Re Fulgencio Milagros S.

CACV 248/2019

[2021] HKCA 323

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 248 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 406/2018)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 16 April 2020, this court (Chu JA, Barma JA and Au JA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the judge”) on 31 May 2019 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing her appeal from the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting her non-refoulement claim.

2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.

3.The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion dated 12 May 2020, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant stated in the Notice of Motion that:

“I would like to inform the [court] that there is some error in law in my decision. Decision maker just relied on COI information and my previous facts which were in favor while rejecting my claim. Actual life occur different situation then what is mentioned in COI information. The Officer and courts prefers to ignore the overwhelming of the evidence of this violence towards minorities searching for unrealistic silver lining. The Decision is betray a bias and formula approach unlikely fairly access the danger of my life and clearly not reasonable.”

4.The applicant lodged a written submission in support of the application on 27 May 2020.  In the written submission, the applicant submitted that:

(1)  the Board failed to meet the high standard of fairness;

(2)  the Board failed to properly assess her credibility; and

(3)  the Board’s decision was Wednesbury unreasonable.

5.Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

6.The matters stated by the applicant do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters she has raised.  

7.The grounds relied on by the applicant are very broad and lack particulars.  They do not identify any error in our judgment, complaining only in respect of the decision of the Board.  In our view, these grounds are not reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal. 

8.We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

9.For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 12 May 2020 is dismissed.

The applicant acting in person