Re Islam Nazrul
Read the full judgment text of CACV 125/2021 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 16 December 2021.
1. This is an appeal against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“ Judge ”) on 16 March 2021 (“ Judge’s Decision ”) refusing to grant leave for judicial review. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“ Board ”) given on 28 June 2018 (“ Board’s Decision ”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“ Director ”) of his non-refoulement claim (“ NRF Claim ”) by
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CACV 125/2021 [2021] HKCA 1892 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 125 OF 2021 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1277 OF 2018) ________________________
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______________ J U D G M E N T ______________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“Judge”) on 16 March 2021 (“Judge’s Decision”) refusing to grant leave for judicial review. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 28 June 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 28 July 2017 (“Director’s Decision”). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of India, is a fear of being harmed or even killed by a loan shark named Manoj Kumar (“MK”) for failing to repay a loan. 3.The circumstances allegedly giving rise to such fear have been set out in paragraph 6 of the Director’s Decision, paragraphs 6 to 14 of the Board’s Decision and [5] of the Judge’s Decision embodied in the Form CALL-1 [2021] HKCFI 632 (“Form CALL-1”). 4.Briefly:
Overstaying in Hong Kong and lodgment of NRF Claim 5.The applicant last arrived in Hong Kong on 13 August 2014 with permission to stay until 16 August 2014. He overstayed. He surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised the NRF Claim by written signification on 2 September 2014. On 12 January 2017, during his release on recognizance, he was arrested for taking employment while being a person in respect of whom a removal order is in force, for which he was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment. Director’s Decision 6.After considering the information provided by the applicant in his non-refoulement claim form dated 24 June 2017 (“NCF”) and at the screening interview on 24 July 2017 (“Interview”), the Director found the NRF Claim unsubstantiated on any ground for non-refoulement protection: torture risk[1], persecution risk[2], “BOR 2” risk[3] and “BOR 3” risk[4].
Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 7.The applicant appealed to the Board. The Board conducted a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 28 March 2018, at which the applicant was present to give evidence and answer the Board’s questions through a Hindi/English interpreter. 8.The Board dismissed the appeal. The applicant was found not credible. His evidence was vague, internally discrepant and inconsistent with much of the information given in the NCF and at the Interview. When confronted with the discrepancies, the applicant was unable to give any reasonable explanation. Given the adverse finding on the applicant’s credibility, it was unnecessary for the Board to consider state protection or internal relocation. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 9.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review (“Form 86”) issued under HCAL 1277/2018 on 4 July 2018 and a supporting affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant applied for judicial review of the Board’s Decision on grounds cited by the Judge at [11] of the Form CALL-1 as follows:
10.The applicant did not ask for an oral hearing. The Judge refused leave on paper for the reasons set out in [12] to [17] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal 11.By the notice of appeal filed herein on 24 March 2021, the applicant appealed against the Judge’s Decision on the ground that the Director and the Board did not properly weigh the gravity of his circumstances. He further deposed in his supporting affirmation that there was a good ground of appeal, but without stating what it was. 12.In breach of paragraph 3(1) of the directions given by the Registrar of Civil Appeals by letter dated 17 June 2021, the applicant failed to lodge skeleton submissions 28 days before the hearing of the appeal, despite having been warned in paragraph 5 that the hearing date would be vacated and the appeal dealt with on paper in the event of non-compliance with such direction. 13.The requirement for the lodgment of skeleton submissions in a civil appeal is prescribed by Practice Direction 4.1. The filing and service of skeleton submissions by the parties are important for the preparation of an appeal, both for the court and the litigants. Non-compliance substantially impairs the exercise of case management power of the presiding judge in an appeal, including the effective management of the oral hearing. Nowadays, this court no longer permits unfocused oral presentation of material at a hearing. In view of the heavy demand on the court’s time due to the large volume of appeals, in recent times this court has taken a firm stance on the requirement to lodge skeleton submissions. Non-compliance is treated as the abandonment of the right to an oral hearing. 14.The hearing date on 10 August 2021 was therefore vacated, leaving us to deal with the appeal on paper on the basis of the material already filed with the court. Discussion 15.In view of the stroppy manner in which the applicant has conducted this appeal, we can dispose of the same shortly. 16.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board (or that of the Director) afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance, which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal shall interfere if and only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(2) & (4)]. 17.The complaint in the notice of appeal, vague and unparticularised as it is, is directed against the Director and the Board. The applicant simply did not in the notice of appeal before us identify any error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was plainly wrong. We cannot discern any either. Nor can we act on a bare assertion (made in the supporting affirmation) that a ground of appeal exists. 18.In any event, we have anxiously scrutinised the Board’s Decision and the Judge’s Decision and are satisfied that they are both in order. Disposition 19.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. |
Cases cited in this judgment