Mehmood Kashir v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of CACV 470/2020 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 29 March 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 9 September 2020 dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office / Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 23 February 2018 dismissing his appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 1 September 2016 and 28 November 201
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CACV 470/2020 [2021] HKCA 410 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 470 OF 2020 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 877 of 2018) ________________________ BETWEEN
________________________ Before: Hon Lam VP, Yau and S T Poon JJ in Court Date of hearing: 22 March 2021 Date of Judgment: 29 March 2021 ________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon S T Poon J (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 9 September 2020 dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office / Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 23 February 2018 dismissing his appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 1 September 2016 and 28 November 2017 rejecting his non-refoulement claim. 2.The applicant is a Pakistani national. He entered Hong Kong unlawfully in September 2013 and was arrested by an immigration officer on 3 October 2013. The applicant lodged a non-refoulement claim on 27 March 2014. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on the fear that, if he returned to Pakistan, he would be harmed or even killed by his former employer(s), the Khan family, who eventually forced him to participate in their illegal activities and to perform forced labour. The factual background was succinctly summarized by the Judge at [2] – [4] of the Form CALL-1[1]. 4.By notices of decision dated 1 September 2016 and 28 November 2017, the Director assessed the applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds and determined it against them. The former covered BOR 3 risk[2], persecution risk[3], and torture risk[4], while the latter covered BOR 2 risk[5]. 5.By its decision dated 23 February 2018, the Board dismissed the appeal having regard to all applicable grounds. Primarily, the Board found that the applicant’s factual account of his claimed involvement in illegal activities to be vague, unpersuasive and lacking in detail. Due to numerous inconsistencies and omissions in his evidence, the Board found that the applicant had not been truthful in his claim and rejected it in its entirety. Application for leave to start judicial review 6.On 21 May 2018, the applicant filed a Form 86 to apply for leave to judicially review the Board’s decision which contained no ground for seeking the relief. In his affirmation in support, the applicant stated that the Immigration Department disregarded his dangerous situation. The Judge’s Decision 7.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Director and the Board, the Judge refused to give leave for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [14] to [18] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal 8.By a Notice of Appeal filed on 14 September 2020, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review. His stated grounds of appeal are that he will face hardship if he were to return to his home country; that the Board relied on sources that are not officially recognized, hearsay or outdated; and that the lack of credible sources of information resulted in the Board making groundless speculations. Written Submissions 9.Pursuant to the Court’s directions, the applicant lodged his written submissions on 25 January 2021. Those submissions consist of general statements of law quoted from case law without identifying how they relate to or apply in this case. The applicant did not provide any details or particulars in support of his grounds of appeal or as to any specific errors by the Board or the Judge. Legal Principles 10.The position in law in an appeal to the Court of Appeal, as established by a number of judicial precedents, is as follows. 11.The primary decision makers in relation to an applicant’s claim for non-refoulement are the Director and (in an unsuccessful claim) the Board. They assess the evidence and are the finders of fact, which may include findings not only in respect of the applicant’s credibility in respect of his/her individual allegations, but also in respect of the risk (or otherwise) of harm, the availability (or otherwise) of state protection, and the viability (or otherwise) of internal relocation, having regard to relevant matters including the applicant’s personal circumstances as found after the hearing, as well as relevant information regarding the applicant’s country of origin. 12.When the matter comes before a judge of the Court of First Instance on an application for leave to start judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Board, the judge’s position is not the same as that of the Director or the Board. Although the judge will adopt an enhanced standard when scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, he does not hear the claim afresh as if he was the Board. In keeping with established principles of judicial review, the judge cannot intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, or procedural unfairness, or irrationality in the Board’s decision. The relevant cases establishing this position have been conveniently set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[6]and we will not repeat them here. 13.Subsequently if the matter comes before the Court of Appeal, the focus is further refined to the scrutiny of the decision of the judge as challenged in the grounds of appeal. Again, in keeping with established principles governing appeals from a refusal of a judge to grant leave to start judicial review proceedings, the Court of Appeal would only interfere if the applicant can demonstrate that the judge had made errors of law, or had failed to take into account relevant matters, or was otherwise plainly wrong[7]. Generally fresh evidence would not be admitted unless the requirements in Ladd v Marshall[8] are satisfied. Nor would the Court of Appeal generally entertain new arguments based on facts, when those arguments should have been canvassed before coming to this court. 14.We heard the appeal on 22 March 2021. At the hearing, the applicant had nothing further to say. Discussion 15.As mentioned earlier, the applicant did not in his Notice of Appeal or written submissions provide any particulars in support of his grounds of appeal, and did not identify any specific errors in the Judge’s decision or any other specific potential grounds for reversing the Judge’s decision. General assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review: see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578; Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626; Re Salim Ahmed [2020] HKCA 244. 16.As we would only examine the Judge’s decision in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant to reverse the Judge, and as there appear to be no such grounds that point to any error by the Judge, the appeal should be dismissed. 17.In the present case, the Board rejected the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection based on its adverse findings as to the applicant’s credibility. Such findings are within the province of the Board, and the court will not interfere with such assessments unless they are reversible on public law grounds. 18.Having considered the materials before us, we are of the view that the Judge’s observations are fully justified. The Judge has applied the relevant legal principles correctly. We cannot find any flaws in his analysis. The Judge is plainly right to refuse leave. There is no reasonably arguable ground to challenge the decision of the Judge. 19.For these reasons, this appeal is dismissed.
The applicant, unrepresented, appearing in person. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115). [5] This refers to the risk of violation of the right of life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [7] See cases cited in Nupur Mst, op cit, §14(2). [8] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. |
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