S, S R (Formerly Known As D, P a) v. S, R P
Read the full judgment text of FCMC 6925/2019 on BabelCite. This Family Court judgment was delivered on 13 December 2019.
1. By Summons dated 23 rd August 2019 the Petitioner/Wife (W) applies for maintenance pending suit for herself, and interim maintenance for the two children of the marriage, S, a daughter born in September 2006 who is now 13 years of age and D, a son born in June 2008 who is 11.
Cites 1 case
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[2019]HKFC321 FCMC 6925/2019 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NUMBER 6925 OF 2019 ----------------------------
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------------------------------------------------------------ J U D G M E N T ------------------------------------------------------------ The Application 1.By Summons dated 23rd August 2019 the Petitioner/Wife (W) applies for maintenance pending suit for herself, and interim maintenance for the two children of the marriage, S, a daughter born in September 2006 who is now 13 years of age and D, a son born in June 2008 who is 11. 2.The Respondent/Husband (H) opposes the application but only as to quantum. He accepts he has a responsibility to continue his financial support of the Petitioner and the children, but says that his capacity to do so is greatly diminished, due to the failure of his business and his lack of income. 3.H’s business, run through a company which I will refer to as “A Limited”, had its principal business in the jewellery trade. It was set up, with his father, before the marriage. It is not disputed that many of the family’s expenses during the marriage were run through A Limited, including accommodation and day-to-day living expenses. The former matrimonial home in Stubbs Road, was leased by the company. 4.It is H’s case that A Limited has failed, due to factors beyond his control. Although he did not include evidence of this with his Form E and his affidavit, at the hearing of the Summons H handed up a letter from his solicitors (CCBH) to those acting for W (SWC) dated 16th October 2019 which attached two sets of Audited Financial Statements for A Limited for the calendar years 2016 and 2017. A comparison of the two years shows a drop in revenue and income of, respectively HK$7.56M net HK3.6M (2016) to HK$1.387M net HK$691,852 (2017). 5.H explained in his affirmation that the drop in income was largely due to a serious hand injury he suffered in mid-2016, and that this ultimately led to the closure of the business. He says that W is well aware of his injury and the reasons why the business failed. 6.W argues otherwise, and says that H has the capacity to meet reasonable payments to support her expenses and those of the children. Her Summons sought orders for interim periodical payments of
7.The Summons also sought an order that H be restrained from disposing of a number of items of art which were situated in the matrimonial home or are currently in storage. At the initial return date of the Summons, both parties gave an undertaking to each other and to the Court that neither would dispose of “or otherwise deal with” any of the items listed in the attachment to the order, numbering 100 in total. For the purposes of the application, at least, it was therefore common ground that the items listed, whatever their value, could not be looked to by either party, whether by sale or other dealing, in satisfaction of their interim financial needs. 8.H acknowledged in both his Form E and affirmation in response to the Summons that during the marriage he had been the main breadwinner and the principal financial support for W and the children. He says he is no longer able to maintain them to the same standard. His offer is to pay either:
9.H placed a value on the AMC debenture of $2,000,000. He said his father had already agreed to the sale, and also agreed to allow H to retain the entire sale proceeds for his ongoing expenses including his support of W and the children. He proposes that the proceeds be divided up with $500,000 paid to W, $250,000 be retained by himself, and the balance be paid into Court.[3] 10.W did not seek leave to amend her Summons to prevent disposal of the AMC debenture, but she is adamant that it should not be sold as it had been purchased “with family assets for the children”: paragraph 23, W’s 2nd Affirmation. She said that the ongoing use of the facilities of the club provided much needed continuity for the children at this difficult time. The Background 11.The parties were married in Hong Kong on 19th July 2003. Both children attend EFS South Island School where S is in year 10 and D in year 8. 12.The proceedings were commenced with W filing a Petition on 13th June 2019 alleging unreasonable behaviour on the part of H. On 3rd July 2019 H filed his Form 4 giving notice of his intention to defend the suit. At the present time the suit has not been compromised. Income 13.W is 42. She says in her Form E that she was employed by A Limited as a director, but it appears that she did not perform any duties for the company and that this “employment” was for the purpose of supplying her with an income for household expenses. She says she received a “salary” i.e. an allowance of $15,000 per month after the marriage in 2003 increased to $20,000 per month when the first child was born. She previously worked but in anticipation of having children ceased all work in August 2005. In her Form E dated 21 August 2019 she confirmed her income up to separation as $20,000 per month i.e. the allowance paid to her through A Limited, but said this was paid “on an irregular basis”. She said that this support ceased in mid-June 2019, apart from a one-off payment of $5,000 in August 2019. A statement of her HSBC Advance Account for July 2019 shows several deposits including an ATM Transfer of $16,000 but the source of these deposits was not explained. 14.In September 2018 W established an Instagram account in the name of “A”[4], which W described as a platform to showcase items of jewellery. Although primarily for her use, W said that the account was also used by H to market his merchandise. W describes this as a “fledgling business” which will take some time to be established before it bears fruit. She says she has been unable to devote much time to it since the parties separated, the repossession of the FMH and the consequences of that, and the illness of her mother. 15.H asserted that W’s business is profitable and provides her with an income of around HK$15,000 per month. He says that W has failed to make full and frank disclosure of the business and, consequently, has hidden her true income from it.[5] 16.H is 49 and describes his occupation as “merchant”. As already noted, prior to the marriage he had already begun his own jewellery business, and with his father set up A Limited as the trading vehicle. In about 2000 his father retired from the business and H took over its day to day operation. The father retains 50% shareholding in the company. The extent to which the father, despite not being actively involved in the company, remained entitled to and received income from the business is unclear, but for present purposes that is not relevant. 17.H described in his Form E, at paragraph 5.5 – which was largely replicated in his MPS/IM affirmation – how the business was successful, and that it provided the family with a comfortable lifestyle, including the lease of a large flat in Stubbs Road, Hong Kong, the employment of two domestic helpers and a driver, membership in the Aberdeen Marina Club and the meeting of all general expenses including school fees and the monthly expenditure on multiple credit cards. 18.In June 2016, H was at a social occasion when he fell on a wet surface and in breaking his fall, suffered a severe laceration to his right hand, his dominant hand. Nerves and tendons were severed. He underwent surgery and a lengthy period of treatment and convalescence. He says that as a result of this injury his business suffered due to his inability to maintain contact with clients, the pain and inconvenience caused by it, and that he was unable to maintain close supervision with mainland Chinese suppliers. He says he suffered significant depression due and that this added to the deleterious effect of his injury on the business in servicing existing clients and attracting new ones. Eventually, H closed the business, in 2018. 19.One aspect of H’s account is that he says he considered and took advice from lawyers on whether he could pursue an action for the loss arising out of the fall. He says he was advised that W’s evidence of what happened was of crucial importance to the prospects of success of such a claim. He says that W refused to assist as a witness and that as a consequence, he decided not to proceed with the claim, which is now statute-barred. For the purposes of W’s Summons, this is a factual issue which cannot be determined and may have to be considered by the Court when it addresses the broader claims for ancillary relief in due course. 20.In April 2018 H established a new business named “OS” for the purpose of selling his antique art and jewellery collection “in order to raise some money for the family’s expenses”. He says this has not been successful and no buyers have been found. The current economic uncertainties have added to the difficulties in selling in what is a niche market. 21.As part of this new endeavour, in August 2018 H took out a HK$5,000,000 facility from the Bank of India (“the Bank of India facility”), secured by a mortgage against his father’s apartment. H says that most of the deposits into his personal account came from the Bank of India facility. He says that he has completely used up the facility and cannot draw any further funds from it. 22.H is exploring other business opportunities in the Philippines, although the nature and extent of his activities, and the monetary investment in them, were not disclosed by him. To her reply affirmation, W exhibited some pages from a website for “Vaya Wellness”, a therapy centre located in Davao City, Philippines, and a screen shot from a YouTube clip featuring H as the founder. Testimonials from the web pages are dated April 2019, suggesting the business has been operating for some time, and indeed prior to the Forms E and affirmations. Assets and liabilities 23.There are no real estate properties in the name of either party. The former matrimonial home in Stubbs Road was rented at $86,000 per month. Beginning in late 2018 the rental went unpaid for several months, leading to demands being made by the landlord, and eventually the flat was repossessed at the end of August 2019. Since then, H has been living with his father and W and the children with her mother. 24.The balances as disclosed by the Form E in each parties’ bank accounts are either insignificant (W) or show substantial indebtedness (H). 25.The major assets appear to be the jewellery/art collection, which the parties have agreed to preserve at least for the moment, and the AMC membership. Both parties make claims that the other party has valuable items either not disclosed or that the represented values are inaccurate. 26.Both parties, in their respective Forms E, list a number of substantial debts. As at August 2019 W’s credit card balances are, in total, HK$338,000 in addition to loans from family members. 27.Aside from the Bank of India facility, H lists 8 credit cards/charge cards for personal and business use with a total balance of HK$411,196. Some of these cards have been cancelled or their credit limits reduced as a result of late or non-payment. 28.H also detailed other loans as follows:
29.W does not accept H’s assertions of his financial position. In her 2nd Affirmation she expressed a concern that “H has over the last few years been planning for this divorce and moving away assets” and that he “has two safe deposit boxes at Bank of East Asia full of jewellery and some items in his father’s home, none of which have been disclosed.”[9] 30.W focused much of her criticism in her documents and submissions made at the hearing on the lack of information provided by H concerning the use of the HK$5M facility obtained by him from the Bank of India. I will return to this in dealing with the question of H’s disclosure in the context of his capacity to meet reasonable payments of MPS and interim maintenance. The Law 31.The Court’s power to make orders for maintenance pending suit and interim maintenance are set out in Sections 3 and 5 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap 192) (“MPPO”). 32.Section 3 of the MPPO provides that the Court upon a petition for divorce may order “either party to the marriage to make to the other such periodical payments for his or her maintenance and for such term, being a term beginning not earlier than the date of the presentation of the petition … as the court thinks reasonable.” 33.Section 5(2)(a) of the MPPO states that the Court may make an order that “a party to the marriage shall make to such person as may be specified in the order for the benefit of a child of the family, or to such a child, such periodical payments and for such term as may be so specified.” Such orders may be made in divorce proceedings “before or on granting the decree of divorce, of nullity of marriage or of judicial separation, as the case may be, or at any time thereafter”: s 5(1). 34.The approach to be taken in applications for maintenance pending suit and interim maintenance approach was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 to be this:
The MPS/IM Budget 35.In her affirmation (her 2nd) in reply, W revised her claim for MPS and interim maintenance substantially from the initial figure of HK$160,000 to a little over half of this sum (at §23, 2nd Affirmation):
36.At §24 of her 2nd Affirmation, W explained the basis for her revision downwards of the amount she was seeking:
37.Concerning her own expenses, W said:
38.In her 2nd affirmation W added that although for the time being she and the children were able to stay with her mother, this was “not ideal as we are living out of cardboard boxes and the children share a bedroom” and there is “simply nowhere to move around” and that her mother’s illness had not improved with the stress and strain of the disruption: §26(1). Further, that later this year she may have to move out temporarily so that her sister, her sister’s new baby and her nephew can stay with her mother, and that this would incur a cost of renting a serviced apartment or AirBnB at around HK$30,000 to HK$45,000/m: §26(2). 39.As for the substantial insurance premia, W affirmed that coverage had been maintained by the same insurance company for many years. During the hearing the Court was advised that coverage for W and the younger child, D, cost $7,200 per month and for the older child, $9,000. She continued:
40.W provided evidence of the payment of the premiums on the insurance policies. 41.I turn to the expenses specifically relating to the children. Their school fees are not in dispute, and both parties agree that the children should continue studying at South Island School. At one point in or around January 2019, due to non-payment of the fees, the school sent notifications to the parents that the children had been suspended and would not be able to attend any classes until the fees were paid. This was only remedied when W contacted H’s father and borrowed money from him for the fees. 42.The quantum of two other child-related expenses was disputed by H. 43.The first of these was the extra tuition for which W said amounted to, on average, $11,760 per month. She gave details of this expense in her 2nd Affirmation:
44.The second child-expense in dispute is the cost of extra-curricular activities, for which W claims $6,000 per month per child, and which includes football/soccer training and camps for the son, and art music and drama for the daughter which W described as particularly important as the daughter is coming into her IB years at school. The children both attend Cotillion and the daughter attends Girl Scouts. As noted, the children use AMC and I was informed at the hearing that there are costs associated with tennis and swimming lessons held there. 45.The Court was informed of the current activities, including tuition:
46.On a broad calculation, this comes to approximately $22,000 per month, on the assumption that the children are engaged in these activities year-round. This cannot be right, although I bear in mind that W’s claim for holidays and entertainment is minimal. In my view there is a small degree of exaggeration in W’s claim for both the extra tuition and the extra-curricular activities, although I consider that she has genuinely tried her best to give an accurate estimate of the current expenditure. 47.H’s comment was that although he accepted all of these activities were valuable in their way, their total cost was no longer sustainable:
48.W described how the children both needed to have certain medical treatment. The daughter is receiving some cosmetic treatment relating to hirsuitism and the son requires braces for his teeth. W points out that the daughter’s treatment is already included in H’s credit card statements and I have confirmed this. An examination of H’s visa platinum account for August 2019 shows that the daughter’s treatment has almost been paid off and by now it may well have been.[12] Although the son’s orthodontic treatment has not yet commenced, he has been told by his dentist that he needs braces and this should be started now. I accept that it is in his interests to have the orthodontic treatment earlier rather than later, and in my view this should be given some priority. The cost of the orthodontic treatment is $60,000, by way of downpayment of $25,000 and 6 instalments of $5,000 each. 49.Finally, W claimed $500 per month for contact lenses for the daughter. 50.Overall, I consider that the claimed monthly expenses are reasonable. I have examined W’s credit cards and in my view the allowance for food is not excessive. Nor is it unreasonable for W to continue to retain a domestic helper. W’s claim for her own expenses is also modest, having regard to the matrimonial standard of living. 51.For the children, their continued attendance at South Island School means the following monthly costs must be met:
52.I will, additionally, allow transport expenses including transport to school at $3,500 per month, and medical/dental at $1,000 per month. This is strictly on the basis that H is to maintain appropriate insurance including medical and dental coverage for W and the children. On an interim basis, I am not prepared to rule on whether one policy or another is appropriate. It is enough to conclude that the coverage must take into account the particular needs of all members of the family. I assume that both parents will want nothing less than this for themselves and the children. 53.As for the children’s out of school tuition, there is, as I have said, a modest degree of exaggeration in W’s claim, and I also accept H’s comment that some choices need to be made. It seems to me that a reasonable amount for the out of school tuition is $8,000 per month, or $4,000 per month per child. This will enable both children to continue with their Chinese language, mathematics and music classes, all of which I accept are important for the children’s development and ongoing routine. As for extra-curricular activities, in my view the present level, while not unreasonable in itself, can be reduced without interfering unduly with their activities as they have been. I will allow an amount for extra-curricular activities at $6,000 per month or $3,000 per child per month. 54.Therefore, as to Children’s expenses, I consider that the following items are reasonable and should be allowed for the purposes of the Summons:
55.W’s claim is assessed as follows:
56.I have considered W’s claim for a one-off additional amount for the temporary accommodation during the time when her sister and nephew come to visit. I do not allow this. As H submitted, during at least some of this time the children could potentially spend time at his father’s apartment. I accept of course that the present conditions are not ideal, nor do they reflect the level of accommodation the children (and the parties) have been used to. Further, and although the Court must be conscious of the matrimonial standard of living, the aim is not merely to replicate that standard. 57.Two other items were sought by W in her 2nd affirmation. The first that H should be ordered to or undertake to pay her and the children’s mobile bills each month. I do not allow this as an additional payment. The amounts for these will have to come from the sum I have allowed. 58.The second was that H undertake to be responsible for the current debt owing on the HSBC Business Mastercard. This is referred to in W’s Form E as having a balance of “about HK$500,000” and being in the name of A Limited. W’s concern is whether she is personally liable for this debt. For the purposes of this judgment, I have proceeded on the basis that she is not personally liable and that this debt is a corporate debt due by A Limited. 59.I have considered H’s claim that W’s Instagram business is producing an income which she is not disclosing and this can contribute to her own and the children’s upkeep. He produced copies of a Facebook page and Instagram Account for “A”. Considering the matter on a broad brush basis, and taking into account that this social media-driven business has been operating for some time, and taking into account the difficulties she has encountered with relocating the children from one home to another and coping with her mother’s illness, I nonetheless am prepared to find that W is able to generate some income from this business and that this can support to a degree her own upkeep and the expenses of the children. However, I would assess this at no greater than $10,000 per month at present. I have taken this into account in arriving at the order on the Summons. Capacity 60.The question is then, whether H has the capacity to pay an amount over what he is offering, and to do so without disposing of the AMC debenture or incurring additional debts. 61.H’s claimed his own expenses to be:
62.Of this total sum, I note that approximately three-quarters of it relate primarily to the expenses of W and the children, assuming for the moment the AMC monthly subscription is an expense incurred for W and the children. Further, deducting the amount H said he spends on trips to the Philippines for his new business (which I assume are made each month), his own estimate of monthly spending is $9,075, a modest sum given the standard of living prior to separation. I do not consider that H has exaggerated his cost of living. 63.I have referred above to the confirmation by the Court of Appeal in HJFG v KCY of the applicable principles, including the requirement that where the Court finds the disclosure by the paying party to be “obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay.” 64.H has not always been represented in these proceedings, but he cannot have been in any doubt about his obligation to provide full and frank disclosure of his financial position, with in his Form E, or failing that, with his affirmation. This is a continuing duty owed to the other party to matrimonial proceedings and to the Court.[13] 65.H claims to be massively in debt, yet there is no evidence of any of the personal loans except for the amount from Conscious Capital and the Bank of India facility. W accepts one of the personal loans as this was from her mother. Nor did H provide an explanation as to when the loans were made, and the terms of repayment, if any. If anything, the existence of the loans suggests that H can, if he wishes, call on family members for financial assistance in the future. 66.As for the Bank of India facility, H says that he obtained the facility to “pay for my living expenses”: paragraph 2.6, Form E. He attached to his Form E a single statement from the Bank of India for the month of August 2019 showing a credit balance at the end of that month of HK$10,633.39. In his affirmation, he said this:
67.He continued:
68.H exhibited to his affirmation four cheque deposit slips, as follows:
69.The slips are the standard form deposits slips provided by an HSBC ATM and record details including the name of the account holder, and a photographic copy of the cheque deposited. The cheques so deposited are clearly from Bank of India and I am prepared to accept that the amounts came from the $5M facility. 70.What is not clear from the papers is how the bulk of the $5M has been used. As I have noted, only one Bank of India statement was provided for August 2019 showing a credit balance of HK$10,633. I assume that this is the “bank statement of OS” to which he referred in paragraph 34 of his affirmation. If so, it is hardly sufficient to explain, simply put, where the money has gone. On H’s case, in the space of 12 months (the mortgage is dated 15th August 2018) the entire facility was drawn down and all but the small sum remaining as at August 2019 had been used for “ongoing expenses”. On average, that equates to spending more than HK$400,000 per month from this one source. 71.I have examined H’s bank statements for his HSBC Premier Account which run from September 2018 to June 2019. They show substantial cheque deposits each month, the largest of which is for HK$400,000 on 23rd May 2019. However, and again assuming that the source of these deposits is the Bank of India facility, these deposits only account for a minority of the $5M. 72.I am prepared to accept that at least part of the Bank of India facility was used for the expenses of the family, and perhaps to service some of H’s debts. On the evidence to hand, it seems to me that some of it has been invested by H’s in his new business ventures in the Philippines. The difficulty is that none of this has been documented. 73.I am conscious that the hearing of W’s Summons was conducted prior to the exchange of Questionnaires. Leave to adduce Questionnaires was given at the hearing. 74.In her submissions for H, Ms. Kwan acknowledged that very little in the way of documents had been provided to demonstrate how the loan facility was used, but she contended that it was not disputed that H had been responsible for most of the family’s expenses including the rental of $86,000 per month. I accept that this is the case, but that does not detract from the fact that in facing an application for maintenance pending suit/interim maintenance, H must have been aware of his obligation to explain to the Court, with frankness, his present financial position. 75.I have not ignored the signs in the papers which might indicate financial difficulty. Several of the credit card statements record payments by cheques being dishonoured and returned. On 29th July 2019 American Express reduced H’s credit limit on his card to HK$8,000. On 27th August 2019 HSBC wrote to H to advise that his credit cards had been cancelled. 76.Nonetheless, the documents supplied by H do not begin to demonstrate how the Bank of India facility has been used. It is clear that it has been fully drawn down (see H’s Form E, at paragraph 2.3). 77.As already noted, much of the family’s expenses – including the rent of the former matrimonial home – were run through the company, A Limited. No bank accounts statements for A Limited, or the new business of OS were supplied with his Form E or affirmation. To be clear, there is no account in the name of H “trading as OS”, or at least none has been provided to the Court. Nor do the Financial Statements of A Limited provided later by H’s solicitors in correspondence help to explain the use of the Bank of India facility. 78.In light of this, I conclude that H’s disclosure in his Form E and affirmation is “obviously deficient” and that H has a present financial capacity to meet reasonable payments to W for herself and the children as I have assessed them, and that he is in a position to do so without having to dispose of the AMC debenture or the jewellery/antique art collection. Conclusion 79.I therefore make the following Order on the Summons:
80.W’s Summons asked that the order for payment be made from 1st September 2019. Exercising my discretion, I order that the payments under paragraphs 80(2) and (3) above be made from 1st November 2019 and be paid on the 1st day of each calendar month thereafter by direct payment into W’s HSBC Advance account #593-657695-833. Again, this is on the basis that H make the direct payments for the items listed in paragraph 80(1) above, including any accrued arrears. 81.As to costs, although W has not been entirely successful, and her initial claim was substantially reduced by the time of the hearing, the order I have made is substantially in excess of H’s offers to pay, and is not conditional upon disposal of the AMC debenture. Exercising my discretion I order that the Respondent do pay 75% of the Petitioner’s costs of the Summons dated 23rd May 2019, on a party and party basis and to be taxed if not agreed.
Ms. J Chin of Messrs. Stevenson Wong & Co for the Petitioner Ms. Thelma Kwan instructed by Messrs. Chaine Chow and Barbara Hung for the Respondent [1] R’s Affirmation, paragraph 47 [2] The debenture is held by J Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of A Limited, in which H and his father are equal shareholders. [3] R’s Affirmation, paragraph 57 [4] The same name as the company, A Limited [5] R’s affirmation, paragraphs 51-52. [6] The initials of the alleged lenders have been used to protect their privacy. [7] W’s mother. [8] Two of these loans, from BC and PS (the latter being H’s father) are secured against three of the art items which are the subject to the parties’ undertakings as to non-disposal. [9] Paragraphs 5 and 9 thereof. [10] I have taken this to be a typographical error, as this and subsequent references to “para 25” of W’s 2nd Affirmation are clearly intended to refer to paragraph 26 thereof. [11] Again, this is a typographical error as the affirmation (and submissions) asserts that R should bear responsibility for the ongoing monthly fees of the AMC. [12] Hearing Bundle, p265, statement dated 28 August 2019 [13] L v L [2006] HKFLR 121, at [198] per Lam J (as he then was). | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment