Re Lama Mina
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 40/2022 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 28 March 2022.
1. This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge P Li (“the Judge”) dated 25 January 2022 refusing to grant an extension of time to appeal against the Judge’s decision dated 29 September 2021, in which the Judge refused leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 16 April 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”) and the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/a
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CAMP 40/2022 [2022] HKCA 452 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 40 OF 2022 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 568/2019) ____________________
____________________ Before: Hon Cheung JA and Barma JA in Court Date of Judgment: 28 March 2022 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge P Li (“the Judge”) dated 25 January 2022 refusing to grant an extension of time to appeal against the Judge’s decision dated 29 September 2021, in which the Judge refused leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 16 April 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”) and the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 14 February 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”) by which the applicant’s non-refoulement claim and appeal were both refused. Background 2.The applicant is a national of India. She arrived in Hong Kong on 25 September 2015 as a domestic worker, but she overstayed and she surrendered to the Immigration Department on 22 April 2016. The applicant thereafter lodged a non-refoulement claim on 7 April 2017. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on a fear of being harmed or killed by a man named Gopal Rai. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at [2] to [8] of his decision (“the CALL‑1 Form”)[1]. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 16 April 2018, the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s Decision covered the torture risk[2], the persecution risk[3], the BOR 2 risk[4] and the BOR 3 risk[5]. 5.The applicant appealed to the Board. After a hearing on 28 November 2018, the Board dismissed the appeal on 14 February 2019. The Board’s Decision covered all four grounds for non-refoulement protection. The Board rejected the applicant’s claims, which it did not find to be credible or established on the evidence before it. The Judge’s decision 6.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 27 February 2019 seeking to judicially review the Director’s Decision and the Board’s Decision without setting out any grounds of review. In her supporting affirmation, she complained that she was unrepresented in the appeal before the Board, and that there was no language assistance provided. 7.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the Board’s Decision and the Director’s Decision, the Judge refused to grant leave for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [13] to [18] of the CALL‑1 Form:
The present application for extension of time to appeal 8.The applicant’s address as stated in her Form 86 was at No. 81 Woosung Street, Jordan (“the No.81 Woosung Street Address”). According to the court’s record, a copy of the CALL-1 Form and a sealed copy of the Judge’s order were sent by post to the applicant at the No. 81 Woosung Street Address on 29 September 2021. This letter was not returned undelivered. 9.Pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(4), the applicant had 14 days to lodge an appeal. The applicant did not file a Notice of Appeal within 14 days of the Judge’s decision dated 29 September 2021. 10.The applicant took out a summons in the Court of First Instance on 10 November 2021 seeking extension of time to appeal, in which her address was stated to be at Nos. 25-27 Woosung Street. She stated in her supporting affirmation that she did not receive the CALL-1 Form. 11.The applicant’s application to appeal out of time was dismissed by the Judge on 25 January 2022[6]. 12.By a summons filed on 4 February 2022, the applicant renewed her application for an extension of time to appeal before this court. In the summons, the applicant stated that she would like to “set aside” the Judge’s decision dated 25 January 2022, being the Judge’s refusal to grant an extension of time for her to appeal against his decision dated 29 September 2021. Although the application purported to seek leave to appeal against the decision dated 25 January 2022, we shall treat it as a renewed application for an extension of time against the substantive decision of 29 September 2021, by which leave for judicial review was refused. 13.In her supporting affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant repeated her complaints of language difficulties as well as being unrepresented in the proceedings below. 14.In the applicant’s written submissions dated 18 February 2022, she contended inter alia that the Judge had been procedurally unfair towards her, and that he had failed to consider her difficulties with language and her lack of familiarity with “the Hong Kong authorities”. Discussion 15.Having considered the papers, we are satisfied that this application can properly be dealt with on the papers without the need for an oral hearing. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed. 16.The applicant has proffered no reason or explanation for the delay in bringing the intended appeal. Although her address appears to have changed, it is incumbent upon the applicant to notify the court of any change of address as soon as possible, and any consequences of having failed to do so lie with her. 17.In the circumstances, we are of the view that there is no reasonable explanation for the applicant’s delay in bringing the intended appeal. 18.We have nonetheless proceeded to consider the merits of the intended appeal. 19.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. 20.The applicant did not in the Form 86 or the accompanying affirmation point to any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision or the Director’s Decisions. The applicant has not condescended to any particulars as to on what basis the Board’s Decision or the Director’s Decisions were said to be wrong, unfair or Wednesbury unreasonable. That being the case, the application for leave for judicial review was hopeless and rightly dismissed by the Judge. 21.Further, an appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal will interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2) & (4)]. 22.The applicant has failed to identify any arguable error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was wrong. Nor can we discern any such matters. 23.As to the applicant’s complaint that she was not proficient in legal procedure and English, it is trite that a lack of knowledge in legal procedure is not a valid excuse for non-compliance with the relevant rules and deadlines. Further, we note that the applicant has managed both in the court below and before this court to file affirmations and submissions in coherent English. It is clear that the applicant has all along had access to language assistance, and there is thus no merit in her complaint that the court did not provide a translation of the CALL-1 Form to her in her native language. 24.We also note that the applicant has had the benefit of legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service in presenting her case to the Director, including the submission of her non-refoulement claim form and at her screening interview. This court has repeatedly held that the high standards of fairness applicable do not require that a non-refoulement protection claimant be absolutely entitled to legal representation at all stages of the screening process or the legal proceedings ensuing therefrom. It suffices for legal representation to be provided at the initial stage, with subsequent legal representation being provided on a merits basis. See Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15, Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17, Re Lopchan Subash [2018] HKCA 37 and Re Ahmed Syed Rafiq [2018] HKCA 178. 25.For these reasons, we do not see any prospect of success in the intended appeal, and this court will not grant an extension of time for a hopeless appeal. The summons filed on 4 February 2022 is accordingly dismissed.
The applicant acting in person [2] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [3] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [5] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. |
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