Re Foo Wai Lok
Read the full judgment text of HCB 6077/2018 on BabelCite. This HCB judgment was delivered on 22 January 2020.
1. The Petitioner was the landlord. The debtor in this case (“ Mr Foo ”) and the debtor in HCB 7480/2018 (“ Mr Yuan ”) were the guarantors under the tenancy agreement.
Cited by 5 cases · Cites 5 cases
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HCB 6077/2018 [2020] HKCFI 258 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 6077 OF 2018 ____________ Re: FOO WAI LOK (符偉樂), Debtor Ex-Parte: NEW CASTLE INVESTMENTS LIMITED (新港投資有限公司), Petitioner ____________
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_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ A. Introduction 1.The Petitioner was the landlord. The debtor in this case (“Mr Foo”) and the debtor in HCB 7480/2018 (“Mr Yuan”) were the guarantors under the tenancy agreement. 2.The Petitioner obtained Default Judgment dated 7 September 2018 against the tenant, Mr Foo and Mr Yuan in HCA 1632/2018 (“the Action”). 3.Based on the Default Judgment, the Petitioner served a statutory demand on Mr Foo on 26 September 2018 for a sum of HK$4,401,248.73 (“the SD”). The SD was not satisfied. The Petitioner petitioned for the bankruptcy of Mr Foo on 24 October 2018. 4.Having recovered vacant possession of the premises on 29 November 2018, ie one month subsequent to the Petition, the Petitioner applied the deposit of HK$ 8,500,000 under the tenancy agreement (“the Deposit”) to set off the debt. As a result, Mr Foo allegedly still owed the Petitioner $966,336.88. 5.Mr Foo opposes the Petition on the ground that there was no debt due under the SD after the Deposit was mandatorily applied to set off the judgment debt pursuant to the terms of the tenancy agreement. The Deposit was never mentioned in the Action or the Default Judgment. The contents of Mr Foo’s defence filed on 6 January 2020 are not relevant. 6.The Petitioner denies that there was any automatic set-off and asserts the rights of a landlord to apply the Deposit at his discretion. 7.This is the substantive hearing of the Petition. B. Legal principles 8.Section 6(2) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap 6 (“the Ordinance”) provides that a creditor’s petition may be presented to the court in respect of a debt that exceeds $10,000, if the debt is for a liquidated sum payable to the petitioning creditor either immediately or at some certain, future time, and is unsecured. Under section 6(2)(c), the debt has to be one which the debtor appears to be unable to pay. 9.Under section 6A of the Ordinance, for the purposes of section 6(2)(c), the debtor appears to be unable to pay a debt if, but only if, the debt is payable immediately and, after lapse of at least 3 weeks since service, the statutory demand was neither complied with nor set aside. 10.In bankruptcy, it is not the debtor’s general inability to pay his debts that is crucial but the apparent inability to pay the debt in the statutory demand, and at the hearing of the bankruptcy petition the failure to pay or secure or compound for that debt: Re Leung Cherng Jiunn, unrep, HCB 244/2014, 21 May 2015, §24, Recorder Linda Chan SC (as she then was), following TBS Bank plc v Platts (No.2) [1998] BPIR 284, at 288H-290A. 11.Under rule 48(5) of the Bankruptcy Rules, Cap 6A, the court may set aside a statutory demand if (a) the debtor appears to have a counterclaim or set-off which equals or exceeds the amount of the debt specified in the statutory demand; or (b) the debt is disputed on grounds which appear to the court to be substantial. 12.The debtor will not normally be precluded from taking the points which he could have taken on an application to set aside the statutory demand at the hearing of the Petition: Re Leung Cherng Jiunn, §24. C. Issues 13.The following issues were raised at the call-over hearing before Anthony Chan J and by Mr Foo’s former counsel (Mr Kelvin KH Liu):
D. Debt due issue 14.Resolution of this issue turns on how the Deposit should be treated. This was governed by Clause 5 of the tenancy agreement:
15.Mr Liu submitted that the Deposit would have been mandatorily set off pursuant to Clause 5.03 to extinguish the debt as at the date of the SD or the Petition. 16.Mr Lok disagreed for 2 reasons. 17.Firstly, he submitted that Clause 5.03 did not deal with the amount of indebtedness owed by the tenant. It merely deemed but did not actually reduce the Deposit. It simply provided the Petitioner with the option of requesting for extra deposit that represented the amount due from the tenant; at the same time, the landlord could, still hang on to the $8,500,000. 18.I accept that Clause 5.03 has to be read in the context of the tenancy agreement. However, with respect, Mr Lok’s submission needs only be stated to be rejected, as being contrary to the terms of the tenancy agreement. “Deposit” was defined as meaning $8,500,000 only. See the First Schedule to the tenancy agreement. The only situation for increasing the Deposit was upon an increase in rent: Clause 5.02. If Mr Lok was correct, the landlord could ask for extra deposit without limit upon every default of the tenant. If so, why was it necessary to include the “deeming provision” in Clause 5.03 in the first place? And it was in mandatory terms – “shall be …”. On the other hand, why would the tenant have to pay the extra deposit? If the tenant had money to pay it, it would have paid off eg the rent or charges in arrears. 19.I reject the first reason of Mr Lok. 20.Secondly, Mr Lok contends that Clause 5.03 expressly provided that that Clause was “without prejudice to any other rights or remedies of the landlord hereunder [ie under the tenancy agreement]”. It would include the Petitioner’s rights to retain the Deposit under Clause 5.04 and/or to forfeit it upon the tenant’s breach under Clause 8.01. 21.With respect, Clause 5.04 was not talking about the right of the Petitioner but its obligation to return the Deposit. Clause 5.04 plainly foresaw the possibility of the Deposit being reduced to below HK$8,500,000 because of arrears of rent or loss and damage, such that the Petitioner was only obliged to return a lesser sum to the tenant. 22.As for Clause 8.01, it was in these terms:
23.Hence, Mr Lok submits that whilst the Petitioner had the option to do so, the Petitioner had no obligation to apply the Deposit to offset any debt or the tenant at any point in time. Read with Clause 5.01 which defined the purpose of the Deposit as being “to secure the due observance and performance by the tenant of the agreements”, and the free right of the Petitioner to use the Deposit; the tenant was not entitled to set off the Deposit against Mr Foo’s indebtedness. Mr Lok cited Re Kwong Ngai Ping, HCB 9447/2003, Reasons for Judgment dated 22 April 2004, at §27, DHCJ Poon (as he then was). 24.With respect, Re Kwong Ngai Ping merely stated the general proposition. That case did not have a clause similar to Clause 5.03 here. 25.Moreover, the Deposit represented 4.25 times the monthly rent of $2,000,000, much more than the usual 1-2 months’ rental deposit in a tenancy. Clause 8.01 was by its nature an unenforceable penalty clause. 26.In any event, the Petitioner had decided not to exercise the option of forfeiture (paragraph 14(b) of Wong Kai On’s 3rd affirmation). Hence, the deeming provision had continued to operate until 29 November 2018. 27.I therefore reject the second argument of Mr Lok. 28.The total debt due under the Default Judgment was:
29.Applying the Deposit on either of those 2 dates, the debt was totally distinguished. Although Mr Foo did not apply to set aside the SD, that did not preclude him from raising the arguments as he did on points of law: Re Leung Cherng Jiunn (paragraph 12 above). The Petition must be dismissed on this ground alone. 30.Alternatively, because of the deeming provision, the rent, repair and maintenance charges due to the Petitioner would have automatically been set-off as soon as they fell into arrears. It was plainly questionable for the Petitioner to obtain judgment on those arrears or charge interest on them. This is at least a bona fide dispute as to validity of the Default Judgment on substantial grounds. 31.The rest of the issues are only dealt with for the sake of completeness. E. Liquidated sum issue 32.The Default Judgment required Mr Foo to pay the Petitioner, amongst others, mesne profits “at the rate of HK$2,000,000 per month from the 1st day of August 2018 to the date when vacant possession of the Premises is delivered up by [the tenant] to [the Petitioner].” 33.Insofar as mesne profits are concerned, a plaintiff could opt for (i) interlocutory judgment for mesne profits to be assessed; or (ii) final judgment on mesne profits at the same rate as the agreed rent of the premises. Both options would state the commencement date for the mesne profits but peg the ending date to the date of recovery of vacant possession. The amount due under option (i) is unliquidated in nature and is a matter (usually) for the Master to adjudicate upon having considered evidence on the market rent etc. Ascertainment of the amount due under option (ii) is only a matter of calculation and so the amount is liquidated in nature: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2020, Vol 1, §13/4/6; Ng Chi Wing v Mok Chung Tim, HCA 3826/1981, 3 May 1982, at §10, Rhind J. 34.In the present case, the Default Judgment was described as Final and Interlocutory Judgment. It was interlocutory in nature as damages and costs were to be assessed. However, it was a final judgment as regards mesne profits, the monthly rate of HK$2,000,000 for which was same rate as the rent under the tenancy agreement. The debt due under the Default Judgment was for a liquidated sum that could be ascertained by simple calculation. It could support the Petition. F. Identical debt issue 35.Mr Lok has confirmed that the SD and the Petition referred to the same underlying debt; although the Petition also claimed post-petition mesne profit up to the date of recovery of possession. G. Mesne profits issue 36.It was open to the Petitioner to seek a bankruptcy order with an underlying debt which included mesne profits from 14 September 2018 (date of the SD) to the date of the Petition, or to 29 November 2018 (date of recovery of possession), as recovery of possession only took place after the Petition was filed. However, because such additional mesne profits were not covered by the SD, the Petitioner has to prove Mr Foo’s inability to pay under section 6(2)(c). Such proof is lacking. 37.Even if the Petition was not entitled to claim the post-SD mesne profits, so long as the debts accrued before 14 September 2018 exceeded the statutory minimum of $10,000 (and they did), the Petition could be presented. H. Conclusion 38.Clause 5.03 mandatorily reduced the Deposit by the amount of arrears of rent or loss and damage of the Petitioner. Such reduction left no outstanding debt to be paid by Mr Foo as at the date of the SD or the Petition. I therefore dismiss the Petition. 39.On a nisi basis, I award costs to Mr Foo to be summarily assessed on the papers without a hearing. Mr Foo shall file and serve his statement of costs by 12 February 2020. The Petitioner shall file and serve its grounds in opposition by 19 February 2020. 40.I thank counsel, including Mr Kelvin KH Liu, for their assistance.
Mr Michael Lok and Ms Euchine Ng, instructed by Wilkinson & Grist, for the Petitioner The Debtor appeared in person |
Cases cited in this judgment