Yuen Tsz Chun (As the Administrator of the Estate of Chan Choi Lin (陳彩蓮), Deceased) v. Lo Chi Keung and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1280/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 February 2021.
1. The present application is taken out by the plaintiff in his capacity as the administrator of the Deceased’s estate (“ Administrator ”) under Order 85 rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court, for the Court’s determination as to the correct interpretation of section 8A(2) of the Intestates’ Estates Ordinance, Cap 73 (“ IEO ”).
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HCMP 1280/2020 [2021] HKCFI 493 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1280 OF 2020 _______________________
_______________________ Before: Hon B Chu J in Court Date of Hearing: 23 February 2021 Date of Decision: 23 February 2021 Date of Reasons for Decision: 2 March 2021 _________________ REASONS _________________ Introduction 1.The present application is taken out by the plaintiff in his capacity as the administrator of the Deceased’s estate (“Administrator”) under Order 85 rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court, for the Court’s determination as to the correct interpretation of section 8A(2) of the Intestates’ Estates Ordinance, Cap 73 (“IEO”). 2.The question posed by the plaintiff is:
3.The Deceased died on 12 February 2015 domiciled in Hong Kong, leaving her spouse (“D1”), and also her father. Her father later passed away in 2016 and Mr Chan Chi Wai (“D2”), namely the Deceased’s brother, is the executor of father’s estate. 4.Originally, D1 was granted the letters of administration of Deceased’s estate. Subsequently, under the Order of Chung J on 17 January 2019, D1 was removed as administrator under HCMP 188/2018, and the Administrator was appointed in his place. Since then, the Administrator has been administering the Deceased’s estate. 5.The Deceased died leaving assets in Hong Kong, Singapore and Isle of Man. 6.In the present application, Counsel Mr Val Chow appeared for the Administrator at the hearing before this Court. D2 has through his solicitors indicated that he was not contesting the application and was granted leave to be absent. D1 turned up at the hearing in person and indicated that he was not opposing the application, and had nothing to say. 7.At the hearing, this Court has found that on the plain and natural meaning of section 8(2) of the IEO, Interpretation 1 is the correct interpretation. My reasons are asset out hereinafter. The statutory provisions 8.Section 4 (4) of IEO sets out as follows:
9.Section 8A then provides as follows:
10.The Court’s attention has not been drawn to any other provisions in the IEO which refer to a “net sum to a surviving husband or wife”, apart from the subsections in section 4 of IEO. It is thus my view that the “net sum” referred to in section 8A(2) clearly refers to the “net sum” in the subsections of section 4 of the IEO and in the present case, the “net sum” is the amount of HKD 1,000,000 in section 4(4) of IEO. 11.Mr Chow has set out the general principles of interpretation in his skeleton submissions. It is well established that the Court will adopt a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, whereby the statutory language is construed with regard to its context and purpose. Words are given their natural and ordinary meaning unless the context or purpose points to a different meaning, and the context and purpose are considered when interpreting the words used and not only when an ambiguity might be thought to arise: HKSAR v Cheung Kwun Yin (2009) 12 HKCFAR 568 at paragraph 12. 12.Thus, as submitted by Mr Chow, the words of the statute are to be given their “natural and plain meaning” having regard to (i) the context of the enactment and (ii) its purpose. Further, Mr Chow has submitted that the purpose of a statutory provision may be ascertained from publicly available documentation of its legislative history[1]. 13.Mr Chow has referred this Court to the legislative history as external interpretative aid, assuming what is called the “Pepper v Hart approach” is good law in Hong Kong[2]. 14.In particular, Mr Chow has referred to the Report of The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong on Law of Wills, Intestate Succession, and Provision for Deceased Persons’ Families and Dependants published in 1990 (“LRC Report”). 15.The recommendation in relation to where a surviving spouse acquires an interest under foreign law of the LRC Report can be seen in paragraphs 8.27 to 8.28, which state as follows:
16.Clause 8 of the Bill at Annexure 7 sets out the then proposed new section 8A of IEO, which subsequently was enacted in 1995. 17.I will not set out in detail all the legislative history of section 8A. 18.Suffice to say, it would appear to this Court that instead of requiring the surviving spouse to fully account for all moneys received elsewhere against any interest received under the intestacy or partial intestacy in Hong Kong in respect of immovable property, the recommendation in the LRC Report was only that the “net sum” payable to the surviving spouse is to be diminished by the value at date of death of the beneficial interests acquired by the spouse under the law of intestacy or of partial intestacy of a foreign place and where the value of those beneficial interests exceeds the “net sum”, IEO shall have effect as if references to the “net sum” and interest on that sum were omitted. 19.In my view, the plain and natural meaning of section 8A(2) is that where the value of those beneficial interests acquired by the surviving spouse under foreign law exceeds the “net sum” of HKD 1,000,000 in section 4(4), the references to the “net sum” would be omitted and the residuary estate of the intestate shall be held as provided in 4(4)(a) and (b), as the situation may be. This interpretation is also consistent with the legislative intent. 20.Thus, my determination is that Interpretation 1 is the correct interpretation. 21.Mr Chow has also set out arguments in favour of Interpretation 2. As pointed out by him, Interpretation 2 would ensure that the beneficiaries of an estate, be they spouses or other family members are treated equally where they inherit under foreign intestacy law as they would all have to account in full for the foreign interest. However, I find that Interpretation 2 is not the plain and natural meaning of the wording of section 8A(2). I also find that it was not the legislative intent. In my view, the legislative intent was clearly for the operation of the spousal accounting provisions (under section 8A(2) and the non-spousal accounting provisions (under sections 8A(3) and (4)) to be different. Conclusion 22.For all the above reasons, as said above, in my view Interpretation 1 is the correct interpretation. 23.I have ordered that the Administrator’s costs of this application be summarily assessed on trustee basis and paid out of the Deceased’s estate. Directions have been made for the lodging of statement of costs and lists of objections. The summary assessment will be dealt with on paper.
Mr Val Chow, instructed by Simmons & Simmons, for the Plaintiff The 1st Defendant appeared in person Mr Michael Cheuk of Wong & Kee, for the 2nd Defendant | |||||||||||||||||||||