Re Ahmed Tanveer

Read the full judgment text of CAMP 141/2021 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 22 November 2021.

1. On 17 August 2020, by way of a decision (“the Deputy Judge’s Decision”)  set out in Form CALL-1 ( [2020] HKCFI 2007 ), Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Deputy Judge”)  refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”)  dated 19 March 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”)  dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of I

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Case No.CAMP 141/2021[2021] HKCA 1731
Court
Court of Appeal
Date22 Nov 2021
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CAMP 141/2021

[2021] HKCA 1731

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 141 OF 2021

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 581 OF 2018)

________________________

RE:  AHMED TANVEER Applicant

________________________

Before:  Hon Chu and Au JJA in Court

Date of Judgment:  22 November 2021

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

Introduction

1.On 17 August 2020, by way of a decision (“the Deputy Judge’s Decision”)  set out in Form CALL-1 ([2020] HKCFI 2007), Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Deputy Judge”)  refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”)  dated 19 March 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”)  dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”)  dated 20 February 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”).

2.The 14-day time period for the applicant to appeal the Deputy Judge’s Decision provided under Order 53, rule 3(4)  of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A)  (“the RHC”)  expired on 31 August 2020.  On 14 October 2020, the applicant sought extension of time before the Deputy Judge to appeal the Deputy Judge’s Decision.  He was more than one month out of time.

3.On 20 April 2021, the Deputy Judge refused to grant extension of time to the applicant (“the Extension of Time Decision”).

4.By a summons dated 3 May 2021 (“the CA Summons”), the applicant sought to challenge the Extension of Time Decision.  However, the proper application for the applicant to make is to renew such application before this Court instead of appealing against the refusal to grant extension of time: see Tang Chai On v Tang Sing Ki [2016] 5 HKLRD 104.  We shall therefore treat the CA Summons as a renewed application for extension of time to appeal.

5.Under Order 59, rule 14A(1)  of the RHC, this Court may determine an application for extension of time to appeal without an oral hearing.  Directions were given by the Registrar of Civil Appeals to the applicant on 3 June 2021 concerning the conduct of the application.  Paragraph 7 of those directions also stipulated that upon consideration of the documents lodged, the Court will decide whether to determine the application on the paper.  After considering the documents filed, we are of the view that it is appropriate to determine the present application on paper without a hearing.

Background

6.The applicant is a national of Pakistan.  He came to Hong Kong illegally on 1 August 2013 and was arrested by the police on 3 October 2013.  He lodged his non-refoulement claim on 6 October 2013.

7.The applicant’s personal background and his claim were summarized at paragraph 7 of the Director’s Decision and paragraphs 7 - 31 of the Board’s Decision.

8.Briefly stated, the applicant claimed that he would be harmed or killed by members of Pakistan Muslim League (N)  (“PML(N)”)  if he was returned to Pakistan.  The applicant stated that he was an active supporter of Pakistan Muslim League (Q)  (“PML(Q)”).  In 2013, during a closely contested election between PML(N)  and PML(Q), members of PML(N)  visited the applicant’s village and persuaded them to vote for PML(N).  The applicant refused and he was seriously injured by members of PML(N).  He was unable to report the attack to the police as the attackers blocked the road and threatened to kill him and his brother.  PML(N)  eventually won the election.  Feared that there would be revenge carried out by members of PML(N), the applicant fled his home country and then to Hong Kong for protection.  The applicant also claimed that he feared that his lover’s brother would kill him because “free love” was forbidden in their country.

The Director’s Decision and the Board’s Decision

9.By way of the Director’s Decision, the Director assessed and dismissed the applicant’s non-refoulement claims on the BOR 3 risk[1], persecution risk[2], torture risk[3], and BOR2 risk[4].

10.The applicant lodged an appeal to the Board against the Director’s Decision.  An oral hearing was held on 16 January 2018, in which the applicant was assisted by an interpreter and he answered inquiries from the Board.  After hearing the applicant, and considering his evidence in the non-refoulement claim form, the Board found that the applicant was not a truthful witness and had manufactured his claims for non-refoulement protection (paragraph 34 of the Board’s Decision).  It further rejected the applicant’s version of events on the material aspects of his claim (paragraphs 35 - 42 of the Board’s Decision).  On this basis, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal.

The Deputy Judge’s Decision

11.On 8 April 2018, by way of a Form 86, the applicant sought leave to challenge the Board’s Decision.  In the supporting affirmation filed on the same day, the applicant simply stated that the refusal of his non-refoulement claim was not carefully considered.  Yet, he did not advance any grounds of review nor did he request for an oral hearing.  After considering the documents, the Deputy Judge refused to grant leave to him to apply for judicial review.  The Deputy Judge set out the grounds of review and his reasons for refusal at paragraphs 12 - 16 of the Deputy Judge’s Decision:

“12. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

13. In the Applicant’s case, the Board rejected his claim essentially on its adverse finding on his credibility for the thorough and detailed analysis and reasoning set out in paragraphs 32 - 42 of its decision with the benefit of hearing him in his oral evidence and answers to questions raised of his claim during his appeal hearing, and in the absence of any error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the finding of the Board.

14. Furthermore, the fact that it has been established by the Director in his decision that the risk of harm in the Applicant’s claim is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Pakistan, a decision also confirmed by the Board, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.

15. In the premises and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

16.  For these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and I accordingly refuse his leave application.”

Application for extension of time

12.On 14 October 2020, the applicant took out a summons to seek extension of time to appeal the Deputy Judge’s Decision.  By way of the Extension of Time Decision, the Deputy Judge dismissed the applicant’s application on the basis that he failed to provide any good reason for the delay and that his intended appeal had no prospect of success.  Thus, the Deputy Judge concluded that it would be futile to extend time.

Renewed application for extension of time to this Court

13.In the CA Summons and his supporting affirmation, the applicant merely stated that his proposed grounds of appeals were (a)  the Deputy Judge’s Decision and the Board’s Decision were unlawful; (b)  these decisions failed to take into account “many things”; and (c)  he would be in danger upon refoulement.  Nevertheless, he did not elaborate on what were the matters that the Board and the Deputy Judge had failed to take into account.  In his written submissions of 15 June 2021, the applicant only repeated his personal background and cited several general legal propositions without stating how these were relevant to his case.  Further, none of these submissions identified any errors against the Deputy Judge.

Legal principles

14.In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will have regard to: (a)  the length of delay; (b)  the reasons for the delay; (c)  the prospect of the intended appeal; and (d)  the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted.

15.Even if the court accepts that the applicant’s explanation for delay is reasonable, an applicant still has to show that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success before extension of time will be considered.  When the delay is inexcusable, the Court will adopt a higher threshold by examining if there is a real prospect of success: Sumarsih v Director of Immigration [2020] HKCA 565; Re Ansar Muhammad [2018] HKCA 227; Re Muhammad Shehbaz [2020] HKCA 256.

16.In this respect, in assessing the merit of the intended appeal, we shall have regard to the legal principles which this Court has adopted in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11]. For the purpose of this application, the principles can be summarised as follows:

(1)  The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal.  The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board.  Though in non-refoulement cases the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board.  Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director).  The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.

(2)  An appeal against the refusal of leave by a judge in the Court of First Instance is not the occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but not raised before the judge.  In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and we would only reverse that decision if an appellant can demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong.

(3)  It follows from the above that in an appeal, the scope for admission of fresh evidence and for new arguments to be run is limited.  In respect of fresh evidence, the general rule is that an appellant has to satisfy the requirement in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489.  In respect of new arguments, this Court will not generally entertain new arguments which are fact-and-evidence sensitive which have not been canvassed at the Court of First Instance and for which leave has not been sought within time.

(4)  In an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the decision of the judge, the appeal should be dismissed.  It is not the role of this Court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if it is a fresh application for judicial review.  Otherwise, an applicant could flagrantly disregard the stringent time limit in Order 53, rule 4(1)  of the RHC.

Discussion

17.A delay of more than a month is significant in the context of a statutory time limit of 14 days. The applicant failed to provide any cogent explanation for the delay.  Further, as mentioned at [13] above, the applicant simply failed to advance any grounds with particularities pointing out any errors in the Deputy Judge’s Decision.  There are no viable grounds of appeal, and no merits in the intended appeal.  It would be futile to extend time.  We therefore dismiss the CA Summons.

(Carlye Chu) (Thomas Au)
Justice of Appeal Justice of Appeal

The applicant acting in person



[1]   This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383).

[2]   This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

[3]   This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115).

[4]   This refers to the risk of violation of the right of life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.

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