Chan Harry Hung-hay v. Yip Sui Ping
Read the full judgment text of HCA 2149/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 March 2020.
1. This is the hearing for assessment of damages suffered by the Plaintiff in respect of an action for libel.
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 5 cases
|
HCA 2149/2015 [2020] HKCFI 366 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 2149 OF 2015 ________________________
________________________
_________________________________ JUDGMENT _________________________________ INTRODUCTION 1.This is the hearing for assessment of damages suffered by the Plaintiff in respect of an action for libel. 2.By an interlocutory default judgment dated 13 September 2017 (“Interlocutory Judgment”), judgment was entered against the Defendant on liability with damages to be assessed and costs to be taxed. 3.The Defendant was all along unrepresented. She also did not appear at the hearing for assessment of damages. 4.Upon reading the affirmation of service provided by the Plaintiff, I was satisfied that the Defendant was notified of the present proceedings and that it was expedient for the hearing to proceed. In the circumstances, the hearing proceeded in her absence. BACKGROUND 5.The present dispute arose in a building management context. 6.Hong Kong Mansion (“Hong Kong Mansion”) is a building situated at No. 1 Yee Wo Street, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong. It was built in 1965 and has approximately 1,000 residents. 7.In 1982, the owners of Hong Kong Mansion incorporated and established the Incorporated Owners of Hong Kong Mansion (“IO”). 8.Since 2004, the Plaintiff (an estate agent by profession) has been serving as the Chairman of the Management Committee (“MC”) of the IO. He has been re-elected to that position every 2 years since 2004. He is still the Chairman of the MC. 9.The Defendant was employed as the IO’s account book-keeper between 2004 and June 2015. 10.Since around mid-2014, disputes have arisen between the Defendant and the IO. These disputes concern the Defendant’s conduct in the course of her employment. As a result, some correspondence was exchanged between the parties. For present purposes, it suffices to note that this led to the IO’s decision not to renew the Defendant’s employment contract after its expiry on 30 June 2015. The Offending Letter 11.The subject matter of the present proceedings is a letter dated 6 July 2015 (“Letter”). The Letter was issued a few days after the Defendant’s employment at the IO ended on 30 June 2015. 12.On the face of the Letter, it was addressed to the Plaintiff (as the Chairman of the MC of the IO), two other members serving as secretary and treasurer of the MC respectively, and all other members of the MC. 13.The Letter was signed by the Defendant. Right next to her signature is her name and former job title (“會計員 葉瑞萍”) in print form. 14.The Letter contained the following passages (respectively, “1st Offending Words” and “2nd Offending Words”):
15.According to the Plaintiff, in their natural and ordinary meaning, the 1st Offending Words and the 2nd Offending Words (together “Offending Words”) meant and were understood to mean all or any of the following:
16.Furthermore, the publication of the 1st Offending Words as contained in the Letter has:
17.As to the 2nd Offending Words, the Plaintiff claims that it has caused a “derogatory impact” on the Plaintiff’s “reputation and pride” in “managing the problematic Hong Kong Mansion”. 18.Based on the above, the Plaintiff claims that the Letter is defamatory and holds the Defendant liable thereof. Commencement of Proceedings 19.On 24 August 2015, the Plaintiff issued a letter to the Defendant, demanding an open apology from the Defendant. 20.On 30 August 2015, the Defendant issued a letter in reply to the Plaintiff. In essence, the Defendant denied liability and continued to assert the truthfulness of the Letter. 21.Noting the Defendant’s response, the Plaintiff commenced the present action on 15 September 2015. The Plaintiff also filed his Statement of Claim, prepared by himself as a litigant-in-person. 22.The Plaintiff later received legal representation and amended his Statement of Claim. By his Amended Statement of Claim dated 11 January 2017, the Plaintiff seeks the following reliefs:
23.No notice of intention to defend was given by the Defendant. Eventually, the Interlocutory Judgment was entered against the Defendant on 13 September 2017. As noted in paragraph 2 above, the Interlocutory Judgment only determined the Defendant’s liability, with damages to be assessed and costs to be taxed. 24.Meanwhile, the Plaintiff abandoned his claim for an injunction and for the “mandatory order” as described in paragraph 22 above. Assessment of Damages 25.The matter has now come before me for assessment of damages. 26.In terms of evidence:
27.At the hearing, Ms Joyce Lee, Counsel for the Plaintiff, asked for aggregate damages (including both general and aggravated damages) to be assessed in the sum between HK$100,000 and HK$200,000. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 28.In assessing damages, I am guided by the following principles. 29.General damages awarded for libel are compensatory in nature: see Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd v Ming Pao Holdings Ltd (2012) 15 HKCFAR 299 at §35 per Ribeiro PJ. 30.An award of general damages serves a “threefold function”. In Oriental Daily at §35, Ribeiro PJ endorsed the observations of Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) in John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586 at 607 that:
31.In assessing damages, the Court must consider all the relevant circumstances of the case. It is not possible to list exhaustively all the circumstances that may bear on the assessment. Meanwhile, some of the important circumstances are highlighted by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in John v MGN Ltd at 607 (which are in turn endorsed in Oriental Daily at §39):
32.Additionally, I note the observations of To J in Lo Sam Shing v Li Fong(unrep, HCA 1803/2011, 14.3.14) at §140, where the learned Judge endorsed the following remarks of Tugendhat J in Downtex v Flatley [2004] EWHC 333 QB at §26:
33.At the end of the day, however, general damages are “at large” in the sense that they cannot be assessed by reference to any mechanical, arithmetical or objective formula: see Gatley on Libel and Slander (2013, 12th Edn) at §9.5. I must therefore consider the specific facts arising from this case, instead of making rigid assessments on quantum. 34.An award for aggravated damages is distinct from that of general damages. In Oriental Daily at §§112-113, Ribeiro PJ explained that:
35.In the same judgment, Ribeiro PJ went on to observe at §130 that:
36.In addition to the above, Ms Lee has also referred me to the following passage in §9.18 of Gatley:
GENERAL DAMAGES 37.With the above in mind, I now turn to the assessment exercise. The Plaintiff’s Reputation 38.According to the Plaintiff’s evidence:
39.The Plaintiff’s evidence is unchallenged and which I accept as the facts. I therefore accept that the Plaintiff has a reputation that should be afforded with the Court’s protection. The Gravity of the Libel 40.As noted above, the Plaintiff is the MC Chairman of the IO. 41.Ms Lee submits that the Plaintiff was defamed in such capacity. She also stresses that the Plaintiff has built up his reputation for over a decade and was well respected by his community. 42.I accept that the libel in this case touches upon the Plaintiff’s mental condition and fitness to manage the IO. However, I do not consider that this is one of the most serious cases of its kind. The allegations in the Letter, for example, did not question the Plaintiff’s honesty, integrity or trustworthiness. There were also no accusations that the Plaintiff had acted in breach of trust or had taken advantage of his position as the Chairman. 43.I shall bear in mind the above when assessing the quantum of damages. The Extent of the Publication 44.The Plaintiff’s evidence is that the Defendant put copies of the Letter into the mailboxes of the 13 members of the MC (including himself). The Defendant also put copies of the Letter into at least 10 mailboxes of other residents of Hong Kong Mansion, and left one copy in the management office for reading by the management staff. 45.The Plaintiff says that he personally witnessed the aforesaid distribution. 46.As noted in paragraph 12 above, the Letter was addressed to the MC members. I accept the Plaintiff’s evidence that the Defendant put the Letter into the mailboxes of the MC members. 47.Furthermore, since this dispute is ultimately concerned with the management of Hong Kong Mansion, it is logical to infer that the Defendant may also want to draw the attention of other residents to this matter. In the absence of any denial or contrary evidence from the Defendant, I accept the Plaintiff’s account that the Defendant put copies of the Letter into the mailboxes of other residents of Hong Kong Mansion. I also accept the Plaintiff’s account that a copy of the Letter was left in the management office. 48.Overall, I accept that the Letter was published in the manner as alleged by the Plaintiff. 49.Having said that, such publication is limited to the residents and/or management staff of Hong Kong Mansion. There is no evidence that the Defendant published the Letter elsewhere (for example, in the other buildings which the Plaintiff assisted in managing). There is also no evidence of secondary publication of the Letter. This is therefore not a case where a defamatory statement has been published in a public and widespread manner (such as cases involving defamation through newspapers). Effect of the Letter on the Plaintiff’s Reputation 50.As to the effect of the Letter on the Plaintiff’s reputation, he says that:
51.The Plaintiff also testified that even as late as one month before this hearing, a man said to him words to the effect that “no wonder people say [sic] there is a problem with you in this part [sic]…you are old and should not work…[You] are not qualified to be Chairman anymore.” 52.In light of the above, and again, in the absence of any denial or contrary evidence from the Defendant, I accept Ms Lee’s submission that there has been injury to the Plaintiff’s reputation and that he felt humiliated by the Letter. 53.Nevertheless, the impact of the Letter on the Plaintiff should be put into perspective. In this regard, I note that:
Others 54.As regards quantum of damages, Ms Lee has drawn my attention to a number of cases, including Mok Kam Kwai v Lam Mo Fat (unrep, HCA 1868/2010, 6.3.14), Lo Sam Shing, Lee Ching v Lau May Ming [2007] 3 HKLRD 623 and Chan Iu Seng v Ko Choi Hin & Ors (unrep, HCA 2901 & 2935/2004, 28.1.10). 55.It seems to me that the situations concerned in these cases are more serious than the present one.
56.In Au Yee Ming Ivan v Ng Fei Tip (unrep, DCCJ 4595/2008, 25.8.10), the plaintiff was the chairman of an incorporated owners of a building. He was slandered to have taken advantage of his position. The court awarded HK$15,000 in general damages and HK$10,000 in aggravated damages against the defendant. 57.However, it seems that the present case concerns circumstances more serious than those in Au Yee Ming Ivan:
58.Having said that, I have not lost sight of the fact that as I have noted in paragraph 33 above, the damages to be assessed are “at large”. I do not derive much assistance from a detailed comparison between the facts of the present case with those in the previous cases mentioned above. In performing the assessment, I will take into account all the circumstances of the present case. Conclusion on General Damages 59.Bearing in mind all the above matters and taking into account the totality of the circumstances, I assess the Plaintiff’s general damages at HK$80,000. AGGRAVATED DAMAGES 60.Besides general damages, the Plaintiff also seeks aggravated damages against the Defendant. 61.In this regard, the Plaintiff had made inquiries with the Defendant as part of his rightful duties as Chairman of the IO. Even if the Defendant felt that she had not done anything wrong, that in no way justified her mounting a personal attack on the Plaintiff’s mental wellbeing and disparaging him in his office as Chairman of the IO via the Letter which was addressed to all other members of the MC. This is particularly so since the Defendant had worked alongside the Plaintiff for a number of years and should have known that her allegations were false. 62.Further, the Plaintiff had on 24 August 2015 requested the Defendant to make an open apology in relation to the Letter. However, in her reply letter dated 30 August 2015, the Defendant refused to apologise, insisting that everything stated in the Letter was true. Worse still, the Defendant suggested that the Plaintiff should be the one apologising. 63.Bearing in mind all the circumstances, I assess the quantum of aggravated damages at HK$20,000. CONCLUSION ON QUANTUM 64.In conclusion, I assess the Plaintiff’s damages as follows:
65.As I shall further explain in paragraph 72 below, the above assessment represents a “global” award, which is inclusive of any claim for pre-judgment interest. COSTS 66.Insofar as costs are concerned, the Plaintiff’s costs incurred up to 13 September 2017 have already been determined by the Interlocutory Judgment. This Court has no jurisdiction to make another costs order covering the same period. 67.As to the costs after 13 September 2017 (including the costs of and incidental to the assessment of damages), I agree that the Plaintiff should also have his costs. 68.However, as the Plaintiff has only succeeded in obtaining damages in the total amount of HK$100,000, a question arises as to what should be the appropriate scale for the costs incurred after 13 September 2017. 69.Generally speaking, in deciding on the appropriate scale of costs, the Court will consider whether the plaintiff, when he or she issued the writ, had a reasonable prospect of recovering a sum in excess of the District Court’s jurisdiction of HK$1,000,000 (currently HK$3,000,000): see Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd v Ming Pao Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2011] 3 HKLRD 425 at §§28-30 per Tang ACJHC (as he then was). In defamation cases, additional considerations may apply as the plaintiff has a prima facie right to trial by jury in the High Court: see section 33A(1) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4. 70.Upon raising the matter with Ms Lee during the hearing, she fairly accepted that the Plaintiff’s costs after 13 September 2017 should be taxed on the District Court scale. In my view, the concession was properly made, since after the Plaintiff had obtained the Interlocutory Judgment together with costs on 13 September 2017, any realistic option of a jury trial had ceased to exist and the Plaintiff should have applied to transfer the case to the District Court to deal with the remaining issue of damages. 71.In the premises, I make an order that the Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff’s costs incurred after 13 September 2017 (including the costs of and incidental to the assessment of damages), with certificate for Counsel, to be taxed on the District Court scale, if not agreed. INTEREST 72.On interest, I note that the Plaintiff has sought both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest in his Amended Statement of Claim. However, when making the award of damages in the total amount of HK$100,000, I have already considered all relevant circumstances. As such, I am not minded to award any interest over the said HK$100,000 between the date of writ and the date of judgment. 73.I would, however, follow the usual rule for post-judgment interest. I therefore award interest at judgment rate from the date of this judgment until payment. ORDERS 74.Based on the matters aforesaid, I make the following Orders:
75.I thank Ms Lee for her helpful assistance.
Ms Joyce H Y Lee, instructed by Ng & Co, for the Plaintiff The Defendant was not represented and did not appear |
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case