Ho Chiu King, Pansy Catilina v. Ho, Angela and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCCA 4042/2020 on BabelCite. This HCCA judgment was delivered on 19 April 2022.
1. The matter concerns the estate (“ Estate ”) of Dr Stanley Ho (the “ Deceased ”).
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HCCA 4042/2020 [2022] HKCFI 1111 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CAVEAT NO HCCA 4042 OF 2020 ________________________
________________________ BETWEEN
________________________ Before: Hon Wilson Chan J in Chambers Date of Hearing: 30 November 2021 Date of Judgment: 19 April 2022 ________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.The matter concerns the estate (“Estate”) of Dr Stanley Ho (the “Deceased”). 2.Before the court are 2 cross-applications taken out respectively by Pansy Ho (“Pansy”) (the person warning) and Angela Ho (“Angela”) (the caveator) for the appointment of independent professional administrators over the Estate. They are taken out pursuant to section 36 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance, Cap 10 (“PAO”).
3.In other words, it is undisputed that independent professional administrators should be appointed. It is also undisputed that the KPMG Administrators should be appointed. The only difference between Pansy and Angela[1] is whether the KPMG Administrators alone, or whether the A&M Administrators in addition to the KPMG Administrators, should be appointed. B. BACKGROUND B1. Family background 4.The Deceased needs no introduction. He passed away on 26 May 2020 at the age of 98, leaving no will. 5.There is no dispute that the Deceased has left behind substantial assets which are expected to be located in various jurisdictions, including Hong Kong, Macau, Portugal, and no doubt other parts of the world:
6.There are 4 branches in the Ho family:
7.Under the rules of intestacy, there are in total 18 or 19[2] beneficiaries to the Estate from these 4 branches. B2. The Family Deed 8.Shortly after the death of the Deceased, the family members of the Deceased had come together to try to agree on a mechanism for appointing professional administrators to administer the Estate, so as to ensure the smooth and amicable administration of the Estate. 9.After discussions, a mechanism was eventually agreed and recorded in a Family Deed dated 24 July 2020. 10.The discussions relating to the Family Deed were led and co-ordinated by Pansy, and all four families were involved in the discussions, and drafts of the document were sent to their respective representatives. Angela even provided a series of comments and queries to the draft. 11.However, in the end, only the Second, Third and Fourth Families signed up to the Family Deed, and each family appointed a “Family Representative” to participate in the decision-making process. 12.Madam Laam did not wish to be a party to the Family Deed, but has separately indicated her support for Pansy’s application to appoint administrators made pursuant to the Family Deed. 13.Thus, 12 or 13 out of the 18 or 19 beneficiaries have agreed to the Family Deed mechanism. For reasons not relevant to the present applications, one of the children in the Fourth Family has not formally indicated his position. 14.Pursuant to the mechanism under the Family Deed, the Family Representatives of the Second to Fourth Families then had a meeting to discuss the potential candidates to be appointed as independent administrators for the Estate, and interviewed 2 accountant firms. In the end they chose KPMG to be the independent administrators. The choice of KPMG was therefore the result of the collective decision-making process following due-diligence work as to the most appropriate candidates for the administration of the Estate. B3. The First Family’s stance regarding the Family Deed 15.The Family Deed was intended to include the First Family, and the other family branches had made efforts to involve the First Family in the discussions. Initially, the First Family participated in these discussions. At one stage, they even signed up to the Family Deed (and the Powers of Attorney) on 21 July 2020, appointing Faye Ho (Angela’s niece) as the Family Representative. 16.However, the First Family soon changed their stance (with Faye Ho informing Pansy of this change one day later). Faye Ho formally resigned as the Family Representative of the First Family on 19 August 2020. 17.It is not clear what the reason was for this change of stance, but it appears that this change was led or advocated by Angela (whom Ringo Siu supports). On Angela’s evidence, she says that this was because she (and not anyone else) wanted the decision making by the Family Representatives under the Family Deed to be by unanimous vote, but this has not been accepted.[3] 18.This was not an issue for other members of the First Family. This can be seen from the fact that Faye Ho, Deborah Ho and Sarah Ho remain supportive of the Family Deed and Pansy’s application. They have each signed a letter indicating that they have no objection to Pansy’s application: see their letters dated 28 September 2020. In other words, a majority of the First Family in fact was content with Pansy’s application even though they did not participate in the selection process via the Family Deed mechanism. B4. The position of the beneficiaries 19.Pansy issued her Summons on 28 September 2020, proposing to appoint the KPMG Administrators. Her application is supported by:
20.Angela issued her Summons on 31 December 2020, proposing to appoint the KPMG Administrators plus the A&M Administrators. Ringo Siu supports her application. Faye Ho and Sarah Ho have also indicated that they do not object to Angela’s application. 21.In other words, Pansy’s application has the support of 15 or 16 out of the 18 or 19 beneficiaries, whereas Angela’s application has the support of 4 of the beneficiaries (with Faye Ho and Sarah Ho appear to indicate that they are content with either application). C. PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE POSITIONS 22.In broad terms, Pansy’s position and submission is that there are plainly no reasons for Angela to insist on appointing the A&M Administrators additionally, and that in the best interests of the Estate and the beneficiaries the court should only appoint the KPMG Administrators:
23.The respondents’ submission, on the other hand, is that there should be a compromise between Pansy’s proposal and Angela’s proposal because:
D. RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES 24.Under the Non-Contentious Probate Rules, Cap 10A (“NCPR”) rule 21(1), certain beneficiaries in an intestacy have priority to take the grant of representation. Those first in priority are the surviving spouse or the partner to a union of concubinage, and those second in priority are children or issue of the deceased. 25.Section 36 of PAO provides that:
26.In other words, under this section, the court has power to “pass over” persons who may have a better entitlement under the law and appoint some other person as administrator. 27.The words “necessary or convenient” in section 36 give the court a broad discretion, to be exercised in the best interests of the estate: Lefkowitz v The Bank of New York [1996] 3 HKC 591, 594D (Litton VP as he then was). 28.This power is often exercised to appoint independent professionals as the administrators. This is often the case where there may be serious disputes or animosity amongst the competing groups of beneficiaries. See: for example, Re Estate of Chen Pang Ping Eugene[2016] 2 HKLRD 813, §38 (Kwan JA as she then was). 29.The court can also make a grant to a nominee under this power, in effect passing over all those entitled under the NCPR, where the relevant parties consent: see Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks on Executors, Administrators and Probate, 21st ed (“WMS”), §21-08. 30.As noted above, in the present case, all family members agree that it would be in the interest of family harmony to appoint independent professional administrators. The only dispute is as to who should be appointed - and more specifically, whether the candidates put forward by Angela should be appointed together with the candidates put forward by Pansy and supported by the rest of the family. 31.In terms of deciding on the identity of the administrator, the court would usually give preference to the candidate(s) with the support of the majority of the beneficiaries: see WMS, §21-27. This consideration usually arises in the context of a dispute between persons entitled to administration in the same degree under the NCPR: see WMS§21-24. Here, all the beneficiaries (save Madam Laam) are the Deceased’s children and are entitled to the same degree. Although they are not putting themselves forward to be the administrator but are putting forward their chosen professionals, the consideration to prefer the views of the majority must apply by analogy. 32.In such an application, the court generally should not delve into any disputed facts between the parties. This is because the court is not called upon to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, and it is not necessary for the court to resolve any disputed issues of fact: Re Estate of Chan Hung Mou HCCA 2740/2007 (unrep, 12.02.2009), §15 (Lam J, as he then was). E. DISCUSSION E1. Authorities dealing with different camps of beneficiaries 33.Pansy’s application has the support of the majority of the beneficiaries of the Estate. 34.As noted at paragraphs 19 to 21 above, Pansy’s application has the support of 15 or 16 out of the 18 or 19 beneficiaries, whereas Angela’s application only has the support of 4 (2 of them has indicated support or no objection to both applications). 35.It is of note that, even within the First Family, the majority of them supports or has no objection to Pansy’s application. In effect, only Angela and Ringo Siu do not support Pansy’s application. 36.This is an important factor, since the court would in law generally prefer the application supported by the majority of the beneficiaries: see paragraph 31 above. 37.The starting point must be the general practice that the choice of the majority would be preferred by the court. It matters not that this is a matter of practice, and not strict immutable law. The idea that the court should reach a “compromise” whenever one minority set of beneficiaries take a different view is clearly not correct. This is especially so when the appointment of independent professionals already addresses the issue of there being different camps of interests. 38.The authorities cited by the respondents in purported support of the idea that Angela and Ringo Siu (as noted above, their stance do not represent the First Family’s) should have their own “representation” do not assist them. This is quite apart from the point (see paragraph 18 above) that they do not represent the First Family. 39.The authorities referred to do not concern the situation where professional administrators are to be appointed. As explained in Re Estate of Chen Pang Ping Eugene(supra), per Kwan JA at §38, where there are disputes and hostility amongst the beneficiaries, it would often be appropriate to appoint professionals. Plainly, the appointment of independent professionals would of itself address the need for each to have their representation. 40.It is notable that the respondents are not able to cite any reasoned decision where there are competing proposals as to the professionals to be appointed and where the court had decided to appoint 2 sets of professionals. 41.Further, both Re Lam Kam Wai [2009] HKCFI 58 and the extract from Tristram & Coote’s Probate Practice§§7.36-7.37 are concerned with the practice in the special situation where there are minority (ie under age) interests, a situation where the court is required to appoint at least 2 administrators (under PAO section 25 and Re Lam Kam Wai §10). This is clear from Tristram & Coote’s §§7.36-7.37:
42.That is not the case here. In Re Lam Kam Wai there was one (lay) administrator from one side, and since there was no one capable of acting from the other side, the court followed this practice and appointed a solicitor: see §13(b). 43.Finally, I agree that the respondents’ reliance on Re Estate of Loo Che Chin[2013] 2 HKLRD 739 is also misplaced:
E2. Basis of agreement to be passed over 44.In the present case, the respondents agreed to independent professionals as a matter of principle to maintain family harmony. The agreement was not stipulated or formulated as being conditional on having their choice of professionals. 45.There seems to be a suggestion that the respondents’ agreement to be passed over was on the basis that there be a professional acceptable to them. That was plainly not the case. It is plain that Angela agreed with this as a matter of principle. Her evidence is that (Angela 1st Aff §21):
46.This is the position as explained in the authorities - if there are disputes and hostility, it would often be appropriate to appoint independent professionals: paragraph 39 above. The authorities do not say that professionals nominated by each branch should be appointed - that would not remove the partisan nature of the appointees and would defeat the purpose of appointing independent professionals. That is also against the practice of giving preference to the wishes of the majority. E3. Respondents’ insistence on A&M should not be accommodated 47.The respondents have no relevant concern over KPMG other than Angela’s insistence that they should have her own “representation”, which is a plainly misconceived notion. 48.As noted, it is only the respondents (not every beneficiary from the First Family) who insisted on the A&M Administrators. The other 3 members of the First Family were content with appointing KPMG alone (even if they did not participate in their selection): see paragraph 18 above. 49.The starting point must be that the court would prefer the proposal of the majority. If the court is to reach a “compromise” and accommodate their wishes every time one or two dissentient beneficiaries insist on their own choice, then this will happen in every case and this would lead to chaos. Moreover, this would also be unfair to members of the majority who have agreed upon one candidate among themselves. 50.The First Family were given every opportunity to participate in the Family Deed and the selection process, and cannot now complain that they had not been given a chance to participate. 51.Further, given that Angela (and by implication Ringo Siu) does not question the competence and professionalism of KPMG, it is difficult to see what the issue is even if Angela did not participate in their selection. 52.This stance of the respondents stems from Angela’s misconceived idea that A&M would be her “representation”, which itself suggests that she has her own agenda. There is no need for her to have her own “representation”, when she does not challenge the professionalism or independence of KPMG. 53.On a proper analysis, it appears that what the respondents are really saying is that, although A&M are (on a proper analysis) not their “representatives” and would act independently, the mere fact of appointing someone nominated by the respondents would:
so that this will minimise the risks of future disputes, which the respondents would otherwise be more likely to cause because they feel that they are not being represented (even if this is a misconceived view). As submitted by Pansy’s counsel, this position just needs to be stated to be rejected. There is no reason for the court to address the respondents’ “concerns” arising from an ill-conceived notion that A&M would be their representatives (which Angela has actually accepted on affirmation that they are not). E4. Allegedly favourable attributes of A&M 54.The respondents’ submission that A&M would somehow “complement” KPMG, or that the costs would be reduced if both KPMG and A&M are appointed is plainly unrealistic. 55.It is completely not to the point that A&M may be equally qualified as KPMG - the question is why they would be needed at all. 56.Specifically, the point originally made in Angela’s evidence was that there are certain skills or industry specific specialties that KPMG does not possess:
57.As to the point that somehow A&M is more efficient in “committing resources seamlessly across borders”:
58.As to the idea that KPMG would more likely encounter conflict of interest issues in respect of the known part of the Estate and the unknown part of the Estate:
59.As to the suggestion that the two firm proposal would not involve deadlock or duplication, I agree that even if the two firms have no difficulty working together, the very involvement of two firms would necessarily involve duplication and increase administrative costs and inefficiency. 60.There is also a suggestion that A&M’s involvement would drive down costs because this would avoid future disputes:
F. CONCLUSION 61.For the reasons set out above, I allow Pansy’s application and make an order in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of her Summons. I dismiss Angela and Ringo Siu’s Summons. 62.As to costs, I make an order for Pansy’s costs of her application to be borne by the Estate, and her costs in respect of Angela and Ringo Siu’s Summons to be paid for by Angela and Ringo Siu (with a certificate for 2 counsel). 63.The above order as to costs is nisi and shall become absolute in the absence of any application within 14 days to vary the same. 64.Lastly, I express my gratitude to counsel on both sides for their helpful assistance in this matter.
Mr Paul Shieh, SC, leading Mr Keith Lam, instructed by Messrs Baker & McKenzie, for the Person Warning/Applicant Mr Douglas Lam, SC, leading Ms Jacqueline Law, instructed by Messrs Haldanes, for the 1st and 2nd Respondents [1] Strictly speaking the Summons of 31.12.2020 was issued by both Angela and Ringo Siu. Since it was all along Angela who filed substantive evidence in support of this Summons, for convenience this Judgment will refer only to Angela as the opposing side. [2] Angela appears to dispute that Madam Lucina Laam was not a concubine of the Deceased and thus not a beneficiary: Angela 3rd Aff §7. This dispute is not material to this application. [3] Angela 2nd Aff §12. Pansy 3rd Aff §8 also explained that it was a collective decision of the family members signing the Family Deed that the selection process should be by a simple majority. [4] Pansy 1st Aff §§50-52; Pansy 2nd Aff §§27-29. [5] Joint Declaration by the Ho family dated 10.3.2011. [6] Pansy 2nd Aff §40. |
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