Re Rexlot Holdings Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCCW 45/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 August 2020.
1. There is before me a creditors’ winding-up petition (“the Petition”) which is presented pursuant to section 327 of the Companies (Winding-Up) Ordinance (“the Ordinance”).
Cites 2 cases
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HCCW 45/2020 [2020] HKCFI 2212 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) PROCEEDINGS NO 45 OF 2020 ______________________________
______________________________ Before: Deputy High Court Judge Maurellet SC in Court Date of Hearing: 20 August 2020 Date of Judgment: 20 August 2020 _______________ JUDGMENT _______________ INTRODUCTION 1.There is before me a creditors’ winding-up petition (“the Petition”) which is presented pursuant to section 327 of the Companies (Winding-Up) Ordinance (“the Ordinance”). 2.The original petitioners were BFAM Asian Opportunities Master Fund LP (“BFAM” or “the 1st Petitioner”), Discovery Global Opportunity Master Fund Ltd, Discovery Global Focus Master Fund Ltd, and Quantum Partners LP (collectively “the Petitioners”). 3.The Petition was filed on 9 March 2020. 4.REXLot Holdings Limited (“the Company”), formerly known as OSK Asia Corporation Limited, was incorporated in Bermuda on 8 August 1997, and was registered on 11 July 2000 as a non-Hong Kong company under Part 11 of the then Companies Ordinance. It has a principal place of business in Hong Kong, in Kowloon Bay. 5.The Company is listed on the stock exchange of Hong Kong, although the trading of its shares has been suspended since 1 April last year. 6.The Petitioners hold bonds which are divided in two categories. They are known as the 2017 bonds, which were convertible bonds originally due on 28 September 2016, but later extended to 2017; and the 2019 bonds, which were also convertible bonds and due on 17 April 2019. 7.Both bonds were constituted by trust deeds (“Trust Deed(s)”) executed by the Company as issuer and the Bank of New York Mellon, London branch, as its trustee (“the Trustee”). 8.Between 11 May 2017 and early in 2020, the Company published a number of announcements on its website indicating that it had devised various plans to repay outstanding amounts on the said bonds and was taking certain steps to deal with the matter. INSOLVENCY PROCESS 9.On 26 September 2019, the 1st Petitioner served a statutory demand relying on section 327(4)(a) of the Ordinance by leaving the said statutory demand at the Company’s principal place of business in Hong Kong. As explained above, the Petition was then filed on 9 March 2020. 10.As the Company is not a Hong Kong incorporated company, it is trite that the Petitioners need to establish that it is appropriate to exercise the court’s jurisdiction to wind up an overseas company and, therefore, the “three core requirements” have to be satisfied[1]. 11.The Petitioners have in their Petition pleaded a number of factors which they say justifies the Court exercising its jurisdiction to wind up an overseas company. I do not understand the Company to be suggesting that the Petitioners have failed to satisfy the Court that it was a proper case to wind up this Company on the said jurisdictional grounds. 12.Mr How-chung Chan (also known as Victor Chan) is a significant shareholder of the Company and also one of its executive directors. He controls a company called Kingly Profits Limited which is also a creditor of the Company to the tune of HK$80 million-plus. 13.The Petition first came before Harris J on 8 June of this year who gave directions for the filing of evidence and adjourned the substantive hearing to 20 August, which is today’s hearing. LOCUS OF PETITIONERS AND TRUSTEE / SUBSTITUTION 14.The Company disputes the locus of the Petitioners to present the petition by reason of the wording in the Trust Deed. In particular, they point to clause 10.1 of the Trust Deed which provides that:
15.What is quite clear is that this gives rise to fairly complicated legal arguments as to whether or not, in such a situation, a bond holder has locus to commence winding-up proceedings or whether only the Trustee can do so. This goes both to the question of the construction of the relevant trust deed and also other legal arguments including whether or not such a term, assuming it has the effect contended for by the Company, would amount to a ‘statutory fetter’[2]. 16.I understood from the written submissions filed by Mr Hew Yang-wahn who ably represented the Petitioners that they were seeking a winding-up order forthwith and were against the notion of any adjournment, no matter how short. 17.In the course of argument, I pointed out that if the question of locus had to be dealt with now this was not a matter which was straight forward and therefore was likely to result in some adjournment. Upon taking instructions, he confirmed that the Petitioners would be content for the Trustee to apply and substitute itself instead as petitioner. 18.I should point out that on 3 June 2020, the Trustee had applied by summons pursuant to Rule 33 to substitute the Petitioners. 19.Rule 33 of the Winding-up Rules provides that:
20.The application to substitute was not opposed and given the Petitioners’ indication, I made an order in terms of the Trustee’s summons[3]. There was no dispute, and there could be no dispute, that the Trustee has locus to present and prosecute the present Petition before me. ADJOURNMENT OF THE PETITION 21.The Trustee, therefore, submits that a winding-up order can and should be made forthwith subject to any application for an adjournment to be made by the Company. 22.Mr Bernard Man, leading counsel for the Company[4], sought an adjournment on its behalf for a period of at least six weeks or so. 23.He persuasively submitted, in effect, that there was something to be gained (potentially a lot) and very little to be lost by adjourning the Petition for a very short while. 24.He very fairly accepted that in situations such as the present, adjournments were not usually granted against the opposition of petitioning creditors given the right ex debito justiciae to a winding-up order. see HSBC v SMI Holdings Group [2019] HKCFI 1948, and Re X 10 Ltd (1989) 2 HKLR 306 at 309I to J. 25.In support of the adjournment application, he highlighted a number of features.
26.In the latest iteration of the repayment plan, six payments were anticipated to be made, the first on 30 September 2020, and the last on 30 September 2021. 27.The first payment to be made on 30 September 2020 would be for approximately HK$100 million in order to pay overdue interest on the 2017 bonds and the 2019 bonds. The second partial repayment on 31 December 2020 would be for an amount it is anticipated of HK$50 million and would seek to repay some of the interest but also some of the principal amount. 28.Pursuant to this plan, therefore, which involves repaying approximately HK$800 million or so, the creditors’ indebtedness would be satisfied by September next year. 29.In the course of his address Mr Man SC on behalf of the Company and, in particular, Mr Victor Chan, sought to go further to assuage the creditors’ doubts and concerns by personally undertaking to pay the first partial repayment and the second partial repayment if the Company was not able to pay and if the Company had not been wound up at the date of the said proposed repayments. 30.All in all, I agree that the offer made and the proposal for an adjournment is not one which the Court would consider to be obviously unattractive given the alternative possibilities. As the sword of Damocles got closer, it is natural that the Company and those behind it who have an economic interest would be willing to give concessions which they previously would not. 31.Those later concessions which are now made cannot automatically be viewed with cynicism, although, given the history of the many failed proposals, one can see why some creditors would not be enthusiastic or confident about them. 32.Obviously, if there is no viable plan, restructuring or benefits to be had, then that would be an end of the matter and the Company would be wound up immediately. 33.However, the fact that there is such a viable plan does not lead necessarily to the converse conclusion that an adjournment ought to be granted. 34.In situations such as the present where the Company is obviously insolvent at least in the sense of cash-flow insolvency, is unable to pay its debts as they fall due, the interest of unsecured creditors is paramount. 35.It is not for the Court to substitute the views of the creditors and, in particular, the views of the unsecured creditors with its own judgment as to the economic viability or attractiveness of various options and it is easy to see why.
36.The views of the ‘related’ creditors are taken into account although, of course, the Court is aware that this may or may not colour their support one way or the other. 37.In the present case, all the creditors[5] save those associated with Mr Chan support an immediate winding-up order. Whether the support amongst bond holders is 58% as suggested by the Company or whether it is more than that does not quite matter given the present circumstances, there is simply no independent creditor supporting an adjournment. 38.I also bear in mind that in the present case before me there is bound to be a number of creditors who have not expressed a view or who have not appeared in the Petition. 39.Whether this is due to apathy or other reasons, one cannot tell. However, I have borne in mind that of those who have supported an immediate winding-up order these included independent and financial institutions such as BlackRock and Value Partners and, of course, one of the original Petitioners, BFAM. 40.The fact that the independent creditors (if I may call them that) have all supported an immediate winding-up order is a powerful factor militating in favour of an immediate winding-up order. DISPOSITION AND COSTS 41.For those reasons, balancing the above considerations I refuse to grant an adjournment of the Petition and it follows that an immediate winding-up order is made. 42.I shall now hear the parties as to costs. (submissions on costs) 43.I will make a costs order nisi that (1) the Trustee’s costs be paid out of the assets of the Company and (2) the costs as between the original Petitioners and the Company be costs reserved, with liberty to restore. 44.It remains for me to thank Mr Hew for the Petitioners, Ms Lam, SC for the Trustee, and Mr Man, SC for the Company for their able submissions.
Mr Hew Yang-Wahn, instructed by Latham & Watkins LLP, for the 1st to 4th Petitioners Mr Bernard Man, SC, instructed by Baker & McKenzie, for the company (with Ms Natalie So for written submissions only) Ms Rachel Lam, SC, instructed by Clifford Chance, for the trustee Attendance of the Official Receiver was excused [1] See the recent Court of Appeal’s decision in Shandong Chenming Paper v. Arjowiggins HKK2 Ltd (unreported judgment dated 5 August 2020) [2] See for example Elektrim SA v Vivendi Holdings [2009] 2 AER (Comm) 213 per Lawrence Collins LJ; Casurina Ltd Partnership v. Rio Algom Ltd 40 BLR (3d) 112; Elliott International & Anon v Law Debenture Trustees (unrep. Judgment dated 23 November 2006, per Warren J); the Law of Company Liquidation (4th ed.) at paragraph 3-017. [3] See Re Titanium Technology Ltd [2011] 3 HKLRD 134. [4] Who was assisted by Ms Natalie So for the preparation of the Company’s written skeleton submissions [5] Of those who have expressed a view |