Re Mir Mohammad Dulal Miah
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1280/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 24 June 2020.
1. On 9 December 2019 I refused to extend time to the Applicant’s late application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) in dismissing his appeal regarding his non-refoulement claim upon finding no merits in his intended application, that none of the grounds put forward by him reasonably arguable for his intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director of Immigration or
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HCAL 1280/2018 [2020] HKCFI 1158 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1280 OF 2018 ______________________________
_____________________________ Before: Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers Date of Hearing: 26 May 2020 Date of Decision: 24 June 2020 ________________________ D E C I S I O N ________________________ 1.On 9 December 2019 I refused to extend time to the Applicant’s late application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) in dismissing his appeal regarding his non-refoulement claim upon finding no merits in his intended application, that none of the grounds put forward by him reasonably arguable for his intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director of Immigration or the Board or in their decisions, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application. 2.The Applicant now by a summons issued on 16 December 2019 seeks leave to appeal against that decision which was interlocutory in nature: see Kwok Cheuk Kin v Leung Chun Ying [2018] HKCA 419, and that section 14AA of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 provides that no appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court of First Instance in any civil cause or matter unless leave to appeal has been granted. 3.In considering whether to grant leave to appeal, section 14AA(4) of the Ordinance provides that leave shall not be granted unless the court hearing the application for leave is satisfied that –
4.The threshold test for reasonable prospect of success was given by Hon Le Pichon JA in SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 at [17]:
5.In the present case, the Applicant did not in his summons or affirmation or at the hearing of his summons before me put forward any draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision, or why it may be argued that the decision was unfair or unreasonable, other than merely repeating his claim that his life would still be in danger in his home country. As such and in the absence of any error in the decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not see any prospect of success in his intended appeal, nor do I find any other reason in the interest of justice why the appeal should be heard. 6.In the premises and for the reasons given, I refuse to grant leave to the Applicant to appeal, and accordingly dismiss his summons.
The applicant appeared in person |
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