Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants v. Ng Kwok Ching
Read the full judgment text of CACV 42/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 9 December 2021.
1. This is the Respondent (“ Mr Ng ”)’s appeal against the order of the Disciplinary Committee (“ the Disciplinary Committee ”) of the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“ the Institute ”) contained in its “Order & Reasons for Decision” (“ the Decision ”) dated 28 December 2018, in which the Disciplinary Committee found two complaints preferred by the Practice Review Committee of the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“ the Practice Review Committee ”) against
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CACV 42/2019 [2021] HKCA 1821 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 42 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM PROCEEDINGS NO D-16-1226P, M119510) ____________________
____________________ Before: Hon Yuen, Chu and Chow JJA in Court Date of Hearing: 24 November 2021 Date of Judgment: 9 December 2021 ____________________ JUDGMENT ____________________ Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): INTRODUCTION 1.This is the Respondent (“Mr Ng”)’s appeal against the order of the Disciplinary Committee (“the Disciplinary Committee”) of the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“the Institute”) contained in its “Order & Reasons for Decision” (“the Decision”) dated 28 December 2018, in which the Disciplinary Committee found two complaints preferred by the Practice Review Committee of the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“the Practice Review Committee”) against Mr Ng proven, and imposed the following sanctions on him:
The Disciplinary Committee also ordered Mr Ng to pay the Practice Review Committee’s costs and expenses of and incidental to the disciplinary proceedings in the sum of HK$55,000 under s 35(1)(iii) of the Ordinance. BACKGROUND FACTS 2.Mr Ng was the sole proprietor of a practice known as Jeremy Ng & Company (formerly known as Tang & Ng), Certified Public Accountants, (“the Practice”). He was responsible for the Practice’s quality control and the quality of its audit engagements. The Practice did not employ any staff, but engaged a subcontractor to perform, or assist in the performance of, its audit work. 3.In December 2012, the Practice was selected by the Practice Review Committee for initial practice review, in the course of which various deficiencies in relation to its quality control system, audit methodology and audit engagements were identified. The Practice Review Committee directed the Practice to carry out various follow-up actions to address those deficiencies. The Practice did not do as directed, on the basis that it would cease to exist after its registration expired at the end of 2013. However, the Practice renewed its registration in 2014. Accordingly, the Practice Review Committee instructed the Practice to perform the follow-up actions to address the aforesaid deficiencies prior to a follow-up visit by the Practice Review Committee scheduled for November 2014. 4.The follow-up visit by the Practice Review Committee was later deferred to February 2015 upon Mr Ng’s representation that he was then involved in some court cases. In January 2015, Mr Ng requested for a further postponement of the follow-up visit based on the same reason. 5.The Practice later submitted to the Institute a “Declaration of Non-engagement in the Practice of Public Accounting” (“the Declaration”) dated 16 February 2015, in which the Practice confirmed that:
6.By a letter to the Practice (for the attention of Mr Ng) dated 27 March 2015, the Practice Review Committee stated that they trusted the Declaration to have been made in good faith, and requested Mr Ng to inform the QAD once the Practice resumed the provision of audit services. 7.In September 2015, in response to the Practice Review Committee’s reminder, Mr Ng informed the QAD that the Practice had performed an audit on a private entity (Lam Seng Hang Limited, “Client L”) for the year ended 31 December 2014. In view of the fact that the Practice had resumed the provision of audit services, the Practice Review Committee made a follow up visit to the Practice in February 2016, and identified a number of deficiencies in the Practice’s audit of Client L’s financial statements. It also transpired, from the Practice Review Committee’s review of the relevant audit papers, that, notwithstanding the Declaration dated 16 February 2015:
8.Upon review of the Practice’s audit working papers for Client L, the Practice Review Committee considered that Mr Ng had failed to perform adequate audit procedures for a number of significant accounts, representing over 67% of its net assets, reported in the financial statements of Client L. In addition, the Practice Review Committee found that the audit documentation did not contain information required under the relevant auditing standard (namely, the person who performed the audit work and the date when such work was completed). The findings of the Practice Review Committee were set out in a “Reviewer’s Report” dated 16 November 2016. 9.By a letter dated 6 December 2016, the Practice Review Committee informed Mr Ng that, having considered the Reviewer’s Report (a draft of which had previously been given to Mr Ng for his responses), it had decided to raise a complaint against him under s 32D(5) of the Ordinance. 10.On 5 July 2017, the Practice Review Committee preferred two disciplinary complaints (“the First Complaint” and “the Second Complaint” respectively, and “the Complaints” collectively) against Mr Ng to the Council of the Institute:
11.On 24 January 2018, the Clerk to the Disciplinary Committee gave Notice of Commencement of Proceedings to Mr Ng in respect of the Complaints. In that notice, it is expressly stated, inter alia, that:
12.On 14 February 2018, the Practice Review Committee submitted the Complainant’s Case, and on 20 March 2018, Mr Ng submitted his written submissions in the form of a “Response: Complaint’s Case dated 14 February 2018” (“the Respondent’s Case”). Thereafter, the Practice Review Committee submitted the Complainant’s Reply dated 25 April 2018, and Mr Ng submitted his “Respondent’s Reply to ‘Complainant’s Reply’” dated 13 June 2018 (“the Respondent’s Reply”). 13.A hearing of the Complaints was conducted before the Disciplinary Committee on 27 September 2018. By a letter dated 28 September 2018, the Disciplinary Committee informed the parties that it had unanimously found the Complaints against Mr Ng proven. Submissions on sanctions and costs were made by the Practice Review Committee and Mr Ng on 12 October 2018 and 7 November 2018 respectively. On 28 December 2018, the Disciplinary Committee handed down the Decision. 14.The Disciplinary Committee’s reasons for finding the Complaints proven, and its reasons for the sanctions and order as to costs are set out in [19] - [31] of the Decision, as follows:
THIS APPEAL 15.Mr Ng lodged an appeal against the Decision by a Notice of Appeal dated 27 January 2019. In the Notice of Appeal, Mr Ng raised the following general grounds of appeal:
16.These general grounds of appeal were elaborated in a 34-page “Supplementary Notice of Appeal” dated 12 August 2019. Mr Ng further elaborated on his grounds of appeal in his Skeleton Argument dated 29 October 2021 and an “Opening Submission by the Respondent” dated 17 November 2021 lodged shortly before the hearing of the appeal on 24 November 2021. 17.As one can gather from his Supplementary Notice of Appeal, Skeleton Argument and Opening Submission, and his oral submissions before this court, Mr Ng’s grounds of appeal can broadly be summarized as follows:
DISCUSSION 18.In respect of Ground (1), Mr Ng’s allegation of “fabrication of evidence” on the part of the Practice Review Committee is based on the fact that the documents placed before the Disciplinary Committee by the Practice Review Committee were “black and white” photocopied documents, whereas his original audit working papers containing “audit tick marks, comments, initials and highlights” were red or blue in colour. This ground of appeal is unsustainable, because:
19.In respect of Ground (2), Mr Ng’s allegation that the Disciplinary Committee failed or neglected to consider contemporaneous documents relates to those documents which were “dated” prior to the date of the Audit Report, ie 30 March 2015, but which the Disciplinary Committee found to have been received by Mr Ng after that date, including, in particular, the “management representation letter dated 31 January 2015” referred to in paragraph 21.4 of the Decision. The Disciplinary Committee’s finding was, however, based on the Practice’s written confirmation, titled “Additional working papers of Lam Seng Hang Limited (the ‘Company’) for the year ended 31 December 2014” signed by Mr Ng dated 31 March 2016 (“the Second Confirmation”), that various documents (26 pages in total), including the said management representation letter, were received by the Practice after the audit report date. Mr Ng did not, in his written or oral submissions to the Disciplinary Committee, suggest that his written confirmation was incorrect. In our view, the Disciplinary Committee was fully entitled to make the finding at paragraph 21.4 of the Decision based on Mr Ng’s own admission or confirmation. 20.In respect of Ground (3), the complaint that the Disciplinary Committee failed to observe the duty of care and diligence is based on the fact that a “Permanent File” was not presented to the Disciplinary Committee, and the Disciplinary Committee did not review the documents in that file. However, in the Practice’s written confirmation, titled “Working papers of Lam Seng Hang Limited (the ‘Company’) for the year ended 31 December 2014” signed by Mr Ng dated 31 March 2016 (“the First Confirmation”), he confirmed that the documents attached thereto, consisting of 105 pages of documents, comprised “the complete audit confirmation relating to the audit of the Company for the year ended 31 December 2014”. A similar statement appeared in the Second Confirmation. The “Permanent File” was not included in the two batches of documents attached to the First Confirmation and Second Confirmation respectively. There was no suggestion by Mr Ng before the Disciplinary Committee that the “Permanent File” contained any document which was relevant to the audit, or ought to be considered by the Disciplinary Committee in considering the Complaints. Mr Ng’s complaint of failure to exercise the duty of care and diligence on the part of the Disciplinary Committee is unsustainable. Anyhow, it would appear from page 000001 of the documents attached to the First Confirmation that what had been moved to the Permanent File were only “Statutory records”, including “B.R. copy files”, “A.R. copy files” and the “green book”. It has not been shown or demonstrated by Mr Ng that those documents could assist him to answer the specific complaints mentioned in paragraphs 21.1 to 21.4 of the Decision. 21.Under Ground (4), Mr Ng alleges that the Practice Review Committee abused his trust and chose to “hide the Permanent File”. We have already dealt with the complaint in respect of the Permanent File. In so far as the allegation of abuse of trust is concerned, Mr Ng’s argument is that he was asked to sign the two Confirmations, which he describes as “2 receipts on 2 small pieces of papers when the Respondent was told to pick up his own files in its offices”. Mr Ng says that he read the first receipt, but not the second one because they “looked so alike”, thinking that the second one was a copy for him. This complaint of Mr Ng has plainly no substance, in view of the following considerations:
22.Ground (5) complains about the failure of the Disciplinary Committee to observe the best evidence rule. This is in substance the same complaint under Ground (1), which we have already dealt with. In any event, strict rules of evidence do not apply to the disciplinary proceedings in this case (see Rule 14 of the Disciplinary Committee Proceedings Rules). 23.Ground (6) complains that the Disciplinary Committee failed to go over the relevant documentation with Mr Ng at the disciplinary hearing, and “ambushed” him with new questions. As clearly stated in the Notice of Commencement of Proceedings dated 24 January 2018 served on Mr Ng, the purpose of the oral hearing was to allow the Disciplinary Committee to question the parties and clarify matters. In our view, the Disciplinary Committee was under no duty to go over any documentation with Mr Ng, and was entitled to ask him questions, which we are satisfied were relevant and proper ones. 24.Mr Ng also complains that his request for time to make closing submissions was rejected by the Disciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee Proceedings Rules permit a respondent to make an oral opening submission and an oral closing submission (which Mr Ng did at the hearing before the Disciplinary Committee), but not written opening or closing submissions (see Rule 30 thereof). We consider that the Disciplinary Committee was entitled to refuse Mr Ng’s request to file written closing submissions, having regard to the fact, as made clear in the Notice of Commencement of Proceedings, that the disciplinary process is intended to be based primarily on written submissions in the cases presented before the oral hearing where the parties are required to fully set out their respective cases in writing. 25.Under Ground (7), Mr Ng raises various points going to the merits of the Complaints. The principles which the court applies in considering such a ground of appeal are well established:
26.We shall deal with the main arguments raised by Mr Ng at the hearing of the appeal. 27.First, Mr Ng argues that the Disciplinary Committee’s finding that he did not carry out any audit work in respect of Client L’s interests in a subsidiary and an associate is wrong.
28.Second, Mr Ng argues that the total value of Client L’s investment in the associate (HK$579,975) comes to less than 1.5% of the net assets of the company (HK$44,891,181), and it was “OK” even if he did not perform any audit verification of that item. Whether an item in the financial statement of a company is sufficiently material to require audit verification to be performed is a matter of professional assessment for the Disciplinary Committee which this court should be slow to interfere with. We do not consider that there is any sufficient basis to interfere with the Disciplinary Committee’s judgment in this matter. 29.Third, Mr Ng challenges the Disciplinary Committee’s findings at paragraphs 21.1 to 21.3 of the Decision, and argues that the Disciplinary Committee applied the “net asset” approach which is “not part of the HKSAs”.
30.Fourth, Mr Ng argues that Client L had no business and no staff, and no internal control was required. He also argues that he was entitled to apply the “materiality guideline” which “cuts down on the work on small balances that the Complainant insists on the need to design and perform procedures to audit them” (see paragraph 477 of Mr Ng’s Opening Submission).
31.Fifth, Mr Ng challenges the Disciplinary Committee’s finding at paragraph 21.3 of the Decision, namely, that he had failed to perform any alternative procedures to obtain relevant and reliable audit evidence in respect of amounts due to directors and shareholders where the audit confirmations had not been received prior to the audit report date. Mr Ng argues that telephone confirmation is permissible, and there is no requirement as to when the audit confirmations may be received. Mr Ng has failed, however, to point to any provision in the HKSA which permits oral audit confirmation, or post-audit report written confirmation, to be relied upon. Further, the substance of the complaint is that, where no written confirmation of a debt has been received prior to the audit report date, the auditor ought to carry out alternative procedures to obtain relevant and reliable evidence in respect of the debt. This Mr Ng failed to do. We can see no valid basis to question the Disciplinary Committee’s finding at paragraph 21.3 of the Decision. 32.Sixth, Mr Ng challenges the Disciplinary Committee’s finding that he failed to carry out audit procedures to ascertain the ownership of the shares held by Client L and their market values as at the year end date (see paragraph 21.2(b) of the Decision). Mr Ng argues that the financial assets of Client L consisted of listed shares in Hong Kong and listed shares outside Hong Kong, and their existence could be ascertained from a monthly statement dated 31 July 2014 (at page 000103 attached to the First Confirmation). However, that statement only shows (i) Client L’s portfolio of shares in July 2014, and (ii) the fact that Client L received some dividends from those shares during the month of July 2014. It says nothing about the ownership of the shares or their market values as at the year end date. 33.Seventh, Mr Ng challenges the Disciplinary Committee’s finding that there was no evidence that the Practice had obtained the management representation as part of the audit evidence before the audit report date (see paragraph 21.4(b) of the Decision), arguing that Client L had orally confirmed the contents of the letter of representation, and agreed to bring the signed document to Hong Kong during a telephone conversation on 27 March 2015 (see paragraphs 486 to 488 of Mr Ng’s Opening Submission).
34.It is not necessary to deal with other minor points raised by Mr Ng in his written or oral submissions in this judgment, save to mention that we do not consider they give rise to any valid grounds of appeal. 35.Under Ground (8), Mr Ng argues that the Disciplinary Committee was wrong to find the Second Complaint (which concerned the failure to record the person who performed the audit work and the date when such work was completed) proved. Mr Ng said in court that: (i) the assistant whom he engaged did some calculation work only, but did not perform any audit work, (ii) he was not satisfied with the work done by the assistant and had torn up the calculation sheets done by her, (iii) he did not pay the assistant any remuneration, and (iv) the whole audit assignment was in fact done by him. What Mr Ng said in court is inconsistent with the case that he advanced before the Disciplinary Committee:
36.It is clear that the case which Mr Ng advanced before the Disciplinary Committee was that (i) the audit was done by him together with his assistant who was also a CPA, (ii) the assistant did not want her identity to be disclosed because she was at that time also working for a listed company, and (iii) it was not necessary to record the person who performed the relevant audit work because her identity could easily be ascertained without any risk of confusion or mistake. 37.It is not, in our view, open to Mr Ng to run a completely new and different case in the Court of Appeal to challenge the Disciplinary Committee’s finding and conclusion in respect of the Second Complaint. We also consider that the Disciplinary Committee’s finding and conclusion cannot be faulted on the basis of the evidence and materials before it. 38.Ground (9) challenges the Disciplinary Committee’s finding that Mr Ng prepared the accounts for Client L. This finding was based on his answer to the Disciplinary Committee at the disciplinary hearing: “We help them to do the - to come up to the totals and then we prepare the financial statements”. This evidence was also consistent with what Mr Ng stated in the Respondent’s Case: “There was no client staff. So everything was drawn up by the Res. The data came from procedures on review of documentation… Material misstatements were impossible as everything was done by the Res …”. Anyhow, whether Mr Ng took up the dual role of accountant and auditor of Client L does not form part of either Complaint. 39.Lastly, under Ground (10), Mr Ng argues that the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Committee is unreasonably high. It is well established that the court would not interfere with the sanction imposed by a specialist tribunal whose members consist of members of the same profession such as the Disciplinary Committee in this case, unless the sanction is plainly wrong, excessive or disproportionate. So long as the sanction imposed falls within the reasonable range of options, the court will not intervene (see Registrar of the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants v Leung Kam Man Victor, CACV 37/2016 (17 January 2017), at §§11-16). The sanctions imposed in this case are (i) cancellation of Mr Ng’s practising certificate and prohibition of issuing a new practising certificate to Mr Ng for a period 12 months, (ii) a reprimand, and (iii) a monetary penalty of HK$50,000. Taking into account the matters considered by the Disciplinary Committee at §§27-30 of the Decision, we do not consider the sanctions to be plainly wrong, excessive or disproportionate. 40.In all, we are not satisfied that there is any ground raised by Mr Ng which would cause this court to interfere with the Disciplinary Committee’s Decision. DISPOSITION 41.Mr Ng’s appeal against the Decision is dismissed with costs. Taking into account the total lack of merits of the appeal, the seriousness of the allegations, rejected by us, which Mr Ng has made against the Practice Review Committee (including allegations of “fabrication of evidence”, “misrepresentation” and “spoliation of evidence”), and the fact that the Institute is a public body defending this appeal in the general interests of the accountancy profession with funds contributed by its members, we consider that there is no reason why it should be out of pocket for the difference between costs on a party-and-party basis and costs on an indemnity basis (see Lie Han Ji v The Registrar of the Hong Kong Institute of the Certified Public Accountants, CACV 265/2009 (24 April 2012), at §§10, and 15-17). Accordingly, we make an order that Mr Ng shall pay the Institute’s costs of and incidental to this appeal, to be taxed on an indemnity basis if not agreed.
Mr Lau Ka Kin, instructed by Minterellison LLP, for the Complainant The Respondent, acting in person [1] Hong Kong Standard on Auditing. |
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