Great Silver Investment Ltd v. Sky Trend Global Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1275/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 November 2020.
1. This is the application by the defendants (“ D1 ”, “ D2 ” and collectively “ Ds ”) to vary the Injunction granted by Deputy Judge To against them on 12 August 2020 (the “ Injunction ”). It comes before me as the Summons Judge today.
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HCA 1275/2020 [2020] HKCFI 2987 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 1275 OF 2020 ______________
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______________ DECISION ______________ 1.This is the application by the defendants (“D1”, “D2” and collectively “Ds”) to vary the Injunction granted by Deputy Judge To against them on 12 August 2020 (the “Injunction”). It comes before me as the Summons Judge today. 2.D2 is the sole shareholder and director of D1. D1 is the sole shareholder of a company called Max Era Properties Limited (“Max Era”). Max Era solely owned 2 properties at Mei Foo Sun Chuen (the “Properties”). 3.The underlying claim relates to an aborted sale by D1 to P of D1’s entire shareholding in Max Era and the shareholder loan Max Era owed to D1. 4.For the purpose of the sale and purchase, a provisional sale and purchase agreement was signed. Deposit in the total sum of HK$70,000,000 has been paid by P. P subsequently claims that D1 has failed to answer certain requisitions on title relating to the Properties. The intended sale fell through. Both sides say that the other side has been in breach. 5.By the present action, P is suing for return of the deposit. It subsequently obtained the Injunction. 6.In respect of the Injunction, I note:
7.Ds are seeking the present variations so as to enable the following obligations to be met:
8.Ms Lee, counsel for Ds, raises 2 main grounds: (1) the total unencumbered value of the assets of Ds and Max Era substantially exceeds the enjoined amount, and (ii) on the basis of the Court’s Angel Bell jurisdiction[1]. 9.The present application is supported by D2’s 3rd affirmation, which I have read. 10.On the evidence, I am satisfied that the total current value of the assets of Ds is about HK$136m. In reaching that view, I have considered the adverse observations on D2’s credibility made by Deputy Judge To in Reasons (No.1) and (No.2). I however accept D2’s evidence on the value of Ds’ assets because his evidence is by and large supported by bank statements and what appears to be independent valuation evidence. The valuations are not perfect, but are in my view sufficient for the present purpose. 11.The total unencumbered value of the assets of D1 and D2 exceeds the enjoined ceiling by about HK$57m. The meeting of the Payment Obligations will not cause the unencumbered value of Ds’ assets in Hong Kong to drop below the enjoined amount. §1(2) of the Injunction is applicable and is triggered. 12.Within the terms of §1(2) of the Injunction, Ds have the right to deal with their own assets in ways they choose to. 13.Mr Lin has referred me to Wharf Ltd v Lau Yuen How [2010] 3 HKC 108 on the principles applicable to variation of injunctions. However, given my view that the Injunction is not proprietary in nature, my view on the effect of §1(2) of the Injunction, and my acceptance of the evidence that the total unencumbered value of the assets of D1 and D2 exceeds the enjoined ceiling, Wharf Ltd in my view has no application. 14.Mr Lin takes the point that D2 should not be permitted to utilize the assets of Max Era to repay the judgment debts owed by D2 personally. I do not take that point as being relevant. If the Ds and Max Era can rely on §1(2) of the Injunction to deal with their assets, the purpose for which the assets are to be used is a matter for them and is beyond the scope of the present application. Not irrelevant is also the fact that D2 is the sole director and shareholder of D1. 15.For the reasons above, and on the first ground raised by Ms Lee, I allow the application. 16.It is in the circumstances not necessary for me to deal with the Angel Bell principles. I say only this. I would if necessary also have allowed the application on the Angel Bell ground. The purpose of the Mareva jurisdiction was not to improve the position of any claimants to the property of the insolvent debtor but to prevent abuse through unwarranted dissipation of assets. The liabilities which ground the 2 judgment debts here were all incurred before the aborted sale of the Properties that has led to the present action. Mr Lin fairly does not strongly oppose the payment of the estate agency fee but says that he would leave that to this Court. The debts appear all to be genuine, sufficiently important, and are pressing. This is particularly so when the judgment creditors have been threatening bankruptcy proceedings. 17.In all, I allow the application. 18.Having heard counsel, I order that the costs of this summons be Ds’ costs in the cause of the action.
Mr Kenny C P Lin, instructed by Vincent T K Cheung, Yap & Co, for the Plaintiff Ms Rosa K Y Lee, instructed by Lo, Wong & Tsui, for the 1st and 2nd Defendants [1] After Iraqi Ministry of Defence v Arcepey Shipping Co SA (The Angel Bell) [1981] QB 65. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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