Re Dhaliwal Rupinderjeet Singh
Read the full judgment text of CACV 594/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 25 October 2019.
1. On 27 June 2019, this court (Barma and Au JJA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Campbell-Moffat J (“the judge”) on 11 December 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decisions of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim.
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CACV 594/2018 [2019] HKCA 1158 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 594 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 968/2017) -----------------------------------
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.On 27 June 2019, this court (Barma and Au JJA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Campbell-Moffat J (“the judge”) on 11 December 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decisions of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim. 2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1] We will not repeat them here. 3.The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion dated 5 July 2019, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant stated in the Notice of Motion that:
4.The applicant lodged a written submission in support of the application on 18 July 2019. In the written submission, the applicant submitted that the lawyer assigned to him by the Duty Lawyer Scheme did not provide sufficient representation. As a result, there was unfairness in the procedure. It was not possible for him to give proper grounds of appeal in the appeal before this court because he was detained by the authorities. He asked the court to consider the fact that it is not safe for him to return. 5.Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the Notice of Motion and written submission. 6.The matters stated by the applicant in the Notice of Motion and written submission do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484. Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised in the Notice of Motion and written submission. 7.The applicant failed to identify any ground of judicial review with sufficient particulars before the judge. In the appeal to this court, he only asked this court to consider the danger he faced. The applicant has failed to identify any public law error on the part of the Board or the Director. As we have repeatedly held in previous cases, an application for judicial review is not a further avenue of appeal from the Board’s Decision. The applicant must identify some public law error and it is not sufficient simply to ask the court to re-evaluate his non-refoulement claim. 8.This court has also repeatedly held that a non-refoulement claimant is not entitled to legal representation at all stages of the proceedings (Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15). Representation at later stages is merits based, and this is not procedurally unfair. The applicant’s contention that he was unable to identify grounds of appeal or lodge skeleton submission is not a ground for seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. We further note that the applicant has failed to identify the deficiency in the legal service he received or any real prejudice from the lack of legal representation. 9.In our view, these grounds are not reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal. 10.We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). 11.For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 5 July 2019 is dismissed.
The applicant acting in person |
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