Re Majeed Abdul

HCAL 2028/2018

[2022] HKCFI 933

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2028 OF 2018

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Before:  Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung in Chambers

Date of Decision:  13 April 2022

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D E C I S I O N

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The application

1.The applicant is an illegal immigrant and he lodged a non-refoulement claim with the Director of Immigration (the “Director”). The Director, by his Decisions, rejected his application and he appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). Having considered his evidence, the Board, by its Decisions (the “Board’s Decisions”), rejected his appeal and affirmed the Director’s Decisions.

2.Pursuant to Order 53, rule 3(2) of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”), the applicant filed Form No. 86 to apply for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Second Decision.

3.By Form CALL-1 dated 7 January 2022 (the “Court’s decision”), the Court dismissed his application for the reason that there is no realistic prospect of success in his intended judicial review.

4.The applicant filed a summons on 1 March 2022 for appeal against the Court’s decision out of time, the delay being 1 month and 8 days.

5.In his affirmation in support of his application, he said he did not receive the Court’s decision. However, according to the court’s record, the Court’s decision was sent to his last known address without return.

Discussion

6.Pursuant to Order 32, rule 11 and 11A of the RHC, having considered the applicant’s reasons, I decide to determine this application without an oral hearing.

7.In AW v. Director of Immigration and William Lam CACV 63 of 2015, 3 November 2015, §27 the Court of Appeal held that for extension of time for making the application for leave to apply for judicial review, the Court has to consider (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the putative respondent if extension of time was granted. The delay is significant. Nevertheless, I shall consider the merits of the case.

8.In Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702, the Court of Appeal held:

“19. The prospect of success of the intended appeal is important: the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued, see Re Rahman Wasif [2019] HKCA 299 at [13]; Re Kpamou Gbotoi Bernard [2019] HKCA 168; and Re Irshad Muhammad [2018] HKCA 864 at [16].”

9.The applicant claimed that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by people from the Pakistan People’s Party (“PPP”) because he refused to join them. 

10.The Director found that the level of risk of him being harmed or killed by PPP members upon refoulement was assessed to be low [18]-[22]; that there was no official involvement [23]-[29]; that state protection was available to him [30]-[32] and that internal relocation was an option open to him [33]-[35].  In a Notice of Further Decision dated 7 March 2017, the Director also rejected his claim on BOR2 risk (“the Director’s Second Decision”) for the reason that there was no evidence to show that his right to life under BOR 2 would be violated upon his return to his home country. He appealed to the Board.

11.By the Board’s Second Decision, the Board affirmed the Director’s Second Decision. Also, it found that the applicant was evasive during cross-examination.  More importantly, his evidence on the political aspects of the claim was not corroborated by the COI. 

12.The applicant is unable to set out any valid ground to challenge the Board’s Second Decision. Nor can he point out any error on the part of this Court in the assessment of his application.

13.There is no realistic prospect of success in his intended appeal. I therefore refuse to extend time for him to appeal and dismiss his application.

The applicant was unrepresented.