A v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 109/2016 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 July 2021.
1. The Applicant is a 37-year-old national of Iraq who was deported from Singapore to Hong Kong on 5 May 2014, and when he was refused entry by the Immigration Department, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Iraq he would be harmed or killed by his uncle who blamed him for the accidental death of his uncle’s son and/or by a former member of the Islamic Army in Iraq (“IAI”) who had extorted money from his family and/or by the Iraqi Security Force (“ISF”) for havi
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HCAL 109/2016 [2021] HKCFI 2001 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 109 of 2016 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
Observations for the Applicant: 1.The Applicant is a 37-year-old national of Iraq who was deported from Singapore to Hong Kong on 5 May 2014, and when he was refused entry by the Immigration Department, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Iraq he would be harmed or killed by his uncle who blamed him for the accidental death of his uncle’s son and/or by a former member of the Islamic Army in Iraq (“IAI”) who had extorted money from his family and/or by the Iraqi Security Force (“ISF”) for having been involved with the US Army and IAI in the past. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim. 2.The Applicant was born and raised in Mosul, Iraq as a Sunni Muslim. After leaving school he assisted in his father’s window frames business, and also worked as a part-time taxi driver in his home district. 3.In 2007 his father and uncles carried out some window framing work for the American Army stationing in Iraq after their invasion in 2003 which they had kept a secret from the local community for fear of reprisal for assisting the enemy. 4.However, later in the same year a man by the name of Abu Marwah (“Marwah”) who used to be a member of IAI, one of the Islamist militant groups formed after the US invasion in 2003, and threatened the Applicant’s father and uncles that he would exposed their secret to the local community unless they paid him money, and when they refused their shop was burnt down, and after the police failed to help, his father and uncle eventually paid the money which Marwah demanded, but the Applicant remained in fear that Marwah may blackmail them again or that the local community may discover his father’s secret and would come to harm him and his family. 5.One day in February 2008 while the Applicant was driving his father’s car together with his cousin Omar on the way to the Al-Yarmuk District, they ran into a column of US army trucks when a roadside bomb exploded and the US soldiers started firing their guns at everyone which hit and killed Omar, and after they stopped shooting, they grabbed the Applicant and searched his car, and when they found a gun which his father had kept in the car for self-defense, they started hitting and kicking the Applicant until he lost consciousness. 6.Upon his discharge from the hospital for the injuries he received from the US soldiers, the Applicant was taken to the US military base in Jawsaq District where he was interrogated about the gun found in his father’s vehicle and was detained there for 7 months as the American soldiers were not satisfied with his explanation that he knew nothing about the gun as it was his father’s car, and eventually the Applicant told them about Marwah being a IAI member extorting money from his family that he was finally released and returned home. 7.However, after learning from him about how Omar was killed, his uncle blamed the Applicant for his son’s death, and one day his uncle fired a shot at him with his gun but missed him, and since then he became fearful of any further revenge attack on his life by his uncle. 8.One evening on 23 April 2009 while the Applicant was visiting some friends in their house, a fire fight broke out between IAI and ISF in their neighbourhood, and suddenly some ISF members broke in and searched their place, and when they found a gun in one of the bedrooms, they accused the Applicant and his friends of being terrorists and took them to their camp base at Al-Kendy where they were detained, interrogated and tortured for almost four months, during which the Applicant was beaten so severely that he had to be brought to a hospital for medical treatments. 9.Eventually the Applicant was released by ISF and returned home where he learned that the ISF agents had also come to search his home during his detention and interrogated his father and brothers. 10.One day in late 2009 the Applicant ran into his uncle in their home district who still blamed him for his son’s death, and tried to hit him with his car but the Applicant managed to escape without harm, but as he was fearful of his uncle’s revenge as well as the ISF, he therefore departed Iraq on 19 April 2010 for Turkey where he overstayed and was repatriated to Iraq on 8 May 2010. 11.A few days later the Applicant left for Syria and in transit to Turkey, and on 27 May 2010 he arrived in Cyprus where he made a refugee application to the European Union, during which he stayed in a refugee camp near Nicosia and relied on the local welfare assistance while his application was being processed, but when Cyprus later stopped the welfare assistance for asylum seekers in 2012, the Applicant departed on 11 December 2012 and returned to Iraq. 12.One week later on 18 December 2012, the Applicant left Iraq again for Malaysia where he found a job working in a restaurant, but one day in March 2013 he was robbed by some gang members in the Taman Milati District including his Iraqi passport, and when he tried to apply for a replacement at the Iraqi embassy, he was only given some travel document and was told that he needed to return to Iraq to apply for a formal replacement of his passport, but as he was afraid to return to Iraq, he therefore sought some local help and obtained a fake Egyptian passport with which he then travelled to Indonesia on 9 December 2013, and from there he took his first trip to Hong Kong as a visitor. 13.On 20 December 2013 he departed Hong Kong for South Korea where he applied for asylum based on his fake Egyptian passport, but during his screening process before the South Korean immigration department, he became worried about the serious legal consequences of being charged for using the fake passport, he therefore abandoned his application, and before leaving South Korea, he obtained a soft copy of the bio-data of his Iraqi passport from his friend in Cyprus, and left for Hong Kong on 24 April 2014. 14.The Applicant stayed in Hong Kong as a visitor for 8 days before departing on 3 May 2014 for Singapore where he threw away his fake Egyptian passport at the airport and used the copied bio-data of his Iraqi passport to apply for asylum to the Singaporean immigration department, but his application was refused and on 5 May 2014 he was deported back to Hong Kong, and when he was refused entry by the Immigration Department, he then produced the copied bio-data of his Iraqi passport for his identity and raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 14 August 2014 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”). 15.By a Notice of Decision dated 4 December 2014 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all then applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”). 16.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his perceived enemies upon his return to Iraq as low due to doubt over the credibility of his claim and in particularly his failure to establish his claimed Iraqi identity or to produce acceptable documentary evidence in support of such claim, that there is no reliable evidence of any official acquiescence of his claimed ill-treatment by ISF, that in the absence of any official involvement in his claimed risk of harm from Marwah or his uncle that state or police protection would be available to him if resorted to upon his return to Iraq, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Iraq with a large population spread across a vast territory that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of Iraq away from his home district in region such as Erbil where it would be difficult if not impossible for his perceived enemies to locate him. 17.On 15 December 2014 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 27 February 2015 before the Board with legal representation from DLS during which he gave oral evidence and answered questions put to him by the Adjudicator for the Board and with submissions made by his lawyer for his appeal. On 9 March 2016 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision. 18.In its decision the Board found the Applicant’s failure or inability to establish his claimed identity as a national of Iraq from Mosul despite ample opportunity to do so as a striking feature of his case that it was not persuaded that his identity and home city were as he claimed them to be, that his assertions that his father and uncles of being extorted by Marwah and his fear of harm from him whom he had never met is far-fetched and unconvincing largely based on hearsay, while his assertion of fear of revenge from his uncle for the death of Omar if true arose from the personal emotional feelings of his uncle and did not advance his case, and as for his claim of fear of harm from the ISF, giving its findings in relation to the general credibility of the Applicant, the Board was not persuaded that he had been detained in the circumstances he described or that he had been ill-treated by the ISF as he asserted, or that he had established that he would face any risk of ill-treatment by the ISF or any other harm that he had claimed if refouled to Iraq that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds. 19.On 14 June 2016 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, but before his application could be heard, the Director on 10 January 2017 invited him to submit additional facts which may be relevant to his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection including any other absolute or non-derogable rights under HKBOR including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), and his leave application was allowed by Deputy High Court Judge Kent Yee to be adjourned pending the Director’s decision on his BOR 2 claim. 20.Upon receiving additional grounds and information provided by the Applicant through his lawyer from DLS, the Director by a Notice of Further Decision dated 5 February 2018 also rejected the Applicant’s claim under BOR 2 risk. 21.On 15 February 2018 the Applicant again lodged an appeal to the Board against this further decision of the Director, and for which he again attended an oral hearing on 24 October 2018 before the Board with his lawyer from DLS during which he gave further oral and documentary evidence as proof of his claimed identity as a national of Iraq and answered further questions put to him by the same Adjudicator for the Board and with submissions made by his lawyer on his behalf. On 3 July 2020 his appeal was again dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the further decision of the Director. 22.In this decision the Board upon considering the additional evidence from the Applicant accepted that he is an Iraqi and a Sunni Muslim from Mosul as claimed but found no reason to alter its previous findings of fact in relation to his past experience in Iraq or to reconsider his USM grounds other than BOR 2 Risk, and that since he had never been involved in politics in Iraq and that there is no evidence to support his claimed fear of being arbitrarily killed by Marwah or the ISF or of being deprived of his life in contravention of BOR 2 or of any additional risk of harm due to his religious faith as a Sunni Muslim if refouled to Iraq that his claim for non-refoulemnent protection also failed under the BOR 2 ground. 23.On 14 January 2021 the Applicant was granted leave to re-re-amend his Form 86 to include leave to apply for judicial review of this Second Decision of the Board as well, and accordingly with additional grounds for his intended challenge of both decisions, starting with those against the First Decision as follows:
24.As for his challenge of the Board’s Second Decision, the Applicant’s proposed grounds are:
25.From these complaints of the Applicant, it seems obvious to me that the first question to ask is this: Given the findings of the Board in the First Decision that it was not persuaded that the Applicant is a national of Iraq and a Sunni Muslim from Mosul as he claimed, and hence he failed to establish that he had suffered serious ill-treatments in the past in Iraq as claimed or any real chance that he would suffer such serious harm in the future ( [96] of First Decision), but in the Second Decision upon hearing and seeing further evidence from the Applicant, the Board accepted that he is indeed who he claimed to be, a national of Iraq and a Sunni Muslim from Mosul, should the Board not have proceeded to re-consider the Applicant’s claim on all the other applicable USM grounds in addition to BOR 2 Risk given its previous adverse findings on credibility were due to his failure to prove his identity? 26.To answer this question, which would in my view be relevant to the consideration of all the Applicant’s proposed grounds against the Board’s First Decision as well as his Ground (2) against the Second Decision, I propose to consider them together as follows. Grounds (1) – (4) against First Decision & Ground (2) against Second Decision: Credibility 27.In the First Decision, the Board started with the assessment of the Applicant’s identity and credibility by highlighting his failure to produce any reliable proof of his claimed identity as a striking feature as follows:
28.The Board proceeded to find it unable to attach any weight to the various documents produced by the Applicant in support of his claimed identity as their authenticity was questionable, and that it was not persuaded that his identity and home city were as he claims them to be:
29.The Board also referred to the Applicant’s previous applications for refugee status in Cyprus and South Korea before making his first entry to Hong Kong in December 2013, and found his reasons for not raising his non-refoulement claim in Hong Kong on that occasion contradictory, and that his failure to apply for protection at the earliest opportunity further damaged his general credibility (see [60] – [65]). 30.It was on those bases that the Board proceeded to consider the Applicant’s claim under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) in respect of each of his claimed fear of harm, starting with that from Marwah:
31.As for the threats from ISF, which is in essence the core of the Applicant’s claim, the Board’s assessment is as follows:
32.After also finding that the Applicant’s claimed risk of harm from his uncle was essentially a personal family dispute which would be negated by state/police protection, the Board arrived at the following conclusion regarding the issue of future risk to the Applicant:
33.Of these findings the Applicant complains that the Board has erred in rejecting his identity claim and thereby undermining his credibility in that:
34.Ms Margaret Ng, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid to act for the Applicant, submits that the Board’s finding that it was not persuaded of the Applicant’s claimed identity was Wednesbury unreasonable in that:
35.Ms Ng also submits that the Board had erred in finding that the Applicant failed to establish any future risk of ill-treatment by the ISF upon his return to Iraq in that:
36.Ms Ng further submits that the Board erred in failing to investigate properly or at all the relevant COI in assessing future risk to the Applicant, as it did not refer to any COI materials on such vital issue of assessing future risk, not did it make any reference to any COI materials that the Applicant failed to establish the claim that he would not receive adequate protection from the Iraqi authorities as they were controlled by the Shias. 37.Of this last submission regarding the Board’s failure to properly assess or investigate the Applicant’s claim that he would not receive protection from the Iraqi authorities because they are controlled by the Shias, it is relevant to first note that such concern was in fact supported by those COI referred to by the Director in paragraph 18 of his first decision as follows:
38.In BA v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKUT 00018 (IAC), in which the UK Upper Tribunal also referred to reports of common view among Iraqi Sunnis that the authorities were unable or unwilling to help them because police officers are largely Shia:
39.As complained by the Applicant, the Board did not appear to have made any factual finding on this particular issue of risk of persecution faced by him as a Sunni Muslim, one way or the other, without any reference to the COI available before it, and for which it seems to me reasonably arguable that the Board failed to discharge its duty under the “joint endeavor” approach to ascertain the future risk faced by the Applicant as a Sunni Muslim upon his return to Iraq given his claimed ill-treatment received during his detention by the ISF. 40.It seems to me that the Board did not do so mainly because of its adverse finding against the general credibility of the Applicant due to his failure to produce any proof of his claimed identity as a national of Iraq from Mosul, of which the Board found as noted above to be a striking feature of his case, that it appears to have just brushed aside or simply ignored altogether those relevant COI and materials before it in arriving at its conclusion that it was not persuaded that the Applicant would face any risk of ill-treatment by the ISF if refouled to Iraq or that he would not receive adequate protection from the Iraqi authorities because they were controlled by Shias. 41.Which then brings me to the Applicant’s complaint that it was unfair and unreasonable for the Board not to re-consider or alter its previous findings against him after accepting his new evidence that he is indeed who he claimed to be: a Iraqi citizen and a Sunni Muslim from Mosul, Iraq, as it stated in [17] of its Second Decision that it would consider his claim only under the provision of BOR 2, and of which it proceeded to state as follows:
42.It is not clear to me from the above as to the totality of what evidence upon which the Board found no reason to alter its previous findings as to the Applicant’s USM claims, or why the fact that he had never been involved in politics in Iraq that the Board saw no reason to alter its previous findings as to his claimed past experience in Iraq in relation to those risks under his USM claim. 43.It seems therefore to me, for all the reasons given above, reasonably arguable that the Board, having earlier rejected the Applicant’s claim under the USM grounds of torture risk, BOR 3 risk and persecution risk mainly on the basis of its previous findings against his general credibility due to his failure to produce proof of his claimed identity, upon later accepting his new evidence that he is indeed an Iraqi Sunni Muslim from Mosul, that it is unfair and unreasonable that the Board then refused to re-consider the Applicant’s claim under those grounds. Ground (1) Against Second Decision – Erred in not considering Article 5 & 10 in relation to BOR 2 44.In his appeal against the Further Decision of the Director on BOR 2 Risk, it was the Applicant’s submission that his feared harm of arbitrary deprivation of life intersects with the feared violations of BOR 10 (equality before the courts and right to fair and public hearing) as well as BOR 5 (liberty and security of the person), including CIDTP, torture, arbitrary deprivation of life during detention, trial/prosecution and punishment. 45.In its decision the Board refused to do so for the following reasons:
46.Ms Ng submits for the Applicant that even though Article 5 and 10 per se are not standalone grounds for non-refoulement protection, the Board has erred in ignoring them altogether since they have a direct bearing on the Applicant’s claim under Article 2 of the HKBOR, as both his status as a Sunni Muslim and his personal profile have placed him at risk of being subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention (contrary to Article 5), and have deprived him of the right to fair trial (contrary to Article 10), thereby rendering him liable to death penalty, of which the Board failed to consider the argument at all, and therefore just considered the Applicant’s case on Article 2 of HKBOR in vacuum without regard to his likelihood of being subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, and to the state of fair trial he would receive in case of prosecution. 47.As held by the Court of final Appeal in Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743, and cited by the Director in his Further Decision, a person not having the right to enter and remain in Hong Kong and whose rights protected by the HKBOR are subject to the territorial limits of Hong Kong and would not avail that person a basis for challenging the deportation order except in respect of BOR 3 because of the absolute and non-derogable character of the prohibition of CIDTP and the severe and irreparable harm it entails, and that there are no other grounds for making such an exception in relation to BOR 11(6) in availing that person as a basis for the challenge. 48.As BOR 5 and BOR 10 are both not included in section 5(2)(c) of the HKBORO, as neither is absolute or non-derogable and hence no non-refoulement duty would arise from those articles, as conceded by the Applicant in the present case, and as the risks of arbitrary arrest and detention (contrary to Article 5) and of deprivation of fair trial (contrary to Article 10) could be considered as part of CIDTP when the Board came to determine the Applicant’s claim under BOR 3 Risk in its First Decision, the Board was entitled not to do so in its determination of his BOR 2 Risk, and as such I do not agree that this ground is reasonably arguable for the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Second Decision on BOR 2 Risk. Ground (3) Against Second Decision – Failure to give reasons for dismissing the Applicant’s claim 49.This ground relates to the Applicant’s claimed imputed political opinion as a source of risk of harm, but of which the Board found no evidence to support his assertion, as “he was not involved in any political activity” in its Second Decision [35] as noted above. 50.The Applicant accepts that he never claimed any actual participation in politics, but submits that should not prejudice his claim under imputed political opinion, as the real question that the Board should have asked itself was that whether in light of the situation in Iraq and the personal circumstances of the Applicant including his profile and Sunni Muslim identity that any such imputed opinion was likely to have arisen, and therefore the Board erred in failing to consider this crucial issue and instead dismissed the claim simply because it could not find any actual political involvement on the part of the Applicant, and without referring to any COI materials to justify any departure from the position that young Sunni men are more likely to be targeted as perceived IS supporters. 51.As noted above in its Second Decision (see [34] – [36] & [38]), and on the facts of the Applicant’s own case, the Board was in my view entitled to find no evidence of any real chance of BOR 2 Risk. Whether or not those other USM grounds such as BOR 3 Risk or Persecution Risk could be engaged on the facts of the Applicant’s case, I shall say no more at this stage in view of my finding that the Applicant’s Ground (2) is reasonably arguable against the Board’s Second Decision as to its failure to reconsider those USM grounds after having accepted the Applicant’s claimed identity on additional evidence. 52.As such and in the premises, I do not agree that this ground is reasonably arguable for the Applicant’s intended challenge against the Board’s decision regarding BOR 2 Risk. Ground (4) Against Second Decision – Finding regarding the Applicant being able to obtain new passport and civil status identity without basis 53.The Applicant complains that the Board having found that he had been able to obtain identity documents from his family that they would vouch for him and assist him to apply for his Civil Status Identity Document (“CSID”) as mere speculation without any basis, and is contrary to available COI in relation to obtaining CSID in Iraq, and that in the circumstances of the Applicant there is in fact no reasonable likelihood of him obtaining a CSID, without which he would not be able to access to financial assistance from the authorities, employment, education, housing or medical treatment, and hence the Board’s decision must be quashed on this ground alone. 54.As noted in paragraph 41above, after receiving further evidence and documents from the Applicant and accepting his claimed identity and nationality, the Board formed the view that the Applicant would be able to apply for a CSID with the assistance of his family upon his return to Iraq, of which it was in my view entitled to do, but even if such view was wrong, it would still not engage the BOR 2 ground of which the Board, rightly or wrongly, decided to consider its provision only in its Second Decision. Accordingly I do not agree that this ground is reasonably arguable either. Ground (5) Against Second Decision – Failure to consider key COI in assessing the Applicant’s risk as a Sunni Muslim 55.Of this assessment by the Board ([38] – [39]) as noted above, the Applicant complains that the Board had cherry picked COI materials in its own favour, and also misunderstood his case which is not that he would be subjected to a real risk of serious harm merely because of his Sunni identity per se, but rather the cumulative effect of his profile, personal circumstances and events which altogether put him at a real risk of serious harm but which the Board merely approached with a broad brush and failed to properly address in its assessment, thus fell fouled of the high standards of fairness required. 56.I agree that this ground would be arguable had the Board been assessing the Applicant’s BOR 3 Risk or Persecution Risk, but as clearly stated in its Second Decision [17], the Board, again rightly or wrongly, was to consider the Applicant’s claim only under the provisions of BOR 2, in which case even on the facts of the Applicant’s own case, and in light of the scope and threshold of a BOR 2 claim, there is no room for engaging the BOR 2 ground. As such I do not see how this ground can assist or advance the Applicant’s case or is arguable for his intended challenge. Decision 57.In the premises, and for the reasons given, I am of the view that the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review of the Board’s decisions is reasonably arguable, thus meeting the threshold for leave to be granted as laid down in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, and accordingly I grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of both decisions of the Board on the bases of all of his proposed grounds against the First Decision and Ground (2) against the Second Decision. 58.It follows that in accordance with Order 53 rule 5 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, the Applicant shall file an originating summons within 14 days of this decision, and serve a copy thereof together with all the relevant documents on the Board as respondent and the Director as interested party, and with costs be in the cause, with Legal Aid taxation. Dated the 7th day of July 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
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