Re Siwa Pariyar Hima
Read the full judgment text of CACV 78/2021 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 16 August 2021.
1. This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Ms SIWA PARYAR Hima, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge P Li (“ Judge ”) on 19 February 2021 (“ Judge’s Decision ”) refusing her leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“ Board ”) given on 14 January 2019 (“ Board’s Decision ”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigrat
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CACV 78/2021 [2021] HKCA 1193 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 78 OF 2021 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 354 OF 2019) ________________________
________________________ Before: Hon Au JA and Lisa Wong J in Court Date of Hearing: 10 August 2021 Date of Judgment: 16 August 2021 ________________________ JUDGMENT ________________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Ms SIWA PARYAR Hima, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge P Li (“Judge”) on 19 February 2021 (“Judge’s Decision”) refusing her leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 14 January 2019 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of her non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”). Such rejection was embodied in, and communicated to the applicant by, a notice of decision dated 31 May 2018 (“Director’s Decision”). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of Nepal now aged about 41, is a fear of being harmed or even killed by her estranged husband (“Pariyar”) because of her family’s failure to give Pariyar’s family a dowry. 3.The circumstances giving rise to such fear have been set out in detail in paragraph 7 of the Director’s Decision and paragraphs 49 to 80 of the Board’s Decision and in gist in [2] to [10] of the Judge’s Decision embodied in the Form CALL-1 dated 19 February 2021, [2021] HKCFI 384 (“Form CALL-1”). 4.Briefly:
Entry into Hong Kong and lodgment of NRF Claim 5.The applicant arrived in Hong Kong by air on 18 February 2014. She overstayed her visitor’s visa since 26 February 2014. She surrendered to the Immigration Department in October 2015 and raised the NRF Claim by written representation dated 29 April 2016. Director’s Decision 6.In processing the NRF Claim, the Director took into account the information provided by the applicant in her Non-refoulement Claim Form dated 16 April 2018 and at the screening interview on 21 May 2018. The applicant then had legal advice and representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”). 7.The Director found the NRF Claim unsubstantiated under any of the applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection: torture risk[1], persecution risk[2], “BOR 2” risk[3] and “BOR 3” risk[4].
Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 8.The applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board. 9.The Board conducted a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 27 November 2018, at which the applicant testified before, and answered questions by, the Board through a Nepali/English interpreter. 10.The Board dismissed the appeal on all 4 applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection, noting that the NRF Claim is founded upon the applicant’s bare assertions unsupported by any objective proof. In any event, the Board considered the risk of future harm to be small. The past conduct of both the applicant and Pariyar deposed to by the former does not really suggest severe assaults by Pariyar or serious injuries to the applicant. Further, the applicant has been out of the country since February 2014. There is nothing to suggest that Pariyar or his family would come to know of her return, and even if they did, that they would try to find her, and even if they did, they would seek to harm or kill her. 11.The Board also reached the same conclusions as the Director regarding the availability of state protection and reasonable internal relocation options. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 12.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review (“Form 86”) issued under HCAL 354/2019 on 8 February 2019, supported by an affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision[5] on the following grounds:
13.Upon the applicant’s failure to attend the scheduled hearing[6], the Judge determined her application on the written materials before him. His reasons can be found in [25] to [29] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal - grounds of appeal and submission 14.The applicant’s complaints in the notice of appeal filed herein on 26 February 2021 and the written submission dated 13 July 2021 can be summarised as follows:
15.The applicant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal on 10 August 2021. She was provided with a Nepali/English interpreter. She had nothing to add to her notice of appeal or written submission. Discussion Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement cases 16.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 17.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal will generally not admit fresh evidence unless the 3 requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall[7]are met. Nor will it normally entertain any new arguments that are fact sensitive that should have been raised in the court below. In short, the Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2)]. Ground 1 18.This ground is too vague to merit any or any serious consideration. The applicant has not condescended to any particulars as to how she or her case has not been treated with caution or diligence. Ground 2 19.It does not follow from the application of high standards of fairness that a non-refoulement protection claimant is therefore absolutely entitled to legal representation at all stages of the screening process or the legal proceedings ensuing therefrom. See Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15, Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17, Re Lopchan Subash [2018] HKCA 37 and Re Ahmed Syed Rafiq [2018] HKCA 178. 20.In this case, the applicant did already have the benefit of legal representation from the DLS in presenting her case to the Director. Other than a general complaint, she has not pointed out in what ways she was prejudiced before the Board or the Judge due to her being unrepresented. Given the purely factual nature of the NRF Claim and the decisions made thereon, we can see none. 21.As for interpretation services, they are provided at the hearings before the Board, the Judge and this court. The Applicant did not highlight any particular aspect of such proceedings where the lack of interpretation service before/after these hearings hampered the presentation of her case. 22.As noted by the Judge:
23.The Judge’s said last observation also applies to the notice of appeal and written submission before us. Ground 3 24.This does not even get off the ground. As summarised in [10] above, despite noting that the NRF Claim is founded upon the applicant’s bare assertions unsupported by any objective proof, the Board did not dismiss the applicant’s appeal on an assessment of her credibility. To the contrary, the Board’s Decision was based on the proper inferences that should be drawn from the applicant’s account of events. 25.In the premises, the applicant did not in the notice of appeal or written submission before us identify any arguable error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was plainly wrong. Nor can we discern any. Disposition 26.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] The Form 86 also sought to have the Director’s Decision judicially reviewed. However, applying Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549, the Director’s Decision, having been superseded by the Board’s Decision which represents the final decision on the NRF Claim at the end of its processing, is not susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the Board has been pursued by the applicant. [6] The applicant claims that she did not receive notice of the hearing. [7] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. |
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