Lau Cho Kwan, Leo and Another v. Cornwall Agency Co Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCA 617/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 21 October 2020.
1. In this action the plaintiffs, Mr Lau Chow Kwan Leo (“ P1 ”) and Mrs Lau Betty Barbara (“ P2 ”) (together “ Ps ”), seek an order to compel the 2 nd defendant, Cornwall Agency Company Limited (“ Company ”), to issue replacement share certificates in respect of 464 shares and 119 shares held by P1 and P2 respectively in the Company.
Cited by 2 cases · Cites 5 cases
|
HCA 617/2020 [2020] HKCFI 2681 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 617 OF 2020 _______________
_______________ Before: Hon Linda Chan J in Chambers Dates of Written Submissions: 10 and 16 September 2020 Date of Decision: 21 October 2020 _______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ 1.In this action the plaintiffs, Mr Lau Chow Kwan Leo (“P1”) and Mrs Lau Betty Barbara (“P2”) (together “Ps”), seek an order to compel the 2nd defendant, Cornwall Agency Company Limited (“Company”), to issue replacement share certificates in respect of 464 shares and 119 shares held by P1 and P2 respectively in the Company. 2.The bases of the application ought to be simple and straight forward: Ps had lost the share certificates previously issued by the Company to them and were willing to confirm such fact to the Company. Upon Ps’ compliance with the requirements of article 15 of the Articles of Association of the Company (“AA”), the Company was obliged but failed to issue new share certificates to them. 3.However, instead of issuing an originating summons to seek an order to compel the Company to issue new share certificates to them, Ps’ legal advisers chose to issue a writ against the Company and joined Ms Lau Siu Fan Elaine (“Elaine”), one of the directors of the Company, as the 1st defendant. The relief sought in the statement of claim is as follow:
4.The relief sought is confusing and inappropriate. In particular:
Procedural history 5.This action is one of the 4 sets of legal proceedings commenced by Ps in respect of the Company within a few months in 2020. This is despite the fact that the Company’s only business is property holding and its only income is the rent generated by a 3-storey building known as Villa Cornwall at 12 Cornwall Street, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong (“Property”). 6.At the hearing on 3 September 2020 in HCCW 262/2020, being a “just and equitable” winding-up petition presented by Ps in respect of the Company (“WU Petition”), the Company sought a validation order in respect of the ordinary business expenses and the legal costs incurred and to be incurred in the petition and 4 other sets of proceedings in which the Company was named as a defendant. This is surprising given extensive allegations have already been made by Ps in the WU Petition. Upon this Court enquiry, it transpired that the following proceedings have been commenced by Ps against the Company and Elaine (and others):
7.As the issue of replacement certificates is a matter regulated by the AA, this Court enquired with Mr Felix Ng, counsel for Ps, as to why an action had to be commenced for such purpose and what are the issues between the parties. Mr Ng submitted that Ps had complied with the requirements of the AA but the Company refused to issue any replacement share certificates to them. On the other hand, Mr Jason Yu, counsel for the Company, submitted that Ps had not provided the requisite confirmation that their share certificates had been lost or any indemnity as requested by the Company. It was clear to this Court that allowing the action to proceed in its usual course would only result in delay and waste of costs, which is contrary to the underlying objectives of the Rules of the High Court. Consequently, the parties were directed to inform the Court by 10 September 2020 whether the action could be disposed of by consent, failing which they should lodge written submissions with the Court and the action would be disposed of on paper. Background 8.The Company was incorporated on 22 October 1968. It was founded by the late Mr Lau Ting Wei and his wife, the late Madam Lucy Cheng, who were its subscribers and first directors. The Company has issued 5,000 shares of HK$100 each, all of which are paid-up or credited as paid up. According to the Company’s register of members, there are 8 shareholders who are members of the Lau family. 9.Amongst the shareholders, P1 holds 583 shares, P2 holds 250 shares, Elaine holds 833 shares and Ms Lau Big Ying Rose (“Rose”) holds 714 shares. There is a dispute as to whether the 1,000 shares previously held by the late father were distributed in accordance with his will and whether the number of shares currently held by the shareholders is correct. There is a personal dispute between Ms Hui Keng Yee (who holds 833 shares in the Company) and his son, who challenges her entitlement to receive all the shares from her late husband. This dispute is the subject matter of HCA 561/2019, and the Company is named as a defendant. 10.Since 29 May 2020, the Company has 3 directors, who are P1, Elaine and Rose. Prior to that, P1 and Elaine were the only directors of the Company. As P1 has been residing in Australia, the day-to-day affairs of the Company have been managed by Elaine, who is the Managing Director of the Company. 11.The AA sets out all the regulations of the Company and Table A in the First Schedule to the former Companies Ordinance shall not apply. The following articles in the AA govern the issue of replacement share certificates:
12.By letter dated 18 September 2019 issued to Elaine, Messrs Wainwright Ryan Eid Lawyers (“WRE”), former solicitors of Ps, claimed that the Company had not issued any share certificates to Ps and requested for share certificates to be issued to Ps by 27 September 2019. 13.Elaine responded by a letter dated 19 September 2019, pointing out that the request should be addressed to the board and not to her personally and, according to the book of share certificates, the Company had issued the following share certificates to Ps (copies of the relevant certificate stubs enclosed):
14.Instead of making the request in accordance with the relevant regulations, WRE stated in their letter dated 25 September 2019 that Ps sought to invoke article 15 and they “are not able to prove that the Certificates were lost or destroyed save and except to say that they do not have the Certificates in their possession” and they are prepared to swear statutory declaration as per the forms provided. They requested the Company to provide details of the indemnity required from Ps. 15.In her email dated 27 September 2019 to WRE, Elaine drew their attention to a declaration of trust made by Lau Cho Bun in 1988 in which he stated that he held the shares in the Company on trust for P1 and such declaration of trust was referred to in a resolution dated 4 January 1988 and hence known to P1. She urged Ps to conduct a thorough search of the whereabouts of the share certificates and provided a draft statutory declaration so that the Company can determine whether there is a sufficient basis for issuing new share certificates to Ps, whereupon she would provide details of the indemnity. 16.In their letter dated 15 October 2019, WRE reiterated that Ps had not been provided with share certificates or if they had been provided, they were no longer in Ps’ possession. The shares previously held by Lau Cho Bun had already been transferred to P1 and share certificate CACL 15 was issued to Ps. In accordance with articles 14 and 15 of the AA, Ps are entitled to be issued with share certificates. Draft statutory declarations stating that Ps had made full and exhaustive search and inquiries with bank, their solicitors and at home, but failed to locate the share certificates were enclosed. 17.By letter dated 18 October 2019 to WRE, Elaine on behalf of the Company, requested Ps to provide a legal opinion to confirm that the statutory declarations made and governed by the law of the State of Victoria would be enforceable in Hong Kong. Given the confusing statements about the shares hitherto held by Lau Cho Bun and the share certificate number, Elaine suggested Ps to conduct a search at the Companies Registry to confirm the actual number of shares held by them from 1968 to 2001. 18.No further correspondence was exchanged between the parties before Ps commenced this action. The writ was endorsed with a statement of claim (“SOC”). 19.In response to the commencement of this action, the Company issued a summons dated 3 July 2020 requiring Ps to provide security for costs. On 28 August 2020, Ps filed a notice to discontinue the action against Elaine. 20.At the hearing of the Company’s validation summons (in WU Petition) on 3 September 2020, this Court reminded the parties and their legal representatives to act in accordance with their duty to assist the Court to further the underlying objectives of the Rules of the High Court[4] and act in a constructive manner. 21.As it turns out, far from acting sensibly and reasonably, in their letter dated 7 September 2020, Messrs. Oldham, Li & Nie (“OLN”), solicitors for Ps, invited the Company to “concede judgment” in terms of a consent summons with costs to Ps on an indemnity basis, on the basis that the Company had unreasonably refused to issue share certificates to Ps even after commencement of the action (“Consent Summons”). In the Consent Summons, OLN still sought an order in terms of prayer (1) and (2) of the SOC but with the amendments identified in footnotes 1 to 3 above. 22.By letter dated 8 September 2020 (which runs to 6 pages excluding the enclosures), Messrs Hugill & Ip (“HI”) confirmed that the Company would issue replacement share certificates to P provided that the following conditions are satisfied:
23.In their letter dated 9 September 2020, OLN reiterated Ps’ request that the Company should “concede judgment” with indemnity costs payable to Ps forthwith and confirmed that Ps would provide “a statutory declaration or notarised affirmation to the effect that any and all share certificate(s) of the Company have been lost or destroyed” and that Ps would execute the 2 DOIs (with amendments marked) but without “banker’s guarantee”. In the DOIs to be executed by Ps, the details of the lost or destroyed certificates are as follows:
Discussion 24.In his written submissions, Mr Ng (rightly) abandons the declaratory relief sought in the SOC. He submits that there is no mandatory requirement for Ps to provide any bank guarantee to the Company. He contends that the passages in the textbooks cited by Mr Yu all stated that bank guarantee may be required. Although in Mayson, French & Rayn on Company Law, 36th ed, 2019, §8.2.2 the learned editor stated that it is usual for the company to require a bank guarantee “if the sum involves is large”, no authority has been cited in support of the proposition. Mr Ng submits that Ps’ shares have never been transferred to any third parties, and there is “no realistic chance that there is a claim by outsiders against the Company for entitlement to those shares”. In any event, as any transfer of shares required to be done in accordance with article 28(a) of the AA , there is “no realistic risk” that the Company would be exposed to any claim by any third parties as a result of issuing replacement share certificates to Ps. 25.Mr Yu submits that the issuance of share certificates is not a trivial or routine matter, given that the statements in share certificates may estop the Company from denying the truth of such statements and may give rise to liability on the part of the Company to pay damages upon rectification of the share register, relying on Re Ottos Kopje Diamond Mines [1893] 1 Ch 618 at 625 and section 633(2)(b) of the Ordinance. Article 15 stipulates 2 conditions for issuance of replacement certificates, viz, an “indemnity as the Directors deem adequate being given” and “proof … to the satisfaction of the Directors” that the share certificates in question have been “lost or destroyed”. It is incumbent upon the Company to request for proof of the alleged loss of share certificates and for an indemnity to be given so as to protect the interests of the Company. 26.Mr Yu contends that Ps have provided inconsistent explanations as to the loss of the share certificates and it is reasonable to require Ps to provide a valid statutory declaration to confirm such fact, which is the usual requirement (The Law & Practice of Hong Kong Companies, 3rd ed, (2017), §5.069; Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law, §8.2.2). A statutory declaration made outside of Hong Kong, as previously proposed by Ps, is not a valid statutory declaration under the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance (Yiu Ping Fong v Lam Lai Hing [1998] 4 HKC 476 at 481, per Yuen J (as she then was)). It is doubtful whether any sanction or penalty is available in Hong Kong under the criminal law in the event that the matters declared were false (Top Flying v Open Mission [2006] 4 HKLRD 83 at §§33-34, per Recorder McCoy QC). To-date, Ps have not provided any constructive answer to the Company’s requests for a valid statutory declaration or provided any executed statutory declarations to the Company. 27.Mr Yu further submits that there are fundamental problems with the SOC in that:
28.It is reasonable for the Company to have requested a bank or insurance’s guarantee in respect of the indemnity and to have offered to assist Ps in procuring the same. Ps’ failure to provide the guarantee is unreasonable as it is usual for companies to request such a guarantee unless the value of the shares is very small (Practice Law UK, Standard Document (2020), The Law & Practice of Hong Kong Companies, §5.069; Compliance and Company Secretarial Practice of Hong Kong Private Companies (2017), section 7(IX); Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law, §8.2.2). 29.I agree with Mr Yu that the prayers in the SOC are defective and the averments in the SOC are plagued with inconsistencies and inaccuracies. I also agree that it was reasonable for the Company to require Ps to provide valid and effective statutory declarations to confirm that they have lost their share certificates issued by the Company, which accords with the requirements of article 15. However, as Ps have already indicated their agreement to sign the 2 DOIs prepared by the Company (as amended by OLN) which contain confirmation that the specified shares have been lost or destroyed, it would be superfluous to require Ps to execute statutory declarations for the same purpose. 30.I do not agree that it is reasonable for the Company to require Ps to provide a bank or insurance guarantee as suggested in §5 of the DOIs. This is because the Company is a private company and by virtue of section 11(1) of the Ordinance, its articles can restrict a member’s right to transfer of shares. 31.The transfer of shares in the Company is governed by articles 27 and 28 which provide as follows:
32.The combined effect of the requirements of articles 27 and 28(a), (b) and (d) is that the shares held by Ps will be transferred if and only if Ps have signed the instrument of transfer for transferring their shares to another person and, if the shares are to be transferred to a non-member, the transfer will not be effective unless and until the requisite notice and procedure have been followed and share certificates issued by the Company. There is no risk of any person who can produce a share certificate issued by the Company in support of his claim that he is the holder of any shares without the consent of Ps and of Rose and Elaine (being the directors other than the proposing transferor). That being the position, I do not think there is a proper basis for the Company to require Ps to provide a bank or insurance guarantee as security for the DOIs. 33.For the above reasons, I make an order that within 7 days after Ps have provided the DOIs (in the forms appended to OLN’s letter dated 9 September 2020) duly executed by them and tendered payment of HK$5 in respect of each certificate to be issued by the Company, the Company shall issue replacement certificates in respect of the shares identified in §23 above to Ps. 34.As for costs, I make a costs order nisi that Ps shall pay 60% of the costs of the action to the Company (including any costs reserved) on a party and party basis, to be assessed by way of gross sum assessment. This reflects the fact that Ps have not pleaded a reasonable cause of action or any viable relief in the SOC and have raised issues and made allegations against the Company improperly and unnecessarily. Had Ps’ legal advisers acted reasonably and responded to the Company’s requests in a constructive manner, the matter could have been resolved without the commencement of this action. Even if the parties could not resolve their dispute on the question of the guarantee (which was never canvassed in correspondence), the issue could readily be resolved at the first hearing of an originating summons. I consider this is a case which falls within Order 62 rule 7(1) where the Court may deprive the “successful” parties of their costs and order them to pay costs on the basis that they have raised issues and made allegations improperly and unnecessarily, both in correspondence and in the SOC. 35.The 40% deduction reflects the fact that the Company (1) has failed in its argument on the requirement of a guarantee; (2) has issued a summons for security for costs, which I consider to be wholly unjustified, given that Ps’ shares are valuable assets within the jurisdiction; and (3) has incurred costs unnecessarily in its 6-page letter to recount the history of the matters when such matters are self-evidenced from the correspondence exchanged between the parties. 36.I direct the Company to lodge its statements of costs, if any, within 3 days of this Decision, and Ps to provide their comments on the statements within 3 days thereafter.
Mr Felix Ng, instructed by Oldham, Li & Nie, for the 1st – 2nd plaintiffs Mr Jason Yu, instructed by Hugill & Ip, for the 2nd defendant [1] These words were not in prayer (1), but have been inserted in the draft consent summons provided by OLN on 7 September 2020 (“Consent Summons”), see §21 below [2] These words were not in prayer (1), but have been inserted in the Consent Summons [3] This phrase has been deleted in the Consent Summons [4] Under Order 1A rule 3 [5] Which concerns transmission of shares held by a deceased member | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case