The Queen v. Mok Chun Yiu

Read the full judgment text of CACC 1614/1983 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 27 January 1984.

1. This is an appeal by way of case stated. The respondent was charged in Tsuen Wan Magistrates Court with 6 charges of accepting an advantage as an agent, contrary to section 9(1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance Cap. 201. At the close of the prosecution case the learned magistrate held that there was no case to answer and acquitted the respondent on all the charges. The Crown now appeals.

Case No.CACC 1614/1983
Court
Court of Appeal
Date27 Jan 1984
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CACC001614/1983

Prevention of Bribery Ordinance S. 9(1)(a) - Magistrates Ordinance S. 27 - Duty to amend particulars - Inference of guilt from admissions.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG Criminal Appeal
1983 No. 1614

BETWEEN

THE QUEEN

AND

MOK CHUN-YIU

Coram: Hon. Bewley, J. in Court

Date: 27 January 1984

___________

JUDGMENT

___________

1. This is an appeal by way of case stated. The respondent was charged in Tsuen Wan Magistrates Court with 6 charges of accepting an advantage as an agent, contrary to section 9(1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance Cap. 201. At the close of the prosecution case the learned magistrate held that there was no case to answer and acquitted the respondent on all the charges. The Crown now appeals.

2. No oral evidence was led. The prosecution case was based on the record of 3 interviews between ICAC officers and the respondent plus one written statement under caution. The following facts were established.

3. The respondent was employed as sales manager by A. S. Watson & Co., Ltd., with special responsibility for sales of distilled water. He was responsible also for a number of salesmen. He admitted to the ICAC that he had received payments of $300 from 4 of these salesmen on a regular basis from 1978 - 1982. He said he had also received $300 on 3 occasions between June and October, 1982, from a fifth salesman, LAU Lee-hong. He also recalled that there had been another salesman, CHAN Chi-wai, from whom he had received payments of $200 or $300, but he was unable to remember when these payments were made. The respondent was not authorized by his employer to accept money from the salesmen.

4. The six charges differed only in respect of the names of the salesmen and the dates of the offences. The particulars of the first charge, for example, alleged that the respondent, being an agent, namely a sales manager employed by A. S. Watson & Co., Ltd. in or about the month of January 1979, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, accepted an advantage, namely $300 HK currency, from CHAN Hung-yin, as an inducement to or reward for or otherwise on account of his having forborne to do an act in relation to his principal's affairs or business, namely taking such disciplinary action against the said CHAN Hung-yin as may have been appropriate.

5. S. 9(l) of the ordinance provides:

"Any agent who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, solicits or accepts any advantage as an inducement to or reward for or otherwise on account of his -

(a) doing or forbearing to do, or having done or forborne to do, any act in relation to his principal's affairs or business; or
(b) showing or forbearing to show, or having shown or forborne to show, favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal's affairs or business,

shall be guilty of an offence."

S. 11 provides that it shall be no defence that:

(a) he did not actually have the power, right or opportunity so to do or forbear;
(b) he accepted the advantage without intending so to do or forbear; or
(c) he did not in fact so do or forbear.

6. The respondent attributed several different motives to the salesmen. They were variously:

(1) That he would procure more new customers for them, so that they could earn more commission.
(2) That he would show them favour in relation to their work. As he explained, "Because if customers complained that the staff's manner was bad, or they had damaged the customers' property, I would deal with it. They thought that I could make good remarks to the customers for them.''
(3) That they wanted to help him in his financial difficulties in the form of non-repayable 'loans'.

7. It is common ground that, as the particulars were framed, only (2) amounts to an offence. The respondent had a duty to follow up complaints by customers and take action against the salesmen, if he found they were justified. This is made clear by his answer to Q. 26 in the first interview viz.:

"Q(26): What would you do in case the above-said complaints were received?
A(26): I would make a full inquiry of the customer about the reason and the details of the complaint. Also, I would ask the salesman and the lorry attendants in question what actually happened. Should (I) think it was the workers' fault; I would give a verbal warning to the first offenders and would dismiss those committing the same mistake again."

8. The learned magistrate found that the respondent's admissions were ambiguous and decided that it was not him to read between the lines.

9. The questions arising for the opinion of the Court are:

(i) Was I right in law in holding that the Respondent had no case to answer on the said informations, and consequently dismissing them?

(ii) If I was right in holding that the Respondent had no case to answer on the said informations, should I have amended them under section 27 of the Magistrates Ordinance, Chapter 227 so as to allege that the Respondent did "an act in relation to his principal's affairs or business, namely procuring new customers for the said (salesman)?"

(iii) If the answer to question (i) is "no", or the answer to question (ii) is "yes", should the trial of the said informations continue?

10. A person's actions may be prompted by more than one motive. In the present case the reasons given for the payments are hot mutually exclusive. Indeed all 3 reasons are plausible. The Crown needed only to prove that the second reason was one of the reasons for the payments.

11. This, however, was a matter for the decision of the magistrate at the end of the case, when he had heard what the respondent had to say, if anything. In deciding that there was no case to answer, he was saying in effect that no jury, properly directed, could reasonably have drawn an inference of guilt from these admissions.

12. It seems that, on the evidence before him, the magistrate felt that he could not draw that inference. But, I think, with respect, that he came to that conclusion too soon. The inference that the second reason was one of the true reasons for the payments was, in my judgment, one that was open to him to draw.

13. Reference is made, in the second question for the Court, to section 27 of the Magistrates Ordinance. This provision is designed to ensure that a magistrate does substantial justice in the case before him and does not throw it out on a technicality. It is, moreover, mandatory in nature. Subsections 1 and 2 provide:

"(1) No objection shall be taken or allowed to any complaint, information or summons for any alleged defect therein in substance or in form, or for any variance between such complaint, information or summons and the evidence adduced in support thereof, and the adjudicating magistrate shall in all cases give judgment upon the substantial merits and facts of the case as proved before him, and convict the defendant of the offence with which he was charged with such variation as has been warranted by the evidence or of any offence which under the provisions of section 10(2)(c) could have been tried therewith.
(2) Whenever in the opinion of the magistrate there is a defect of substance or there has been any such variance as aforesaid he shall make the necessary amendment in the complaint, information, or summons and shall read and explain the same to the defendant."

14. If, after all the evidence was in, the magistrate felt he was, in fact, unable to draw the inference in question, he would be duty-bound to amend the particulars to accord with the facts, as he found them, and to convict on those particulars, provided he was satisfied that they were proved beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, if he found that the only reasonable inference from the respondent's admissions was that the payments were made for one of the other stated reasons, or a combination thereof, he would be bound to amend and convict accordingly.

15. It follows that Q(i) must be answered 'No' and Q(iii) 'Yes'. It may be necessary for the learned magistrate to amend as proposed in Q(ii), but that is not a matter that arises at this stage. It may be, indeed, that he will feel it necessary to amend in a more comprehensive manner - as provided for in S. 27 - but that is essentially a matter for him.

16. There is one other minor matter. Counsel for the Crown concedes that 6th charge needs amendment as to the time of the offence. 'In or about the month of January, 1983' is alleged, the only evidence concerning CHAN Chi-wai is contained in 3rd interview, when he was asked at Q.5 "When did you commence collecting money from him?". The answer was "The actual time has slipped my memory. But the office was still in Whampoa (Sun Chuen) then." The charge will thus have to be amended to 'a date unknown'.

(E. de B. Bewley)

Judge of the High Court

Representation:

Mr. M. A. McMahon, Senior Crown Counsel, for appellant

Mr. John Mullick (Laurence Pang & Co.) for respondent