Au Kai To Karel v. End User Technology Ltd and Others
Read the full judgment text of CACV 237/2017 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 13 August 2020.
1. At the hearing on 4 January 2019, we dismissed the 1 st Defendant’s appeal but allowed the 2 nd Defendant’s appeal against the judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Kent Yee of 28 September 2017. We gave our reasons for judgment in the appeal together with our decision on costs on 18 January 2019 ( [2019] HKCA 72 ).
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CACV 237/2017 [2020] HKCA 673 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 237 OF 2017 (ON APPEAL FROM HCA 170/2015) ____________________
____________________ Before: Hon Lam VP, Au JA and P Ng J in Court Date of Hearing: 24 June 2020 Date of Judgment: 13 August 2020 __________________________________ JUDGMENT __________________________________ Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.At the hearing on 4 January 2019, we dismissed the 1st Defendant’s appeal but allowed the 2nd Defendant’s appeal against the judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Kent Yee of 28 September 2017. We gave our reasons for judgment in the appeal together with our decision on costs on 18 January 2019 ([2019] HKCA 72). 2.The present applications concerned the disposal of money paid into court in the following circumstances. 3.After DHCJ Kent Yee’s judgment, the Plaintiff presented a Petition in HCCW 343/2017 on 13 November 2017 to wind up the 2nd Defendant due to non-satisfaction of the judgment. On 16 April 2018, Harris J made an order that unless the 2nd Defendant either obtained an interim stay of the judgment or paid into court HK$4,400,000 by 3 May 2018, the 2nd Defendant would be wound up on 7 May 2018. On 3 May 2018, the 2nd Defendant paid the sum of HK$4,400,000 into court. 4.There was also an application for stay of the judgment in the Court of Appeal. By way of consent summons filed on 14 May 2018 in this appeal, the Plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd Defendants consented to an order in the following terms:
5.The consent order was made by Kwan JA (as she then was) on 14 May 2018. 6.After the determination of the appeal, the Plaintiff filed a summons on 17 January 2020 in these proceedings to apply for an order that the sum of HK$4,400,000 be paid out to the Plaintiff together with any interest accrued thereon, with costs to the Plaintiff. 7.On 10 March 2020, the 1st and 2nd Defendants filed a summons to apply for an order that the HK$4,400,000 be released to the 2nd Defendant, with costs to the 2nd Defendant. 8.After reading the papers, we directed that an oral hearing be held. We heard the applications on 24 June 2020. 9.It is well established (and Mr Justin Lam, appearing for the 1st and 2nd Defendants, properly accepted) that in light of the order of Kwan JA, the sum of HK$4,400,000 is subject to a security interest to discharge the liabilities under the judgment. 10.The nature of a sum of money paid into court was analyzed at some length by Hobhouse J in Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd v Central Reinsurance Corporation [1988] 1WLR 1122. At p.1133 F, His Lordship said:
11.See also the judgment of Godfrey Lam J in Herbert Smith Freehills v Chris Au [2018] 5 HKLRD 207 at [14] to [16]. At [16], the following was said:
12.Pending disposal of the money by an order of the Court, such security interest prevails over any other legal interest in the money, see YBL v LWC (No 2) [2017] 2 HKLRD 783 at [28]. 13.In the present case, though the HK$4,400,000 was first paid by the 2nd Defendant into court in HCCW 343/2017, it was treated by the parties and the Court as monies paid by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to the credit of the appeal by virtue of the consent order of Kwan JA. Such payment was made in order to secure the stay pending the appeal as ordered by Her Ladyship. 14.It should be noted that the stay was in respect of a judgment on the joint and several liabilities on the part of the 1st and 2nd Defendants. In other words, not only did the 2nd Defendant benefit from the stay, so did the 1st Defendant. Thus, there had to be an agreement by the 1st and 2nd Defendants that the payment was to be treated as payment by both the 1st and 2nd Defendants instead of a payment by the 2nd Defendant only. 15.Mr Lam submitted however that the Plaintiff could only obtain payment out in its favour if this Court upheld the judgment of DHCJ Kent Yee in its entirety. Since the appeal by the 2nd Defendant was allowed, the Plaintiff could not rely on the security interest stemming from the consent order of Kwan JA. The Court should order payment out to the 2nd Defendant as owner of the money. 16.With respect, we do not accept this submission. 17.It is, in our judgment, too narrow to limit the security interest under the consent order to the event of the judgment below being upheld in its entirety. That judgment imposed joint and several liabilities on the 1st and 2nd Defendants. But for the stay of execution in favour of both of them, the Plaintiff was at liberty to enforce the judgment against both or either of them. The stay was in place for both the joint as well as several liabilities of the two defendants. The several liabilities encompassed the liability of each of the 1st and 2nd Defendants separately. 18.Looking the matter in context in the circumstances under which the consent order was made, there is no reason to confine the security interest in the manner suggested by Mr Lam. 19.Had the 2nd Defendant minded to limit the security interest in the way as suggested by Mr Lam, there was no justification for requiring the payment be treated as one made by the two defendants. There was also no justification for the Plaintiff agreeing to a stay of execution against the 1st Defendant. 20.We hold that the security interest covers the present contingency, viz the upholding by this Court of the liability of the 1st Defendant only (which is encompassed in the judgment of DHCJ Kent Yee for several liabilities against the 1st and 2nd Defendants). 21.By way of fallback, Mr Lam submitted that the security interest should only be limited to half of the HK$4,400,000, viz HK$2,200,000. 22.We cannot see any basis for this contention. As pointed out by Mr Derek Chan (appearing for the Plaintiff in this application), the consent order did not provide for payment of HK$2,200,000 each by the 1st and 2nd Defendants. 23.We therefore make an order in favour of the Plaintiff for the payment out of the HK$4,400,000 on the summons of 17 January 2020. 24.We dismiss the Defendants’ summons of 10 March 2020. 25.We also order the 1st and 2nd Defendants to pay the costs of the Plaintiff in the two summonses. Having considered the statement of costs of the Plaintiff (in which a total sum of HK$150,485 is asked for, HK$50,000 was for counsel’s fee), we find the charges proposed on solicitor’s professional work and communication to be excessive. We fix the costs at HK$100,000.
Mr Derek J Y Chan, instructed by Christine M Koo & Ip, for the plaintiff Mr Justin Lam, instructed by Khoo & Co, for the 1st & 2nd defendants |
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