Re Lovepreet Singh
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 924/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 14 January 2022.
1. This is the Applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal the order of Deputy High Court Judge CP Pang (“DHCJ Pang”) dated 28 September 2020 refusing to grant him leave to apply for judicial review (the “Order”).
Cited by 2 cases · Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 924/2018 [2022] HKCFI 99 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 924 OF 2018
____________ Before: Deputy High Court Judge To in Chambers Date of Decision: 14 January 2022 ______________ D E C I S I O N ______________ Introduction 1.This is the Applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal the order of Deputy High Court Judge CP Pang (“DHCJ Pang”) dated 28 September 2020 refusing to grant him leave to apply for judicial review (the “Order”). 2.On 24 May 2018, the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 25 April 2018 (the “Decision”). By that Decision, the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 25 November 2016 refusing his application for non-refoulement protection. 3.On 17 November 2020, about one and half months after the Order was made, the Applicant applied by summons for leave to appeal the Order out of time. In his summons, he gave the following explanation for the delay in appealing the Order:
4.In his supporting affirmation filed on the same date, he said:
5.In essence, the Applicant’s rather convoluted statements suggest that he did not receive the Order because he had moved his address without informing the court. He only learned about the Order on his regular reporting to the Immigration Department. He did not know the law and did not know he had to report his change of address to court. He complained the Order was unfair. But he gave no particulars. 6.As the Applicant had not given any specific grounds of appeal, this Court gave the Applicant directions by letter dated 16 June 2021 to file an affirmation setting out his grounds of appeal and warned him that the Court will determine his application on paper whether he complied with the directions or not. He did not respond. The Law 7.In AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam[1], the Court of Appeal held that what may constitute a good reason for extending time cannot be defined. In most cases, this would be a “multi-faceted question” the answer to which would depend on the circumstances of each case. The following factors, which are not exhaustive, are likely to be of significance in determining whether to grant extension of time:
The delay and reasons for the delay 8.Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the court of Appeal within 14 days after such order. By 17 November 2020, the time to appeal has expired. The application for leave to appeal is about one month out of time. The delay was not particularly long, but not insubstantial having regard to the time allowed for lodging an appeal. 9.The Order of DHCJ Pang was sent to the Applicant by post to his address at Portland Street on 28 September 2020. In his supporting affirmation, he said he did not receive the Order because he had moved his address but had not informed the Court. He did not know it was his duty to report his change of address to the Court. It was only on his regular reporting to the Immigration Department that he learned about the Order having been made. 10.In Karamjit Singh[2], the Court of Appeal said:
Thus, it is the Applicant’s duty to report his change of address to the Court. If he did not, he has to bear the consequence of his neglect. Ignorance of the law or his duty is not an excuse. Hence, there is no valid explanation for the delay. Grounds of appeal 11.The Applicant had not advanced any specific grounds of appeal. He only made a vague allegation that “the judges give unfair decision” in his supporting affirmation, but gave no particulars. He had made similar vague allegations against the Board when applying for leave to apply for judicial review[3]. DHCJ Pang was conscious of the complaint and had that in mind when dismissing that suggestion in paragraph 20 of the Call-1 Form. Though that complaint was directed at the Board, there is no reason to suggest DHCJ Pang had not been conscious of his own duty of fairness when dealing with his application. Actually, having examined the Call-1 Form with anxious scrutiny, I am unable to find any suggestion, let alone evidence, of unfairness on the part of the Court in refusing the Applicant leave to apply for judicial review. 12.Despite my specific directions to file specific grounds of appeal, the Applicant did not respond. The Court’s letter had not been returned. There is no suggestion that the Applicant had not received the letter because he had moved or for any other reasons. Even if he had moved, he only had himself to blame, for this time he must have known he had the duty to inform the Court of any change of address. Accordingly, I find that the Applicant has failed to advance any valid grounds of appeal. Prejudice to the respondent 13.As for prejudice to the proposed respondent, it is unlikely that this issue would be explored in an ex parte application for extension of time. The prejudice to the proposed respondent and to public administration if a challenge is allowed to proceed is obvious. The delay is by itself an abuse of the process of the court and the non-refoulement protection arrangement. To allow the challenge to proceed would encourage other claimants to indulge in such abuse. It would cause unnecessary waste of judicial and public resources and delay the genuine non-refoulement claimants’ access to the court. It would render it difficult for the Director to perform his duty of maintaining immigration control. Above all, it would make it difficult or unduly burdensome for Hong Kong to honour its international obligations under the various conventions to protect people from persecution, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This application does not raise any questions of general public importance. Allowing the application may subject the whole system of non-refoulement protection to serious abuse to the prejudice of Hong Kong. No questions of general public importance 14.The application does not raise any questions which are likely to have to be resolved by the courts in any event. Conclusion 15.Though the Applicant was only one month late, the delay was self-created. It was not insubstantial. He has no valid explanation for the delay and no valid grounds of appeal. For these reasons alone, his application for leave to appeal must be dismissed. It would be a futile exercise of the Court’ discretion to grant extension of time to enable an applicant to appeal or to apply for a judicial review which is bound to fail. To allow such an un-meritorious challenge to proceed would be prejudicial to the intended respondent and the administration. The application does not raise any questions of general public importance. Accordingly, the application for extension of time to appeal the Order of DHCJ Pang is refused.
The applicant is not represented [1] CACV 63/2015 (unreported) 3 November 2015 [2] CACV 78/2018; [2018] HKCA 460 [3] See paragraph 11 of the Call-1 Form | ||||||||||
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