Sunny Square Ltd. v. Artsland Properties Investment Ltd. and Another
Read the full judgment text of on BabelCite. was delivered on 4 June 1999.
1. On 23 December 1998, Yam J. struck out the statements of claim in two actions brought by Sunny Square Limited ("the purchaser") against (1) Artsland Properties Limited ("the vendor"), a company in the Sun Hung Kai group of companies; (2) Sun Hung Kai Real Estate Agency Limited ("the sales agent"), another company in the group; and (3) Jones Lang Wootton ("the estate agent"), an independent firm. These actions arose out of the purchase by the purchaser of two flats in Royal Court, 3 Kennedy Ro
|
CACV000035A/1999 CACV 34 & 35/1999 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 34 & 35 OF 1999 (ON APPEAL FROM HCA 9897 AND 10428 OF 1998)
---------------------- Coram : Godfrey, Mayo & Leong, JJ.A. Date of Hearing : 20 May 1999 Date of Judgment : 4 June 1999 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Godfrey, J.A. : Introduction 1. On 23 December 1998, Yam J. struck out the statements of claim in two actions brought by Sunny Square Limited ("the purchaser") against (1) Artsland Properties Limited ("the vendor"), a company in the Sun Hung Kai group of companies; (2) Sun Hung Kai Real Estate Agency Limited ("the sales agent"), another company in the group; and (3) Jones Lang Wootton ("the estate agent"), an independent firm. These actions arose out of the purchase by the purchaser of two flats in Royal Court, 3 Kennedy Road, Hong Kong. The first action concerned 22B; the second, 18A. The purchaser, having contracted to buy these two flats, has purported to rescind both contracts. It complains of misrepresentations, on the basis of which it says it was induced to contract, made to it by the sales agent and the estate agent (against whom, as well as against the vendor, it seeks relief). The judge held that the case of the purchaser based on the alleged misrepresentations was a myth, which had no solid foundation, and consisted of a tissue of improbabilities which ought not to be sent to proof. The purchaser now appeals, asserting that there is sufficient substance in its case to warrant that case being allowed to go for trial, and that the judge was wrong to strike out its claims. We have to decide whether the judge was, or was not, entitled to do so. Background 2. It is convenient to start the story in 1949, when the land on which Royal Court now stands was vested in the Zetland Hall Trustees (a body corporate) by an Ordinance (No. 20 of 1949) in pursuance of which the land was expressed to be assigned to the Zetland Hall Trustees by an assignment dated 19 May 1951. 3. By a statutory declaration made on 12 January 1988, the makers of this statutory declaration (three of the Zetland Hall Trustees) declared that this assignment had been lost and could not be found. They exhibited a copy of the assignment to their declaration. 4. In 1998, the sales agent, in marketing flats in Royal Court for the vendor, put out a sales pamphlet, including a price list for the flats, which described both 22B and 18A as being units with a "net usable area" (an expression which was not defined) of 1,157 square feet. The purchaser, by a director one Sunny Yam Wing Yin ("Mr. Yam"), who was experienced in property transactions, expressed interest in both these flats. It is sufficient to relate what transpired in relation to 22B, as to which Mr. Yam was invited to sign a form of memorandum of sale, an attachment I to which contained an acknowledgement by the purchaser thereunder that the 19 May 1951 assignment was lost; that the vendor would not be required to produce either the original or a certified copy of it; and that the purchaser would accept the copy exhibited to the statutory declaration of 12 January 1988 as sufficient proof of the contents thereof. The memorandum provided for the signature by the purchaser of a formal sale and purchase agreement. It also contained an agreement on the part of the purchaser that "the Agreement shall strictly follow the form of the Agreement for Sale and Purchase annexed hereto" and an acknowledgement by the purchaser "that he has perused the same and understands the contents and legal effect thereof before signing the Memorandum for Sale." In fact, no form of Agreement for Sale and Purchase was attached to the Memorandum. The Memorandum referred to the "Saleable Area" of the flat (again an expression which was not defined) as being 1,157 square feet. 5. On 18 February 1998, Mr. Yam signed the Memorandum for Sale as it stood (his request to endorse the attachment I "subject to my lawyers' approval" was rejected). The purchaser's case is that Mr. Yam did so on the faith of representations made to him by a salesperson to the effect (1) that the title was good and marketable; (2) that the absence of the 19 May 1951 assignment had been remedied by a "court declaration"; (3) that the attachment to the Memorandum for Sale was redundant and of no legal effect and would not affect title; (4) that the prices mentioned in the sales pamphlet would not be reduced; (5) that the "net usable area" mentioned (not by the salesperson but in the sales pamphlet) was equivalent to the internal floor area and that accordingly the latter was an area of 1,157 square feet, whereas in fact it was only 984 square feet. 6. On 20 February 1998, the vendor's solicitors, Winston Chu & Co., sent to the purchaser's then solicitors, Ip Kwan & Co., a draft Agreement for Sale and Purchase. This referred to "the saleable area" of the flat as 107.49 square metres (it is common ground that this may be taken, for present purposes, as being as near as may be to 1,157 square feet). The expression "saleable area" was comprehensively defined in the draft (the details of this definition are immaterial). 7. The draft contained the following clauses 12(a) and (b) and 28 :
8. On 23 February 1998, the purchaser's solicitors returned the draft to the vendor's solicitors, proposing certain amendments, including an amendment to clause 12(b) which would have inserted the following introductory words :
9. On 28 February 1998, Mr. Yam signed the Agreement for Sale and Purchase. It did not contain the amendment to clause 12(b) which the purchaser's solicitors had put forward. It contained clauses 12(a) and (b) and clause 28 as set out above. (After it was too late, on 2 March 1998, the purchaser's solicitors raised a number of requisitions including the following :
10. Mr. Yam subsequently attempted thereafter to negotiate with the vendor an arrangement under which the purchaser would complete its contract to purchase one of the flats if it were allowed to withdraw from its contract to purchase the other; but he did not succeed in achieving this objective. 11. On 25 March 1998, the purchaser gave notice to the vendor, under a provision in that behalf contained in the Agreement for Sale and Purchase, to postpone completion of the transaction until 24 August 1998. 12. On 28 April 1998, the purchaser accepted a licence to go into possession. 13. On 4 May 1998, the purchaser wrote to Mr. Thomas Kwok, of Sung Hung Kai Properties Ltd. as follows :
14. On 6 May 1998, the purchaser's new solicitors, Johnson Stokes & Master, wrote to the vendor's solicitors as follows :
15. While the purchaser, and its solicitors, were trying to re-open the whole matter, as indicated in their letters of 4 May 1998 and 6 May 1998 respectively reproduced above, the purchaser caused an advertisement for sale of the two flats to be inserted in the Hong Kong Economic Daily which (in the English translation) reads as follows :
16. On 29 May 1998, all this having come to nothing, the purchaser parted company with Johnson Stokes & Master, again instructing new solicitors, Hui & Lam, to write to the vendor's solicitors as follows :
17. On 2 June 1999, the purchaser received a report from Wayfoong Property Limited, Valuation Department, which confirmed a "saleable area" for 22B of 1,126 square feet, plus bay window area of approximately 32 square feet and a flower box area of approximately 10 square feet (a total area of 1,169 square feet). It also confirmed an "internal floor area" (in respect of which, the report said, there was "no conscientious definition", whatever that means) of approximately 984 square feet. 18. On 17 June 1999, the purchaser instituted the proceedings with which we are now concerned, claiming rescission, the return of its deposits, damages, interest and costs against the vendor, with alternative claims for damages for breach of warranty of authority against the sales agent and the estate agent. The law 19. It was common ground before us that each action here ought to be struck out only if it is perfectly clear that it is bound to fail. If not, it ought to be allowed to continue. It is on this basis (different from that adopted by the judge) that it is convenient to deal with the case. Is the purchaser's action bound to fail? 20. The purchaser relies, as we have seen, on a number of "representations" which for present purposes it may be accepted were made to Mr. Yam before he signed the Memorandum of Sale on 18 February 1998. But on 28 February 1998, Mr. Yam signed the Agreement for Sale and Purchase, including clause 28. In my judgment, it is perfectly clear that clause 28 debars the purchaser from relying on any of the alleged "representations". The whole purpose of a clause such as clause 28 is to prevent purchasers from taking such points as are now taken by the purchaser here. A purchaser who wants to be able to rely on estate agents' "puff" should either (1) refuse to enter into a contract containing a clause such as clause 28 or (2) insist that the "representation" on which he wants to rely is written into the contract. (Indeed, the purchaser in our case attempted to do this in relation to the "representation" about the "court declaration" to be obtained as to the missing assignment of 12 May 1951; but it entered into the contract even though its attempt was rejected). 21. Sir John Swaine S.C., for the purchaser, submitted that even if clause 28 would otherwise operate to defeat the purchaser's claims, its provisions were unreasonable. That would raise an issue of fact which was fit to go to trial. I reject this argument, for in my judgment it is perfectly clear that an attempt to show that clause 28 was unreasonable would itself be bound to fail. A clause in an agreement for sale and purchase designed to ensure that parties are held to their bargain as recorded in writing, far from being unreasonable, is highly desirable. 22. That is sufficient to dispose of the case; but there is yet another reason here why these actions are bound to fail. 23. It is well-settled that a party to a contract is entitled, after discovering that false representations have been made to him, to call off the contract (in lawyer's language, to claim that the contract be rescinded ab initio). But he cannot blow hot and cold. He must elect whether to affirm or rescind the contract. If by his words or conduct he elects to affirm it, he cannot go back on that election. It is perfectly clear here that the purchaser, albeit reluctantly, affirmed the contract before it attempted to rescind it. It did do by seeking to postpone completion in accordance with the contract and later by trying to sell the two flats (as it did by its advertisement in the Hong Kong Economic Daily in early May). The purchaser has no answer to this (except perhaps as to the "representation" as to the size of the flat, a "representation" which it says it did not discover was false until it was told so by Wayfoong Property Limited at the end of May). 24. Lastly, I would add that the purchaser's grievances about the alleged "representations" even if (as I assume) they are genuine, are quite groundless. The problem of the missing assignment of 12 May 1951 was resolved, perfectly satisfactorily, by the 1988 Statutory Declaration; there is no justification whatever for the purchaser's belief that the title is otherwise than perfectly "good and marketable"; a piece of "puff" by a salesperson that a vendor will not reduce its prices is not a "representation", in the legal sense, at all; and there has never been any real question but that "the saleable area" of the flats as defined in the contract was 1,157 square feet, whatever figure might be thrown up by some other undefined and uncontractual calculation of that area. Conclusion 25. There is no substance in the purchaser's case. It is bound to fail. The judge was right to strike out the purchaser's claims. I would dismiss this appeal. Mayo, J.A. : 26. I agree. There is nothing I can usefully add. Leong, J.A. : 27. For the reasons given by Godfrey, J.A., I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. Godfrey, J.A. : 28. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. As to costs, we will order that the costs of the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant, and the costs of the 3rd defendant, be taxed (if not agreed) and paid by the plaintiff, unless an application is made within 14 days after the date of this judgment for some other order as to costs.
Representation: Sir John Swaine, S.C. and Mr. Victor So (M/s. Hui & Lam) for the Plaintiff Mr. Denis Chang, S.C. and Mr. Mok Yeuk Chi (M/s. Winston Chu & Co.) for 1st and 2nd Defendants Mr. Rimsky K.K. Yuen (M/s. Baker & McKenzie) for 3rd Defendant |