Re Li Man Hoo
Read the full judgment text of HCB 802/2018 on BabelCite. This HCB judgment was delivered on 29 June 2020.
1. By a bankruptcy petition presented on 8 February 2018, FTLife Insurance Company Limited (formerly known as Ageas Insurance Company (Asia) Limited and Fortis Insurance Company (Asia) Limited (“ Petitioner ”) seeks a bankruptcy order against Mr Li Man Hoo (“ Debtor ”).
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HCB 802/2018 [2020] HKCFI 1354 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 802 OF 2018 _______________
_______________ Before: Hon Linda Chan J in Court Date of Hearing: 12 June 2020 Date of Judgment: 29 June 2020 ________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ 1.By a bankruptcy petition presented on 8 February 2018, FTLife Insurance Company Limited (formerly known as Ageas Insurance Company (Asia) Limited and Fortis Insurance Company (Asia) Limited (“Petitioner”) seeks a bankruptcy order against Mr Li Man Hoo (“Debtor”). 2.The substantive hearing of the Petition was scheduled to be heard on 9 January 2019 but was adjourned by consent to 26 March 2020. The adjourned hearing was further adjourned to this hearing due to the General Adjourned Period announced by the Judiciary. A. BACKGROUND 3.The Petitioner engages in insurance business in Hong Kong. On 23 June 2010, the Petitioner and the Debtor entered into, inter alia, the following agreements:
4.Further, on 23 June 2010, the Debtor signed an Authorisation Letter for Agents’ Deferred Incentive Scheme (“Scheme”), which was copied to the Petitioner. 5.The Loan Agreement provides, inter alia, as follows:
6.It is common ground that by April 2014, the Loan was reduced to HK$769,883.09, while the total MFA advanced to the Debtor from July 2010 to June 2012 was HK$505,802. 7.Under the Side Agreement, which became effective on 1 July 2010, the parties agreed, inter alia, that the Petitioner shall pay Target PB to the debtor if the Weighted Total Annualised First Year Commission (“AFYC”) produced by the Debtor during the Validation Period (from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2013) reaches or exceeds the Validation Target (“Target”), where:
8.By letter dated 6 July 2017, the Petitioner gave notice to the Debtor to terminate all agreements with effect from 5 August 2017. This was followed by a letter dated 3 August 2017 whereby the Petitioner demanded the Debtor to repay HK$1,293,274.81, which comprised of (1) HK$769,883.09, being the outstanding amount of Loan; (2) HK$505,802, being the MFA; and (3) interest at Prime + 3% p.a. or 7% p.a. whichever is higher from 6 August 2017 until full repayment (“1st Demand”). 9.A few days later, on 8 August 2017, the Petitioner revised the 1st Demand by deducting the renewal commission payable to the Debtor (HK$10,910.15), and required the Debtor to repay HK$1,282,364.66 plus interest at Prime + 3% p.a. or 7% p.a. whichever is higher from 6 August 2017 until full repayment (“2nd Demand”). 10.No payment was made by the Debtor. The Petitioner through its solicitors issued a statutory demand dated 1 December 2017 (“SD”), which was served on the Debtor on 18 December 2017. In the SD, the Petitioner referred to the Contract, Loan Agreement, Side Agreement and the Authorisation Letter, the termination of these agreements and the 1st and 2nd Demands issued to the Debtor, and stated that the Debtor was indebted to the Petitioner in the sum of HK$1,653,815.14 (“Debt”), which comprised of:
11.In response, in his letter dated 6 January 2018 to the Petitioner’s solicitors, the Debtor denied “the claims made in the [SD]” and said that any attempts to advance those claims would be “vigorously contested”. 12.Following the Debtor’s failure to comply with the SD, on 8 February 2018, the petition was presented. In the petition, the Petitioner essentially repeated the contents of the SD and stated that the Debt is “for a liquidated sum payable immediately and the Debtor appears to be unable to pay it”. 13.On 6 April 2018 the Debtor, whilst acting in person, filed a notice of intention to oppose petition stating that he intends to show cause against the petition and to dispute the Debt on, inter alia, the grounds that (1) “the figure of the Debts (sic) is not correct”; and (2) PB is not repayable to the Petitioner after the 84th contract month (“1st Notice”). 14.On 7 May 2018, the Debtor’s solicitors filed another notice of intention to oppose petition (“2nd Notice”), stating that the Debtor intends to show cause against the petition and dispute the Debt on the grounds that:
B. DISCUSSION B1. Applicable principles 15.The relevant principles have been set out in Re Leung Cherng Jiunn, HCB 244/2014, unrep., 21 May 2015, at §§17-28 (“CFI”), affirmed in part and restated by the Court of Appeal in Re Leung Cherng Jiunn [2016] 1 HKLRD 850 at §§8-10, 13-17, 20-27, per Kwan JA (“CA”) and may be summarised as follows:
16.Section 6(1) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap 6) (“Ordinance”) provides that a creditor’s petition must be in respect of one or more debts owed by the debtor. Section 6(2) states:
17.Section 6A(1) of the Ordinance provides that “for the purpose of section 6(2)(c), the debtor appears to be unable to pay a debt if, but only if, the debt is payable immediately and either” (a) a statutory demand in the prescribed form was served and the demand has been neither complied with nor set aside in accordance with the rules; or (b) execution in respect of the debt on a judgment or order of any court has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part. 18.Ms Sabrina Ho, counsel for the Petitioner, submits that where a debtor seeks to rely on a cross claim to oppose a petition, he has to show that the cross claim has substance and that the claims exceeds the amount of the petitioning debt (Re Shang Lili, HCB 5329/2014, unrep., 25 January 2016, at §§10, 24-26, per Ng J). As a general principle I agree, but I do not think that this principle applies to the present case for 2 main reasons.
19.Ms Ho contends that even if the Court considers that some of the cross claims raised by the Debtor have substance, so long as the Petitioner is able to show that the Debtor owes more than HK$10,000 to the Petitioner, that would be sufficient for the Court to make a bankruptcy order against the Debtor, relying on section 6(2)(a) of the Ordinance and Re Sy Chin Mong Stephen, HCB 5784/2013, unrep., 9 May 2014, at §§11, 12, 19-21, per Ng J which, in turn, referred to In re a Debtor (No 1 of 1987) [1989] 1 WLR 271). I disagree.
B2. Bona fide dispute on the Debt 20.The Debtor in the 1st and 2nd Notices and his affirmation disputes the Debt on the basis that the Petitioner has failed to set off the following amounts from the Debt:
21.Ms Ho submits that the above claims do not amount to a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds of the Debt. At the same time, Ms Ho puts forward different versions of the Debt in that:
22.At the hearing, Ms Ho submits that Annex 4 is the “final version”. 23.Despite the apparent acceptance of the Scheme Claim and the Interest Claim (which the Petitioner deducts for the purpose of the hearing but disputes the Debtor’s claim), no attempt has been made by the Petitioner to amend the Debt stated in the SD and the petition. Ms Ho submits that no amendment is necessary. So long as the bulk of the Debt is indisputable, that would be sufficient for the Court to make a bankruptcy order against the Debtor. For the reasons stated in §19 above, I am unable to accept the submission. 24.In my judgment, the SD and the petition are defective as they both rely on the Debt, which the Petitioner accepts at the hearing to be incorrect. The Scheme Claim and the Interest Claim is not immaterial, as they represent almost one-fourth of the Debt. Nor is the defect a matter of mere technicality. The Debtor was entitled to know what constituted the Debt and decided how to respond to the claim. As stated by Nicholls LJ (as he then was) in In re A Debtor (No 1 of 1987) [1989] 1 WLR 271 at 280D-E (and approved by the CA in Re Leung Cherng Jiunn (§§15-16)) where, as here, the debt in issue was not a large sum, it could not be said the defect would have made no difference in that the debtor would not have paid anyway and no prejudice would have been suffered. For this reason alone, I would dismiss the petition. 25.Even if, contrary to my view, the defect in the SD and the petition is not a matter which warrants the dismissal of the petition, for the reasons stated in §§26-32 below, I do not think that the Petitioner has discharged the burden of proving the matters which the Debtor has given notice to dispute, as required by Rule 70. 26.In respect of the PB Claim, the Debtor contends that during the Validation Period, his Weighted Total AFYC was HK$845,002, which represented 91.88% of the Target. As the Target PB was HK$1,379,497, he was entitled to receive pro-rated PB in the amount of HK$1,267,502.54. For this purpose, the Debtor produced the notices dated 11 March 2014 and 29 January 2015 issued by the Inland Revenue Department for the years 2010/2011 to 2012/2013 to show the commission income received from the Petitioner during the period. 27.Ms Ho submits that the Debtor was not entitled to receive any PB, given that:
28.In response, Ms la Fontaine Chung, counsel for the Debtor, submits that the Petitioner’s records contained manifest errors and cannot be regarded as conclusive. For this purpose, she identifies the discrepancies between the FYC stated in the Summary and those stated in the Commission Statements (where available) in Schedule 3 to her Reply. It is clear from Schedule 3 that for the 16 months from March 2012 to June 2013, the Weighted Total FYC stated in the Summary was lower than the Weighted Total FYC stated in the Commission Statements by HK$31,474.64. The Petitioner has not been able to explain the discrepancies. 29.Ms Ho seeks to brush aside the discrepancies by submitting that even taking into account such discrepancies, the Weighted Total AFYC was still below 75% of the Target and, as such, no PB was payable to the Debtor. The submission misses the point. The existence of the discrepancies shows that the Petitioner’s calculation and the Statements cannot, on their face, be regarded as conclusive. As the burden is on the Petitioner to prove any matter in dispute, its inability to explain the discrepancies shows that there is a bona fide dispute on the PB Claim. 30.As for the Commission Claim, the Debtor alleges that the Petitioner wrongfully withheld commission in the total amount of HK$543,239.03 for the period from July 2013 to August 2017 and failed to set off such commission from the Outstanding Sum. He arrived at this amount based on the opening balance shown as at 1 July 2013 and the closing balance as at 13 August 2017 as shown in the Commission Statements, and subtracted the upfront repayments and finance interest[2] paid to the Petitioner during the period from July 2013 to June 2014. 31.Ms Ho submits that the Debtor’s calculation is wrong. According to the Petitioner’s calculation and records (which include the Commission Statements, a table showing the calculation of commission and “GI O/S Premium Deduction” and another table listing the commission income, the repayments, the payments and various other adjustments), the Debtor was entitled to commission in the total amount of HK$552,582.34 for the period from July 2013 to July 2017, which was applied to pay off the Loan, the MFA and interest owed by the Debtor, leaving an outstanding amount of HK$1,013,837.90. 32.It is not the function of the Court hearing a bankruptcy petition to go into the detailed calculations and supporting documents adduced by the parties or to resolve their differences. As the Petitioner needs to establish its entitlement to the Debt through a civil action, I will say no more on the merit of the Commission Claim and the Post Contract Commission Claim. C. DISPOSITION 33.For the reasons set out above, I consider that the Petitioner fails to prove the matters which the Debtor has given notice of his intention to dispute and that there is a bona fide dispute on the Debt. I dismiss the petition. 34.I make a costs order nisi that the costs of the petition be paid by the Petitioner to the Debtor, to be assessed by way of gross sum assessment. The Debtor do submit a statement for gross sum assessment within 3 days of this Judgment and the Petitioner do provide its comments, if any, within 3 days thereafter. The costs of the Official Receiver to be paid out of the deposit.
Ms Sabrina Ho, instructed by Keith Lam Lau & Chan for the Petitioner Ms la Fontaine Chung, instructed by Rowdget W. Young & Co. for the Debtor Attendance of the Official Receiver was excused [1] Defined in the Loan Agreement as “the amount of indebtedness (including without limitation the Loan and the [MFA] together with any interest thereon) owing to the [Petitioner] by the [Debtor] under [the Loan Agreement] for the time being” [2] Ms Ho submits that the finance interest should be added, instead of subtracted from the amount due |
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