Re Hossain Mohammed Nur
Read the full judgment text of CACV 236/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 30 August 2019.
1. This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Hossain Mohammed NUR, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“Judge”) on 23 May 2019 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 20 June 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision
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CACV 236/2019 [2019] HKCA 987 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 236 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1190 OF 2018) -----------------------------------
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Hossain Mohammed NUR, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“Judge”) on 23 May 2019 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 20 June 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 2 November 2016 (“Director’s Decision”). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of Bangladesh now aged about 33, is a fear of being attacked or even killed by members of the Awami League (“AL”), particularly by 2 individuals named Kana Babu and Samad, if he should return to Bangladesh. Such alleged fear is said to arise out of the following detailed circumstances:
Arrival in Hong Kong and lodgment and processing of NRF Claim 3.The applicant left Bangladesh for Kunming, China on 18 June 2014. He transferred from Kunming to Shenzhen, from where he then entered Hong Kong illegally by boat on 23 June 2014. He was arrested on the same date. He raised the NRF Claim on 30 June 2014. On 2 February 2016, he lodged his completed non-refoulement claim form (“NRF Claim Form”). 4.In processing the NRF Claim, the Director’s representative(s) conducted a screening interview on 27 October 2016 with the applicant, who then had legal assistance and representation from the Duty Lawyer Service. Director’s Decision 5.The Director’s Decision covered all applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection: torture risk[1], persecution risk[2], “BOR 2” risk[3] and “BOR 3” risk[4]. 6.The Director found the NRF Claim to be unsubstantiated for reasons which can be summarised as follows:
Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 7.The applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board on 11 November 2016. 8.The Board conducted a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 15 January 2018 at which the applicant, through a Bengali interpreter, testified and answered questions by the Board. 9.The Board’s Decision dismissed the appeal on all 4 applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection. 10.The Board found inexplicable “obvious discrepancies” in the applicant’s evidence of the events that formed the basis of his fear of risk, which rendered his claim implausible. The Board also considered his evidence unreliable because of the unreasonable nature of his claim. That being the case, the applicant had firstly failed to establish the substantial grounds required for non-refoulement protection under the Ordinance. Secondly, the ill-treatment relied on did not attain the minimum degree of severity to engage BOR3. Thirdly, the applicant had not proved any “well-founded fear” for the establishment of persecution risk. He did not hold a leadership position in the BNP or have any political influence in his home area for him to be targeted. Fourthly, the Board was not satisfied that the applicant would face a real risk or danger against his life in Bangladesh. 11.The Board also came to the same conclusions on the availability of state protection and reasonable internal relocation options as the Director. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 12.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review issued under HCAL 1190/2018 on 25 June 2018 (“Form 86”) and the supporting affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision on grounds which were summarised by the Judge at [10] of the Form CALL-1 dated 23 May 2019, [2019] HKCFI 1279 (“Form CALL-1”) as follows:
13.After hearing the application in open court at which the applicant was present, the Judge refused leave. His reasons can be found in [11]-[14] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal and grounds of appeal 14.By a notice of appeal filed herein on 29 May 2019, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review on this ground (“Ground”):
15.On 15 July 2019, the applicant lodged his skeleton submission, which referred to (1) ST v Director of Immigration (sic)[5] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277 and Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 to remind this court of the high standards of fairness that are required in the adjudication of torture claims and the rationales for such requirement. 16.The applicant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal on 27 August 2019. In further support of his appeal, the applicant merely stated that his family in Bangladesh, particularly his uncle, have been negotiating with Kana Babu and Samad on his behalf with a view to settling the dispute between them and that he needs to stay in Hong Kong for another 3 to 4 months for the settlement to materialise. Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement claim 17.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 18.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal will generally not admit fresh evidence unless the 3 requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall[6]are met. Nor will it normally entertain any new arguments that are fact sensitive that should have been raised in the court below. In short, the Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2) & (4)]. Discussion 19.In light of the above principles, it is incumbent upon the applicant to point out with sufficient particularity the errors allegedly committed by the Judge in refusing leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. 20.The Ground appears to be a mere repetition of the third ground placed before the Judge and is directed at the Board’s Decision, not that of the Judge. In any event, the Judge dealt with the same in [4] of the Form CALL-1. The applicant has not identified, and we do not see, any fault in the Judge’s reasoning. 21.As summarised in paragraphs 6, 10 and 11 above, the NRF Claim failed on the facts at both stages of the Unified Screening Mechanism. The questions whether the applicant would be at risk of life or torture if he is refouled to Bangladesh and, if so, whether the danger would be lowered or negated by the availability of state protection and/or reasonable internal relocation options are all questions of fact within the province of the Board (after the Director). The applicant has not advanced any ground of appeal, properly so called, that tackles the negative findings of fact against him. 22.The applicant did not in the notice of appeal or his submission (whether written or oral) before us identify any error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that she had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was plainly wrong. Nor can we discern any. Disposition 23.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) (“Ordinance”) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [5] The correct citation should be ST v Betty Kwan. [6] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. |
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