Re Siti Hayani
Read the full judgment text of CACV 54/2022 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 13 May 2022.
1. This is an appeal by the applicant against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge P Li (“the Deputy Judge”) set out in the Form CALL-1 dated 18 January 2022, by which the Deputy Judge refused her application for leave to apply for judicial review ( [2022] HKCFI 138 ) (“the Leave Decision”).
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CACV 54/2022 [2022] HKCA 677 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 54 OF 2022 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1202 OF 2019) ________________________
________________________ Before: Hon Au JA and Lisa Wong J in Court Date of Hearing: 26 April 2022 Date of Judgment: 13 May 2022 ________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Au JA (giving judgment of the court): 1.This is an appeal by the applicant against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge P Li (“the Deputy Judge”) set out in the Form CALL-1 dated 18 January 2022, by which the Deputy Judge refused her application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2022] HKCFI 138) (“the Leave Decision”). 2.The intended judicial review is to challenge against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 26 April 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”), dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 25 June 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”) rejecting her non-refoulement claim. Background 3.The applicant is a national of Indonesia. She last arrived in Hong Kong on 1 March 2017 and was permitted to remain as a visitor until 31 March 2017. She overstayed since 1 April 2017 and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 6 April 2017. On 12 July 2017, she raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that her life would be endangered by her creditor due to a loan dispute which was caused by her husband. Factual details of the applicant’s claim were summarised by the Deputy Judge at [3] - [6] of the Leave Decision. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 25 June 2018, the Director rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. His decision covered all applicable grounds including torture risk[1], BOR2 risk[2], BOR3 risk[3] and persecution risk[4]. Taking into account all relevant circumstances, the Director considered that her non-refoulement claim was unsubstantiated. 5.On 26 June 2018, the applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board. The applicant attended the hearing before the Board on 1 February 2019 with the assistance of an Indonesian interpreter. The Board dismissed her appeal on 26 April 2019. Having assessed the evidence, the Board considered that there were inconsistencies in her evidence. The Board was not satisfied that she had ever been adversely approached or threatened with harm or death in connection with the unpaid debts of her husband or for any other reason. The Board also did not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of harm of any type in Indonesia in the reasonably foreseeable future for any of the reasons claimed. Accordingly, the applicant failed to substantiate her claim and her appeal was dismissed. The Leave Decision 6.On 6 May 2019, the applicant filed a Form 86 and a supporting affirmation applying for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision. She did not provide any ground of review in her Form 86 or supporting affirmation. By way of two letters to the Court respectively dated 26 May 2021 and 18 August 2021, the applicant claimed that there had been procedural unfairness in the process before the Board given the lack of language assistance and that the Board’s Decision was irrational and unreasonable. She also alleged that the Board merely dismissed her claim in terms of state protection but had failed to take into account the seriousness of bribery in Indonesia. She further complained that the Board relied significantly on the source of news which was not officially recognised or was hearsay. 7.As the applicant failed to attend the hearing before the Deputy Judge on 8 November 2021, the Deputy Judge considered her application on paper. By the Leave Decision, the Deputy Judge refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. His reasons were set out at [10] - [16] of the Leave Decision:
The Appeal 8.On 27 January 2022, the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal and an affirmation in support of her present appeal against the Leave Decision. However, she did not give any ground of appeal in her Notice of Appeal. In her supporting affirmation, she only claimed that the Board and the Director disregarded her dangerous situation. 9.Pursuant to this Court’s directions dated 4 March 2022, the applicant lodged her skeleton argument on 29 March 2022. In those submissions, the applicant alleged that the Director and the Board had been procedurally unfair, irrational and unreasonable. However, the applicant failed to condescend upon particulars as to her allegations. 10.We heard the appeal on 26 April 2022. A Bengali interpreter was present to provide language assistance. During the hearing, the applicant confirmed that she had nothing further to add to her written materials. Discussion 11.The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non-refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. 12.In an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. It is not the role of the Court of Appeal to examine a decision of the Board afresh as if it is a fresh application for leave to apply for judicial review. Otherwise, an applicant could flagrantly disregard the time limit in Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A. 13.Nowhere in her Notice of Appeal, supporting affirmation or skeleton arguments did the applicant identify any error in the Leave Decision. It is well-established that in the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and we would only reverse that decision if an appellant can demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration, supra, at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11]. As the applicant failed to provide any ground of appeal, the appeal ought to be dismissed on this basis alone. 14.Further, the applicant’s contentions are all too vague and general. General and bare assertions that she would face harm upon return to her home country do not constitute proper grounds of appeal. In any event, assessment of evidence, Country of Origin materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director) as primary decision makers. The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration, supra, at [14]. In the present case, we do not see any error of law or procedure in the proceedings before the Board in relation to the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. There is no basis to disturb the Leave Decision. 15.For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [2] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [5] Letter from this court dated 17 June 2021. |
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