Chan Yim v. The Queen
Read the full judgment text of CACC 166/1972 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment.
1. The appellant was charged in the Court below that he on the 15th March 1971 outside 394 Castle Peak Road in this Colony, being the driver of a public light bus caused the vehicle to wait on a road within 50 feet of and on the same side of the road as a sign erected in accordance with the provisions of the Road Traffic (Public Omnibuses and Public Cars) Regulations Cap. 220 to indicate the setting aside or designation of a bus stop contrary to Regulations 3(2) and 34 of Road Traffic (Parking &
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CACC000166/1972 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 166 OF 1972 -----------------
----------------- Coram: Leonard J. in Court. Date of Judgment: 15th May 1972 ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- 1. The appellant was charged in the Court below that he on the 15th March 1971 outside 394 Castle Peak Road in this Colony, being the driver of a public light bus caused the vehicle to wait on a road within 50 feet of and on the same side of the road as a sign erected in accordance with the provisions of the Road Traffic (Public Omnibuses and Public Cars) Regulations Cap. 220 to indicate the setting aside or designation of a bus stop contrary to Regulations 3(2) and 34 of Road Traffic (Parking & Waiting) Regulations Cap. 220. 2. Regulation 3(2) reads as follows:
while Regulation 34 makes contravention on offence and prescribes the penalty. 3. The evidence for the prosecution which was accepted by the learned Magistrate was that the appellant stopped his public light bus at the bus stop about 20 feet away from the bus stop sign and picked up 4 passengers. The vehicle was stopped for less than half a minute. There were no Kowloon Motor buses in the vicinity nor was there any evidence that appellant's vehicle obstructed any other traffic. The bus stop sign was a temporary one and there were no markings on the road surface. 4. The appellant who was unrepresented in the Court below raised no question as to whether the facts proved disclosed an offence, apparently taking it for granted that they did, but by his notice of appeal contended that "the conviction was wrong in law". This was of course wholly inadequate as a ground of appeal but in unmerited leniency and as there was no objection by Crown Counsel I permitted the solicitor for the appellant to argue that on the evidence accepted by the learned Magistrate the appellant could not be said to have "caused" the vehicle "to wait" at the bus stop. 5. Mr. Winter for the appellant contended that the words "cause to wait" must import some longer stop than that proved against the appellant and in support of his contention referred me to a number of regulations made under the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 220) contrasting the words used in them with those of Reg. 3(2) or where the words used were "cause to wait" or "wait" pointing out how in other regulations they must be given a wider meaning than "stop to pick up passengers". He suggested that it was clear from the legislation in its entirety that the legislature intended that the words should be given a wider definition than that for which Crown Counsel must contend to support the conviction in this case. 6. Thus he pointed out that Reg. 3(2A) of the same regulations made it an offence to "cause or permit a passenger to be picked up or set down by the vehicle" in certain circumstances and suggested that the use of these words in an adjoining regulation indicated that "cause to wait" required the vehicle to remain stationary for a longer period than would be required in order to pick up or set down passengers. He referred to Regulations 3(1), 6(1) and 6(2) and (1) of the Road Traffic (Parking & Waiting) Regulations where "parking" and "permitting to wait" are classified together to reinforce his argument that "waiting" and "parking" must be analogous contending that the words "cause to wait" must be assumed to have the same meaning throughout the various regulations in which they were used for there was nothing in those regulations to suggest an intention to change their meaning from one regulation to another while there was, in the fact that different expressions were used on occasions in connection with the picking up of passengers or in relation to other momentary stops a strong reason for contending that something more than a momentary stops a strong reason for contending that something more than a momentary stop was contemplated by the phrase "cause to wait". He further referred to Eldridge v. British Airport Authority (1970) 2 A.E.R. 92 in which it was held for the purposes of section 35 of The London Hackney Carriage Act 1831 that the word "standing" meant something more than merely being stationary but "something akin to waiting or parking". Mrs. Jackson-Lipkin for the Crown contended that the word "waiting" in its natural and ordinary meaning embraced the behaviour of the appellant and suggested that one could "wait" for a second or for a period of 5 minutes. In this case it was clear that the appellant had stopped and remained stopped to wait for 4 passengers to get in. She did not however pursue her argument to its logical conclusion and suggest that to wait for one passenger to get in would necessarily be covered by the regulation but contented herself with suggesting that the length of the period for which a vehicle must be stopped before it can be said to be waiting was a question of fact in each particular case. 7. In any interpretation of the Regulation I am enjoined by section 19 of the Interpretation Ordinance to deem it to be "remedial" and to give it "such fair large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Ordinance according to its true intent, meaning and spirit". The trouble to be remedied by the Road Traffic (Parking & Waiting) Regulations generally is surely obstruction, actual or possible, caused or likely to be caused by improper parking or waiting while that to be remedied by Regulation 3(2) in particular is obstruction by improper parking or waiting near a bus stop. 8. The words to which I must give a fair large and liberal inter-pretation are "cause (a vehicle) to wait". The meaning of the word "wait" when applied to a person is different from its meaning when applied to a thing. Indeed the Shorter Oxford dictionary makes this difference clear when it defines the word, as applied to a person, as meaning "to defer action until something happens" but, as applied to a thing as meaning "to remain in readiness" or "to remain for a while neglected". Reference to a dictionary for the meaning of a simple word like "wait" is perhaps contrary to the spirit of section 19 but, giving it as fair large a liberal inter-pretation as I may, to me the expression "cause to wait" in this regulation when read in conjunction with the others in Parking & Waiting Regulation must mean something akin to park. I agree with Mrs. Jackson-Lipkin that the question as to how long a vehicle must be stopped before it can be regarded as being "caused to wait" is a question to be decided in each particular case. It is a question of fact that one must approach with common sense remembering that the purpose of the Regulation is to present unreasonable obstruction of traffic, particularly of public buses, wishing to approach or leave the bus stop. The regulation does not necessarily prohibit stopping; it does not necessarily prohibit picking up or setting passengers. It would in my view prohibit stopping for expected passengers who were not in a position to beard the vehicle stopped immediately. Equally it would prohibit stopping even for the Purpose of picking up or setting down passengers read to board if there was likelihood of interference with other traffic generally and Public Buses in particular. However, it is no part of this judgment to endeavour to list the factors which must be taken into account in determining whether a particular "stopping" amounts to "causing to wait". that is a matter dependent on the prevailing traffic conditions in each case. 9. In this particular case traffic conditions were described as "heavy but not congested", there was no obstruction alleged and there were no buses approaching or leaving the bus stop. On these facts I have little doubt but that the learned Magistrate would, if the matter had been argued before him as it has been before me, have decided that the manner in and the period for which the appellant stopped his vehicle did not amount to causing it to wait. 10. Accordingly I allow this appeal and quash the conviction and fine.
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