Re Mohammad Javed
Read the full judgment text of CACV 579/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 4 June 2020.
1. This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr MOHAMMAD Javed, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 11 December 2019 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 5 June 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-re
Cited by 1 case · Cites 7 cases
|
CACV579/2019 [2020] HKCA 430 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 579 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1231 OF 2018) -----------------------------------
-----------------------------------
___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr MOHAMMAD Javed, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 11 December 2019 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 5 June 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 28 August 2015 and a notice of further decision dated 16 November 2016 (“1st Director’s Decision” and “2nd Director’s Decision” respectively and “Director’s Decisions” collectively). Bases and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of Pakistan now aged about 42, is a fear of being harmed or even killed by the family of his paternal uncle Shahbir Abbas (“Abbas”) due to a feud arising from the applicant’s marriage to Rafaqat Bibi (“Rafaqat”), daughter of Mohammad Ilyas (“Ilyas”), another paternal uncle of the applicant. 3.The events giving rise to such fear have been set out in detail in [17] to [50] of the 1st Director’s Decision and [3] to [30] of the Board’s Decision and in gist in [1] to [9] of the Form CALL-1 dated 23 December 2019, [2019] HKCFI 2568 (“Form CALL-1”). Briefly:
Entry into Hong Kong and lodgment of NRF Claim 4.The applicant entered Hong Kong from China illegally on 14 August 2007. He was arrested on 9 January 2008. On 14 January 2008, he was convicted of remaining in Hong Kong without the authority of the Director after having unlawfully landed in Hong Kong and was sentenced to imprisonment for 10 months. 5.On 26 February 2008, the applicant lodged a torture claim under article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, which claim was taken to be, and processed as, a non-refoulement claim upon the commencement of the unified screening mechanism on 3 March 2014. In June 2014, the applicant accepted legal assistance and representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”). The applicant’s completed non-refoulement claim form (“NCF”) was submitted to the Director through the DLS by letter dated 18 August 2014. 6.In processing the NRF Claim, in place of a screening interview (which the Director had twice attempted to fix with the applicant without success), on 27 March 2015, through the DLS the applicant provided the Director with written answers (“Answers”) to a list of questions relating to the NRF Claim served by the Director on the applicant by letter dated 16 March 2015 to the DLS. The Director processed the NRF Claim based on the NCF, the Answers and the written legal submissions by the DLS on behalf of the applicant[1]. Director’s Decisions 7.The 1st Director’s Decision found the NCF Claim unsubstantiated under torture risk[2], persecution risk[3] and “BOR 3” risk[4]. 8.Following the 1st Director’s Decision, by a letter dated 30 September 2016, the applicant was invited to submit additional relevant facts on or before 14 October 2016 so that the Director could take them into account in considering the NRF Claim on any other applicable ground. According to paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of the 2nd Director’s Decision, the applicant responded to such invitation by written submission dated 28 October 2016 through the DLS, which basically reiterated information previously provided to the Director. The only new information was that the police arrested Abbas’ sons Azhas and Fazal for the murder of the applicant’s aunt in 2013; that no trial had taken place; that the release of Azhas and Fazal was secured after some 6 months through bribery; that another Abbas’ son Nazar involved in the murder flew to Dubai for a year and returned to Pakistan without ever having been arrested. 9.By the 2nd Director’s Decision, the Director also rejected the NRF Claim for failing to establish a “BOR 2” risk[5]. Appeal to Board and Board’s Decisions 10.The applicant appealed against the 1st Director’s Decision to the Board on 11 September 2016. 11.After a rehearing over 6 days, at which the applicant was represented by the DLS and testified before, and answered questions by, the Board through a Pakistani interpreter, on 5 June 2018, the Board dismissed the appeal on all applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection[6]. In so doing, the Board found the applicant’s information and evidence to be “totally unreliable” as the information in the NCF and his evidence were “inconsistent with each other” “in material aspects”. Furthermore, the Board observed that from 2001 to 2006 when the applicant lived in Mana Kot Village, he was undisturbed by his cousins. Thus, the Board considered it highly unlikely that the feared ill-treatment would materialise if the applicant relocated to places other than his home village.The Board also noted that the feud between the applicant’s family and the Abbas family is a private dispute without any involvement of the Pakistani government. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 12.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review issued under HCAL 1231/2018 on 29 June 2018 (“Form 86”), supported by an affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision[7] on grounds summarised by the Judge in [15] of the Form CALL-1 as follows:
13.After hearing the application in open court on 30 August 2019, at which the applicant was present and was assisted by a Pakistani interpreter, the Judge refused leave. His reasons can be found in [16] to [20] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal and grounds of appeal 14.By the notice of appeal filed herein on 16 December 2019, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review on the following ground (sic):
15.In his skeleton submission dated 7 May 2020, the applicant asserted as follows (sic):
16.The applicant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal on 27 May 2020. He was provided with the assistance of a Pakistani interpreter. He had nothing to add to his notice of appeal or skeleton submission. Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement claim 17.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 18.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal will generally not admit fresh evidence unless the 3 requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall[8]are met. Nor will it normally entertain any new arguments that are fact sensitive that should have been raised in the court below. In short, the Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2)]. Discussion 19.As explained in the preceding paragraph, in hearing an appeal against a refusal of leave for judicial review of the Board’s decision, what the Court of Appeal examines is whether, in denying leave for judicial review, the first instance judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. 20.Neither the bare expression of dissatisfaction with the Judge’s decision (without identifying how it was wrong) nor the hope for obtaining a better outcome or more time in Hong Kong from the Court of Appeal, as expressed in the notice of appeal and skeleton submission, is or could be a ground of appeal, properly so called. 21.Further, as summarised in [11] above, the NRF Claim failed on the facts and evidence before the Board. In particular, the Board assessed the risk of harm facing the applicant upon his return to Pakistan to be low, especially if he stays away from his home village. Such findings of fact contradict the applicant’s repeated allegation in his skeleton submission that his life will be endangered if he goes back to Pakistan. The question whether the applicant would be at risk if refouled is a question of fact within the province of the Board (after the Director): see [17] above. The Board heard the applicant. It provided detailed reasons in [31] to [88] of its decision, explaining why it found the information provided and evidence given by the applicant on the events upon which the NRF Claim was premised to be “totally unreliable”. It can be seen from [12] above that the applicant has not, by the proposed grounds for judicial review raised before the Judge, articulated any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Board in coming to such adverse findings against him. 22.The applicant has simply failed to state in his notice of appeal or skeleton submission in what ways (if any) the Judge had erred in law, failed to consider any relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. Disposition 23.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] By letter dated 26 September 2014, the DLS informed the Director on behalf of the applicant that the NRF Claim should be assessed without reliance on previous screening records and/or questionnaire. [2] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [3] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [5] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [6] Notwithstanding that the applicant had not lodged any appeal against the 2nd Director’s Decision. [7] The Form 86 also sought to have the 1st Director’s Decision judicially reviewed. However, applying Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549, the Director’s Decisions, having been superseded by the Board’s Decision which represented the final decision on the NRF Claim at the end of its processing, were not susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the Board had been pursued by the applicant. [8] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 579/2019