to re-open his non-refoulement claim due to his persisted failure to return or submit his Supplementary Claim Form (“SCF”)within the required time. 2.The applicant is a national of India who had previously made a torture claim with the Immigration Department on the basis that if he returned to India he would be harmed or killed by the family of his girlfriend who opposed their relationship and/or by the police as her brother was one of them. After his torture claim was rejected by the Immigration Department, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the same basis, and was required to submit the SCF and to attend screening interview before the Immigration Department in order that his non-refoulement claim could be assessed under the applicable grounds other than torture risk including risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“BOR 3 risk”) and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“persecution risk”). 3.Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 has made provisions for the procedures relating to the making of such claim, and the provisions relevant to the making of a torture claim also apply to non-refoulement claim subsequent to the commencement of the Unified Screening Mechanism and are as follows. 4.Section 37Y:
5.Section 37ZA also sets out the duties of a claimant in making his or her claim as follows:
6.As for the failure of a claimant to return the completed torture claim form, section 37ZG provides that:
7.As set out in the chronological details of the Director’s Notice of Decision dated 25 August 2016, from the date when the Director by written notice dated 2 June 2015 to the applicant requiring him to return his completed SCF within the required periods up to the time of his refusal to re-open the applicant’s non-refoulement claim, the applicant never returned his SCF to the Immigration Department despite having legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) and despite twice being deemed to have withdrawn his claim under the above rules but was subsequently allowed to re-open his claim with the same requirement to complete and return his SCF, and it was only on his third request to re-open his claim when he still failed to return his SCF within the required period that it was not accepted by the Director that it was due to circumstances beyond his control to do so after having been repeatedly reminded for more than one year for the following stated reasons:
8.On 6 September 2016 the applicant filed an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) against the Director’s decision, for which the Board did not hold any oral hearing and dealt with the appeal in the absence of the applicant and on paper. On 4 August 2017 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the decision of the Director. 9.In its decision the Board found that the applicant had merely given his reasons for coming to Hong Kong for non-refoulement protection but did not provide any additional information for his failure to return his SCF, and upon reviewing his earlier explanations given to the Director, it agreed with the Director’s decision that the applicant has failed to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the Director that due to circumstances beyond his control that he had been unable to return his completed SCF as required under section 37Y(2) of the Ordinance as stated above. 10.On 10 April 2018 the applicant filed his Form 86 (dated 5 March 2018) for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, but no grounds for seeking relief was given in his Form, and in his supporting affirmation of the same date he merely stated that his life would be in danger if refouled to his home country and that he should be allowed to re-open his claim. 11.Nor did he attend the scheduled hearing of his application or provided any explanation for his non-appearance. His application was however way outside the stipulated period within which it was required to be filed, as Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. 12.As the last day of the three-month period for the applicant to file his Form 86 fell on 4 November 2017, he was therefore more than five months late with his application, and in considering whether to extend time, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: Re Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1; and AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393. 13.In the applicant’s case, a delay of more than five months must be regarded as substantial, for which he did not provide any explanation either in his Form 86 or his supporting affirmation, and as he failed to attend the oral hearing of his application, there was no opportunity to extract any explanation from him either. 14.As for the merits of his intended application, again in the absence of any grounds proposed by him or of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality identified in the Board’s decision, I do not see any reasonably arguable ground or any prospect of success in his intended challenge. 15.In the premises and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the applicant’s claim. As a matter of fact, even up to now the applicant has not submitted or produced his SCF. 16.For these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in the absence of any good reason for his substantial delay, I refuse to extend time and accordingly his application is dismissed. Dated the 20th day of September 2019.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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