Nguyen Ngoc Toan and Another v. Chan Leung Wai Ching, A Senior Immigration Officer
Read the full judgment text of CACV 51/1991 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 19 June 1991.
1. This is an appeal against the order of Bokhary, J. who, upon an application by way of judicial review, set aside the decision of Madam Chan Leung Wai Ching, a Senior Immigration Officer that Nguyen Ngoc Toan ("Toan"), a boy now of almost 16 years of age, did not fall within the definition of a refugee as laid down by the United Nations Convention of 1951, as amended by the Protocol of 1967, a definition in fact applied by the authorities in this jurisdiction, although the Convention and Proto
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CACV000051/1991
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--------- Coram: Sir Derek Cons, V.P., Kempster & Clough, JJ.A. Date of hearing: 13 June 1991 Date of delivery of judgment: 19 June 1991 ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- Sir Derek Cons, V.P. delivered the judgment of the court: 1. This is an appeal against the order of Bokhary, J. who, upon an application by way of judicial review, set aside the decision of Madam Chan Leung Wai Ching, a Senior Immigration Officer that Nguyen Ngoc Toan ("Toan"), a boy now of almost 16 years of age, did not fall within the definition of a refugee as laid down by the United Nations Convention of 1951, as amended by the Protocol of 1967, a definition in fact applied by the authorities in this jurisdiction, although the Convention and Protocol have no legal force. 2. Toan arrived unlawfully in Hong Kong on 5th July 1988. Ultimately the screening process to decide whether he qualified as a refugee was conducted in accordance with a Special Procedure for Vulnerable Persons in Hong Kong. These are persons who have "special difficulties in fully establishing the facts of the case or present special and compelling needs with regard to a durable solution". 3. Under the Special Procedure the potential refugee is interviewed by a case worker from the International Social Service (ISS) whose duty is to collect, by reference to an approved questionnaire, all the relevant information which will enable a Special Committee for Vulnerable Persons, the second stage of the process, to formulate a recommendation as to refugee status and advise on an appropriate durable solution. The report of the case worker is forwarded to the Committee who, in the light of that report and any further information provided to it, make a recommendation to the Director of Immigration. It is then up to the Director, through one of his officers, to whom all the papers and the recommendation of the Special Committee are forwarded, to make the decision. 4. It is well settled that it is no part of the ISS case worker's duty to express an opinion upon the merits of the claim. Initially it was the practice to delete any such opinion from the case worker's report. Now however, in deference to the desire of some case workers to forward their own opinion or recommendation to the Committee, such views are submitted in the form of an "addendum", which the Committee look upon as purely personal opinion, bearing in mind that the case workers are not qualified to make an assessment of the merits. 5. That is what happened in the present instance. Toan was interviewed on several occasions by a case worker, who spoke also with his brother and their cousin. To her final report she appended a sheet headed "Addendum: Interviewer's Opinion". That document was forwarded to the Special Committee, but was excluded from the papers which were subsequently passed on to Madam Chan. 6. The judge took the view that consideration of the addendum, had it been passed to Madam Chan, might have affected her decision. In that circumstance he held that Toan's case had not been fully and fairly presented to her, or in other words, that Toan had been denied natural justice in his quest for resettlement. 7. Mr. McNamara, who has presented the appeal ably and succinctly, takes no point that the addendum, being mostly concerned to press the case worker's own opinion on the merits, should not in any event have gone to the Senior Immigration Officer. He is content to accept that other parts of it would have been proper for her consideration. The main ground of his argument is that even had she seen it she would inevitably have come to the same conclusion, for the acceptable parts were already fully covered in the report. There was thus no possibility of a breach of natural justice: see George v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Another 1979 77 LGR 689, in particular the comment of Lord Denning, M.R. at 695:
and of Cummming-Bruce, L.J. at 698:
8. To see if Mr McNamara can make good that submission it is necessary to compare the relevant part of the report with the addendum, bearing in mind that since no viva voce evidence was led below, this court is in as good a position" to make that comparison as was the judge below. We thus make no excuse for setting out these passages in full. 9. Section E: Additional Comments of the report reads:
The addendum is in these words:
10. The judge set out fully the reasons for his conclusion:
11. It is clear that the part of the addendum upon which the judge relied as "qualitative'' improvement in the presentation of Toan's case is the second paragraph which focuses on his honesty. Mr Pritchard, who has appeared throughout for Toan, submits that this was indeed a new factor. He suggests that, despite the judge's apparent acceptance of it in the first paragraph of the passage we have just quoted, it was not reflected in the report, which on his analysis is no more than a report that the claims made by Toan are plausible claims, reserving the question of whether or not they are truthful. 12. With respect we are quite unable to accept that analysis. Taxing the four paragraphs of the report as a whole and in detail, we can only read them as strongly favourable to both the truth and accuracy of Toan's allegations. 13. We are also unable to read into the phraseology of the Special Committee's recommendation the unwillingness to accept that they were free from exaggeration which was found by the judge. Not only would we expect any doubts on this score to have been expressly revealed by the Committee, but they would not lie consistently with the Committee's view that "the discrimination/harassment (which the Committee must have accepted was) encountered by the family did not amount to a wellfounded fear of persecution". 14. In our view Mr McNamara has made good the submission that failure to submit the addendum to the Senior Immigration Officer in no way prejudiced Toan's application. We do not need then to consider the further argument that in fact she did not disbelieve him. 15. In the course of resisting the appeal Mr Pritchard put forward arguments which appear to suggest that the recommendation of the Special Committee was based upon a misunderstanding of the true facts, and that it was Wednesbury unreasonable. The latter point was taken below, but the judge having set aside the decision on the ground that he did, felt it unnecessary to go further. Neither point has been raised by a Respondent's Notice in these proceedings. 16. For these reasons we allow the appeal and order the decision of the Senior Immigration Officer dated 6th September 1990 to be reinstated.
Representation: Rodney Pritchard (M/s Wong, Hui & Co) for the applicant John MCNamara & Liu Yuen Ming, Crown Solicitor for the respondent/appellant |