HKSAR v. Cheung Kie-chung

Read the full judgment text of HCCC 292/2019 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 3 December 2020.

Case No.HCCC 292/2019[2020] HKCFI 3106
Court
High Court CFI
Date03 Dec 2020
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCCC 292/2019

HCCC 293/2019

(Heard together)

[2020] HKCFI 3106

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CRIMINAL CASE NOS 292 & 293 OF 2019

________________________

  HKSAR  
  v  
  Cheung Kie-chung (張祺忠)  

________________________

Before: Hon Anthea Pang J
Date: 3 December 2020 at 10.07 am
Present: Mr Jonathan Man, SADPP, and Ms Lilly Wong, SPP, of the Department of Justice, for HKSAR
Mr Graham Harris, SC, and Mr Lee Shu-wun, instructed by Morley Chow Seto, for the accused
Offence: (1)  Murder (謀殺) (HCCC 292/2019)
(2)  Preventing the lawful burial of a body (阻止埋葬屍體) (HCCC 293/2019)

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Transcript of the Audio Recording
of the Sentence in the above Case

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COURT: The accused was charged with Count 1, murder, and Count 2, preventing the lawful burial of a body. He pleaded guilty to Count 2 at the committal stage in the Magistrates’ Courts but pleaded not guilty to Count 1 which count was committed to this court for trial.

At the beginning of the trial for murder, the accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter, which plea was not accepted by the prosecution. At the conclusion of the trial on 26 November this year, the jury returned a majority guilty verdict.

Although for the offence of murder, there is only one sentence, that is a mandatory life sentence that this court could pass in law, Mr Harris, leading counsel for the accused, indicated that he felt duty-bound and would like to organise the material for the mitigation of Count 2 and he therefore requested for the proceedings to be adjourned.

While whatever sentence I am going to pass in respect of Count 2 would not really matter in this case because of the mandatory life sentence for murder, on the basis advanced by Mr Harris, I granted the adjournment requested and the hearing resumed this morning.

During the adjournment, Mr Harris sent to this court two bundles of mitigation letters, including hundreds of signatories coming from the accused’s friends, schoolmates, distinguished academics, ex-colleagues, former students, alumni of HKU and Wei Lun Hall, etc. All spoke of the generosity, dedication and passion the accused had for his work, his hall and his students. The accused was described as a selfless person who was always willing to help and who was always prepared to go the extra mile to see that the others’ needs or problems were addressed. I do not intend to go into the details of these letters as in the course of this trial, this court had heard live witnesses giving similar testimonies and I have little doubt that prior to the commission of these offences, the accused was such a person and was well respected and well liked by those with whom he had dealings.

That said, the offence of murder is the gravest offence in our statute books for which a life sentence is prescribed. Irrespective of the background of an accused, in the case of murder, we are talking about the intentional taking away of another’s precious life. Therefore, no matter how gentle and caring the accused was before the killing, by the verdict of the jury, he did, at the time of the killing, cold-bloodedly murdered his wife with whom he had married for 30-odd years.

In other words, although at trial, the accused pitched his killing on the basis of provocation or diminished responsibility, by the verdict of the jury, the said manslaughter was clearly rejected and the jury found the case of murder against the accused. They found that the accused did not kill because he was provoked to do so, nor did he kill because he was, at the time, suffering from an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired his responsibility.

As to the reason why the accused murdered his wife, whether it was because of the money matter as suggested by the prosecution or otherwise, this, only the accused himself knows. Whatever it was, the result is tragic. Tragic to the deceased, to the accused himself, and to their family.

As I have said at the outset, there is only one sentence which I could pass in law for the murder count and that is a life term.

In respect of Count 2, preventing the lawful burial count, on the facts admitted and now undisputed, the killing of Tina took place in the small hours of 17 August 2018. Tina’s body was then concealed by the accused, firstly in a suitcase, then inside a wooden box made by him. It was only until 28 August 2018 was Tina’s body then discovered in the accused’s office. In the interim, Tracy, Nancy, and Scot thought Tina went missing and tried to locate her, which eventually led to the Missing Person Report being made to the police.

As observed by the Court of Appeal in R v Chu Kwai Ying and Another [1996] 4 HKC 40 at paragraph 16:

“The body lay hidden for more than a week, with all the consequent distress that is bound to have caused relatives or friends of the deceased”.

Likewise, the concealment of Tina’s body in this case had not only caused a missing person report to be made to the police, but must have, in the first place, brought a false hope on those who wanted desperately to locate Tina at the time which hope, the accused knew full well, could never be fulfilled. The eventual discovery of Tina’s body must have also caused great distress to those concerned and until then could Tina’s body be properly dealt with.

Given the facts admitted in relation to this count, the time involved in the concealment, the way of concealment, etc, and even taking note of the suggestion that the concealment of the body was done out of panic and done out of the accused’s inability to face up to the enormity of what he had done and the naivety involved, I consider that a starting point of 3½ years to be appropriate.

The accused pleaded guilty at the committal stage and I would grant him the full one-third reduction. Other than this, there is nothing which would warrant any further discount in sentence in relation to this count.

Accordingly, I sentence the accused to life imprisonment for Count 1, murder, and to 28 months’ imprisonment for Count 2, the burial count. Applying the totality principle, I order that both terms are to run wholly concurrently.

Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under HCCC 292/2019