Ykh v. Lsm

FCMC 243/2011

[2022] HKFC 88

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 243 OF 2011

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Coram:  His Honour Judge G. Own in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Dates of Hearing:  1 September 2020, 25 and 26 November 2020

Dates of Written Final Submissions :  7 January 2021

Extended Dates of Final Submissions :  4 February 2021

Date of Decision:  14 April 2022

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D E C I S I O N

(Setting Aside : Ex Parte Orders)

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This Application

1.This is Respondent’s application by way of summons dated 19/12/2018[1] seeking to set aside 3 Ex Parte Orders obtained by the Petitioner during the course of these proceedings. Although parties’ marriage had ended, I will conveniently refer to the Petitioner as Husband (“H”) and the Respondent as Wife (“W”) in this Decision.

2.The 3 Ex Parte Orders are dated 31/3/2011 (“Order 1”)[2]; dated 21/10/2011 (“Order 2”)[3] and 31/1/2012 (“Order 3”)[4]. Order 1 and Order 2 was granted upon H’s Affirmations filed separately as ex parte applications. Order 3 was granted by the Court during a directions hearing without H’s further Affirmation.

Chronology

3.Prior to the issuing of the present Summons for setting aside, W had oddly taken out different applications which include :-

(a)  Issuing an Inter Partes Summons dated 29/7/2016 for variation of the Ancillary Relief Order dated 3/7/2012[5] and seeking various other reliefs (the “1^st Inter Partes Summons”). The call over hearing for this Summons was scheduled for 5/9/2016;

(b)  Commencing separate proceedings under FCMP No. 268/2016 on 22/12/2016 under Order 35 of the Rules of the District Court, Cap.336H for, inter alia, discharge of the Ancillary Reliefs Order dated 3/7/2012 in these proceedings and; in substitution therefor, seeking various other financial reliefs (the “FCMP proceedings”).

4.In response to the 1^st Inter Partes Summons, H applied for legal aid and the call over hearing on 5/9/2016 was then vacated to give way to the 42-day stay of proceedings. It was then adjourned to 10/11/2016. At the adjourned hearing, leave was granted for W to withdraw the 1^st Inter Partes Summons.

5.On 19/1/2018, the FCMP proceedings were adjourned sine die with liberty to restore.

6.On 19/12/2018 which is another 11 months later, W took out the present Summons.

Background

7.On 6/1/2011, H filed a Petition for divorce[6] on the fact that he had separated with W for at least 2 years from and since 2004. The marriage had been irretrievably broken down. Suffice is to say that since the filing of the Petition and throughout these proceedings, W was absent which had led H to apply for substituted service orders from the Court. There are 3 substituted service Orders granted.

8.There is a child born out of the marriage, a son, born in September 1992 (the “Child”).

9.It is common ground that the separation started when W moved out from the former matrimonial home in Hoi Fu Court, Kowloon, Hong Kong (“FMH”) in mid-2004 and that she had never returned. She had not left behind the address as to where she was moving to or any contact address. H and the Child stayed at the FMH. Around a year or so later in mid-2005, the Child also moved out from the FMH and started to live with W. H continued to live in the FMH.

10.It is also common ground that since the separation in mid-2004, the parties did not meet with each other for about 6 ½ years. On 5/1/2011 when the Child was leaving Hong Kong to study in the United States that they met again. There was, however, different version as to exactly how the parties met with each other on that day. I will deal with their respective evidence in the latter part of this Decision.

11.Trial of the ancillary reliefs was proceeded upon H’s case in the absence of W given that W had not taken any part in these proceedings. Judgment (after trial) on ancillary reliefs was delivered on 3/7/2012.

The 3 Ex Parte Orders

12.Order 1[7] : on substituted service of Petition and all

(dated 31/3/2011) accompanying documents by advertisement once in

Oriental Daily, a Chinese newspaper, granted upon

H’s Affirmation dated 2/3/2011 (filed on 3/3/2011)[8];

Order 2[9] : on substituted service of Order dated 12/7/2011 and

(dated 21/10/2011) Notice of First Appointment hearing by

advertisement once in Oriental Daily, a Chinese

newspaper, granted upon H’s Affirmation dated

3/8/2011[10];

Order 3[11] : on date of trial of ancillary reliefs scheduled for

(dated 31/1/2012) 22/3/2012 with one day reserved; granted by the

Court at a directions hearing without H’s Affirmation.

The Law

13.There is no dispute that orders granted ex parte could be set aside under Order 32 rule 6 of the Rules of the District Court, Cap.336H.

Wife’s case and her evidence

14.Apart from relying upon her own affirmations and oral evidence given at trial, she also arranged the Child to file his affirmation and testify in Court.

15.W’s case for the setting aside application rests upon H’s material non-disclosure and deliberate misstatements made to the Court. Given the fact that Order 1 and Order 2 were granted upon H’s Affirmations, W submitted that on the respective dates of the 2 affirmations, namely, on 2/3/2011 and 3/8/2011, H knew that the contents of his affirmations were either incorrect, incomplete or did not reflect the truth.

16.Whilst admitting that she did not provide H with her contact address at the time when and after she left H in mid-2004, W said she had never changed her mobile telephone number. H would be able to contact her if he so wished. According to W, H had not done so.

17.Besides, H could also ask her parents in Mainland China whom she had close contact whether before and after her separation with H since 2004. Her parents knew her contact details in Hong Kong. It is W’s case that H had not done so.

18.Further and admitted by H, the Child moved away from H to live with her around 2005. H could ask the Child for her contact details. According to W, H had not done so although W agreed that she had told the Child not to tell H her contact details. It was also admitted by H that at all times the Child was in close and frequent contact with H’s mother, that is, the Paternal Grandmother.

19.Finally and also admitted by H, there was an occasion on 5/1/2011 when the Child left Hong Kong to study in the United States. H met W on this occasion although there are sharp discrepancies on facts between them as to what had happened on that day, including where they met with each other.

H’s Case and his evidence

20.H’s filed his 5^th Affirmation in Opposition[12] (which was written in Chinese) and also referred to his 5 other affirmations filed on 3/3/2011 (1^st), 3/8/2011 (2^nd), 17/2/2012 (3^rd) and 8/7/2014 (4^th) in these proceedings. H also referred to his Affirmation filed on 10/7/2017 (5^th) in the FCMP Proceedings.

21.In a gist, H was repeating what he had said in those earlier affirmations which he filed for applying the substituted service Order 1 and Order 2. In this Affirmation in Opposition, he referred to the following 5 additional facts which had not appeared in any of his earlier affirmations. They are :-

-  At paragraph 9, he first mentioned the Child moved out from the FMH in 2005. Through his mother, he learnt that the Child moved to live with W (Fact 1).

-  At paragraph 10, he was told by his mother that the Child was going to the United States for study and needed him to sign some documents for processing (Fact 2).

-  At paragraph 11, he said around 3/1/2011 his mother told him the Child would be departing on 5/1/2011 and he was given the flight details by his mother (Fact 3).

-  At paragraph 12, he described what had happened on 5/1/2011 when he went to the Hong Kong International Airport (Fact 4).

-  At paragraph 14, he talked about having occasional telephone chats with the Child whilst the Child was in the United States (Fact 5).

22.At paragraph 8 of the Affirmation in Opposition, H tried to explain that when he earlier said W had brought the Child along when she left the FMH in mid-2004 was due to misunderstanding arising from miscommunication with his previous lawyers. It was also because he was not able to fully comprehend the contents of his 2^nd Affirmation which was prepared in English.

The Child’s evidence

23.The Child filed his 3-page Affirmation[13] referred to his other affirmation dated 19/1/2018 filed in the FCMP proceedings. He added that whilst he was studying in the United States between January 2011 and August 2012, no one told him and he had no knowledge that H had commenced divorce proceedings and that there were documents need to be served upon W.

24.In his oral testimonies, he gave an account of what had happened on the date of his departure (that is, 5/1/2011) at the airport. He also confirmed the following :-

-  From time to time since 2006 he had telephone conversation with his Paternal Grandmother when occasionally H was present and that H would talk to him;

-  From time to time he had meals with the Paternal Grandmother when occasionally H was there also;

-  In early 2006 he resumed contact with H through the aid of the Paternal Grandmother (“穿針引線”);

-  It was only after he returned to Hong Kong in August 2012, but not at any time before and whether he was in Hong Kong or in the United States, that H started to ask him about W’s contact details. He did say to H “你哋大人嘅事，你哋兩個自己處理啦，唔好搞到我。”

Discussion

25.It is best and useful to first examine the legal position for setting aside ex parte orders granted in the absence of the other party.

26.Under the explanatory notes of Order 32 rule 6 where the following passages are useful and informative[14] :

“Setting aside ex parte order (rr.1-6)

Rule 6 embodies the fundamental rule of practice that a party affected by an ex parte order may apply to the court to discharge it, inasmuch as he has not had an opportunity of being heard (H.M.S, Archer [1919] P.1 at 4). The jurisdiction under O.32, r.6 also enables the court to vary the order. At the inter partes hearing, a party may ask the court to substitute the original order with any order that the court finds just and convenient (Lim Boon Kick and Leong Mei Yong v. Kelvin Lim Kok Sai (CACV 97/1995).

The court has an inherent jurisdiction to revoke leave given ex parte, e.g. if it feels that it gave its original leave under a misapprehension upon new matters being drawn to its attention (per Lord Denning M.R. in Becker v. Noel (Practice Note) [1971] 1 W.L.R. 805; [1971] 2 All E.R. 1248, CA). When applying for an ex parte order it is the duty of the applicant to make a full and frank disclosure to the court of all the relevant facts of which he knows and failure to do so may itself be a ground for setting aside such an order (Bloomfield v. Serenyi [1945] 2 All E.R. 646, CA; Lau Wai Bing v. Lau Lee Kin (HCA 529/2007; [2007] H.K.E.C.1588) and see also Continental Mark Ltd v. Verkehrs-Club de Schweiz (HCA 7999/2000), October 31, 2001; [2001] 4 H.K.C. 46; [2001] H.K.E.C. 1318) regarding the ex parte duty of frankness in RHC O.11 application and PCCW-HKT Telephone Ltd v David Mathew McDonald Aiken (HCA 1089/2008, July 10, 2008; [2008] H.K.E.C. 1149) in relation to non-disclosure of legal arguments and authorities). The court has adopted a four-limb test when considering whether to set aside an ex parte order for material non-disclosure: (1) were the facts alleged not to be disclosed material ? (2) was there non-disclosure ? (3) if there was non-disclosure, was it innocent ? (4) if there was material non-disclosure, should the court nevertheless exercise its discretion not to discharge the order ? (Yau Chi Wah v. Gold Chief Investment Ltd [2003] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 553 as applied in Yau Ngai v. Yau Tak [2008] H.K.E.C. 1488)). If the facts are “relevant to the weighing operation which the Court has to make in deciding whether or not to grant the order”, they are material and should be disclosed (see Secretary for Justice v. Choy Bing Wing (CACV 11/2004), December 3, 2004; [2004] H.K.E.C. 1481); Citibank N.A. v. Express Ship Management Services [1987] H.K.L.R. 1184, CA following Thermax v. Schott Industrial Glass [1981] F.S.R. 289; Prediwave Corp. v. New World TMT Ltd (CACV 292 and 293/2006); [2006] H.K.E.C. 1914, CA)). Quaere, whether the non-disclosure must have amounted to an attempt to deceive the court (see Ellinger v. Guinness, Mahon & Co. [1939] 4 All E.R. 16). Whether the non-disclosure was innocent, in the sense that the fact was not known to the applicant or its relevance was not perceived, is an important consideration whether the ex parte order should be discharged, although it is not decisive (Re A HCMA 1407/2007; [2007] H.K.E.C. 2266), per Kwan J. at 41, applying Brink’s Mat :Ltd v. Elcombe [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1350). In the majority of cases, the matter has to be approached on the basis of considering the quality of the material which was not disclosed without making any final decision whether or not there has been bad faith in the failure to disclose (Re A (above) at para.41).

In the case of a deliberate mis-statement/non-disclosure, the discretion not to set aside the ex parte order should be rarely exercised, and even in the case of non-deliberate non-disclosure, the discretion not to set aside the ex parte order should only be exercised with great caution (Kan Hung Cheung v. Director of Immigration [2008] H.K.E.C. 244). An applicant’s alleged failure, at an ex parte hearing, to draw the court’s attention to a legal decision does not amount to the non-disclosure of a fact, but was rather a matter of law; as such, it was not a fact relevant to the “weighing operation” in deciding whether or not to grant the ex parte order at all (Secretary for Justice v. Choy Bing Wing (above)).

The duty of full and frank disclosure continues while the proceedings remain on an ex parte basis (China North Industries Investment Ltd v. Ronald Chum [2010] 5 H.K.L.R.D. 1). By its nature, an ex parte order is essentially a provisional order made by the judge on the basis of evidence and submissions emanating from one side only and there is therefore no basis for making a definitive order and accordingly when the judge reviews his provisional order in the light of the evidence and argument adduced by the opposite party, he is not hearing an appeal from himself and is in no way inhibited from discharging or varying his original order (per Sir John Donaldson M.R. in WEA Records Ltd v. Visions Channel 4 Ltd [1983] 1 W.L.R. 721; [1983] 2 All E.R. 589, CA; Builders Federal (H.K.) Ltd v. Elemeta Holdings Ltd (HCA 709/1986, [1986] H.K.E.C. 197); Lim Boon Kick and Leong Mei Yung v. Kelvin Lim Kok Sai (CACV 97/1995); John Phillips Goldie v. Grandtag Financial Consultancy & Insurance Brokers Ltd (HCMP 23/2006; [2006] H.K.E.C. 710).

…………….”

The Issues Involved

27.At paragraph 23 of H’s Counsel’s Written Submissions dated 19/5/2020 where Counsel Miss Yu said :-

“23. The key questions are :

(1) Whether it was impracticable for H to serve on W the documents in concern in the prescribed manner, i.e. by post, in person, leaving at the last known address of W ? Only when the answer is “practicable”, then H may have obtained the orders for substituted service on a non-footing; and

(2) Whether W has shown any defence having a real prospect of success on merits.”

28.At paragraph 19 of H’s Counsel Miss Yu’s Closing Submissions dated 4/2/2021 where she further said :-

“19. It appears that parties’ major differences are the applicable legal principles :

(1) W argued on that H’s affirmations made back in 2011 to support applications for the Substituted Service Orders involve non-disclosure, or inaccurate information, and therefore, the Substituted Service Orders are liable to be set aside. W seems to suggest that whenever there is any “non-disclosure”, the Substituted Service Orders made shall be set aside per se; and

(2) H disagrees with W. H submits that – if the Court finds, based on the evidence about what happened in 2011 as it now stands, that it was impracticable for H to serve on W the documents in the prescribed manner, i.e. by post, in person or leaving at the last known address back in 2011, the substituted service orders shall stand. Any allegation of material non-disclosure could not be material, or relevant, when it would not have changed the final result anyway; and

(3) H repeats his submissions made in (1) Section C of H’s Main Skeleton dated 19 May 2020 and (2) §15 to §21 of H’s Supplemental Skeleton also dated 19 May 2020 on the applicable legal principles. It is worth pointing out that none of the cases cited by W is a case on service.”

29.On the other hand, W’s Counsel Miss Cheung in her Note in Reply at paragraph 1(2) said :-

“(2) However, the real issue is whether the 3 Ex Parte Orders for substituted service (as well as fixing the date for the First Appointment) had been properly made on the basis of full and frank disclosure of all the relevant facts.”

30.Given that W is now seeking to set aside the 3 Ex Parte orders granting substituted service, I do not accept H’s Counsel Miss Yu’s submission or analysis of the issues involved. Miss Yu’s submissions referred to the final result as determinative of relevance and materiality of the facts that had not been disclosed. With respect, this must be wrong and in defiance of established legal principles. If the facts (emphasis added) are relevant to the weighing operation which the Court has to make in deciding whether or not to grant the ex parte order, those facts are material and should be disclosed[15].

31.W’s setting aside application is not the same as an application to set aside a regularly entered default judgment in ordinary civil actions when the end result of the litigation might play a significant part as to whether or not to exercise the discretion on setting aside. Here is an application to set aside case management order(s) for substituted service granted ex parte. W’s application was not to set aside the Ancillary Reliefs Order dated 3/7/2012[16] but to set aside those earlier ex parte order(s) that had been granted which paved the pathway for the ancillary reliefs trial proper.

32.Having said, I agree with W’s Counsel Miss Cheung’s submission that the real issue before the Court was whether the 3 Ex Parte orders or any of them, all of which are case management orders by nature, was properly granted upon H having made full and frank disclosure of all relevant and material facts to the Court so required by the law. H’s Counsel Miss Yu’s submissions of

whenever there was any “non-disclosure”, the substituted service orders made shall be set aside per se must be read and considered in such context. Whether it was practicable or not practicable to serve documents on W does not affect H’s duty of making full and frank disclosure of all relevant and material facts to the Court when seeking substituted service orders. The Ex Parte orders are for substituted service and not for deemed service. Hence, whether W would have known the existence of the proceedings was not an issue need to be considered by the Court.

33.Having identified the issues, I will now go to those factual disputes upon consideration of the parties’ testimonies and affirmations. I will then apply the four-limb test[17] to the facts found.

Analysis of evidence and Fact Finding

The non-disclosure and misstatement

34.H’s 1^st Affirmation dated 3/3/2011 was filed seeking substituted service of the Petition and accompanying documents. H did not disclose the whereabouts of the Child except saying that he was unable to find W’s whereabouts. He said he had contacted W’s parents, siblings and relatives to locate W. All of them said they did not know W’s whereabouts[18].

35.On 8/3/2011 Her Honour Judge S.D. Melloy raised requisitions upon H’s application on 3 areas, namely :

(a)  H to make enquiries as to whether the Child met W recently with reasons of enquiries made known to the Child;

(b)  why did H not report to police immediately after missing of W; and

(c)  how could H be sure that W was residing in Hong Kong[19].

36.On 10/3/2011 H’s then lawyers Messrs. Cheung & Liu replied to all the learned Judge’s requisitions; in particular to (a), where it was said :

“1. There is only one son to the family who is currently of majority age. As the Respondent brought the son along and left the matrimonial home and the Petitioner in about June 2004, the Petitioner had since lost contact with her and the son. As such, enquiries cannot be made to the child of the family.”

37.Upon considering the reply, this Court granted Order 1 on 31/3/2011 for substituted service of the Petition and all accompanying documents.

38.The statement of W bringing the Child along when she left H in mid-2004 was somehow repeated in H’s 2^nd Affirmation dated 3/8/2011[20] when he again applied for substituted service of the Order granted on 12/7/2011 where he said :

“6. There is only one son to the family who is currently of majority age. As the Respondent brought the son along when she left the Matrimonial Home, I have since lost contact with the son as well.”

39.Upon considering H’s 2^nd Affirmation, this Court then granted Order 2 on 21/10/2011 for substituted service.

40.It is H’s own case that actually W left him in mid-2004 without (emphasis added) bringing along the Child with her. The Child continued to live with him but only left him around a year later in 2005 to join W. H in his 5^th Affirmation in Chinese filed in opposition to W’s setting aside application attempted to “amend” what he had said earlier by saying that it was due to misunderstanding caused by miscommunication with his previous lawyers. I find such explanation totally implausible and unacceptable.

41.Although both the letter of reply dated 10/3/2011 to the Court’s requisitions and the 2^nd Affirmation dated 3/8/2011 were prepared in English, there was an interpretation clause in the said 2^nd Affirmation saying that the affirmation had been interpreted to H who then confirmed his understanding of the contents and accepted them as being true and correct, including his statement that W brought along the Child with her in mid-2004. In my view, there could hardly be any “misunderstanding” or mixing up of bringing along (帶走) and not bringing along (沒有帶走) the Child. It is just a “black and white” situation.

42.Both the letter of reply and the 2^nd Affirmation was prepared back in 2011 whilst the 5^th Affirmation in Chinese was prepared in 2019, some 8 years later. I do not believe H’s memory would improve given the passage of time when he came to recall 8 years later in 2019 that W did not bring along the Child with her some 15 years ago (that is 2019 – 2004), counting backwards to W’s departure in mid-2004.

43.H’s other explanation of not knowing how much details he needed to tell his then lawyers when preparing the 1^st Affirmation dated 3/3/2011, in my view, is yet another excuse. Had this been the case, which I do not believe, the requisitions from the Court on 8/3/2011 for him to enquire with the Child must have aroused his or his then lawyers’ attention of the need for specificity and details. Yet it came up with the letter of reply dated 10/3/2011 keep saying that W had brought the Child away with her in mid-2004. Such an answer completely prevented the Court from raising further requisitions on his application for substituted service order.

44.I also believe that his then lawyers must have clear and specific instructions from H before replying on his behalf by letter of 10/3/2011 to the Court’s requisitions.

45.Given careful consideration, I find, on balance of probabilities, that the misstatement of W bringing the Child along with her in mid-2004 both in the letter of reply dated 10/3/2011 and repeated at paragraph 6 of H’s 2^nd Affirmation dated 3/8/2011 was deliberate and not innocent.

46.The fact of W not bringing the Child with her, which was not disclosed by H, satisfies both the requirements of relevance and materiality. It was even worse when H affirmatively said that W had brought along the Child. Had the facts been fully and frankly disclosed, the Court might be able to raise further requisitions with H; say for instance, the Child’s contact, if there was any, with W since W left H in mid-2004 up until the time when the Child also left H a year later in 2005 to join W. Depending on the answers, there might be a chain of further requisitions leading up to other possible options for the Court to consider before granting Order 1. In my decision, this affects the weighing operation of the Court for deciding whether or not to grant Order 1; and also Order 2.

47.On this finding alone and in reliance upon Order 32 rule 6, I decided that Order 1 and Order 2 should be set aside.

48.I will now deal with other aspect of the parties’ evidence.

The airport incident on 5/1/2011

49.W said that she, her parents and the Child saw H at the bus stop near CCC Ming Kei College in Tai Kok Tsui, Kowloon, on the date of the Child’s departure to the United States. This was unexpected and not pre-arranged. They intended to take bus to the airport but it was H who then suggested taking a taxi as the Child was carrying luggage. They (5 persons in total) then took a taxi together to the airport. In the taxi there was no conversation at all between H and her. H had never asked for her contact details nor was there any exchange of words in respect of H’s planned divorce which his lawyers filed the Petition on the following day, that is 6/1/2011. According to W, there was only some casual talk (家常嘢) between H and W’s parents during the journey to the airport in the taxi.

50.H disagreed. H said he did not turn up at the bus stop. Having been told by his mother on the Child’s flight details, he just went direct to the airport hoping to see the Child off. Upon arrival at the departure hall, he met W, her parents and the Child. In their presence, he told W that he would like to end the marriage by divorce (搞離婚) which W did not respond to him. He also mentioned about transferring ownership of the FMH to the Child which W also did not respond. The atmosphere turned tense which caused the security guard at the airport to come over and separate them. Nothing further was said between them and they left separately.

51.According to the Child’s evidence, they took a taxi to the airport on that day together with H. Upon arrival at the airport, he went over to the check in counter himself. He did not notice any heated conversation or exchange of words between H and W. However, he heard H said he wanted to divorce W but his mother made no response to that. In his evidence, he had no impression (冇印象) that H had ever asked W for her contact details in order for his lawyers to serve papers on her. Also, the Child said there was no security guard coming over to them up until he entered the departure gate but of course he had no idea whether it had happened after he left.

52.Although both parties have different version as to where they met each other on 5/1/2011, the common consensus was that this was the first time they met with each other since mid-2004 when W left. H’s Counsel Miss Yu noted that in W’s affirmation, she did not disclose having first met H at the bus stop and then accepted H’s suggestion to take a taxi to the airport. W’s explanation was that she just missed (漏咗) it in her Affirmation.

53.I think how and where the parties met with each other on that day bears little significance. What really matter was what had actually happened after they met, including words spoken (if any). Had H ever asked W for her contact details since he already had the Petition for divorce ready for filing the next day ? What, if any, was W’s response to H’s intention to divorce her (搞離婚) ? Did she not respond to H at all or responded by saying “法庭見” to H ?

54.Since H’s case was that he turned up at the airport where he met W, the Child and W’s parents, W’s evidence of no conversation with H during the journey in the taxi was neither here nor there.

55.The following is part of the extract of the transcript of the Child’s evidence during examination-in-chief by W’s Counsel Miss Cheung[21] :-

“ 問： 然之後就到12段喇，「本人就喺1月15號（1月5號?）就前往機場嗰度希望能為兒子出國送行。本人於機場一號客運大樓離境大堂附近接近閘口嘅區域碰到兒子、答辯人與答辯人...」--即係撞到你阿媽同埋你公公、婆婆，「該次也是自答辯人於2004年年中搬離婚姻居所後首次與她見面。」呢度喇「本人於兒子與答辯人父母面前，告知本人已經決定與她離婚，以正式終止與她的關係，並要求她提供聯絡方法，好讓我的代表律師把相關的文送達給她。」呢一句你同唔同意佢講法？

答： 我唔肯定。

官： 你咩嘢話？

答： 我唔肯定。

官： 唔肯定？

答： 我唔肯定佢哋有冇--嗱，因為我去到機場，我直至入去check-in之前呢，雙方係冇講過任何嘢嘅，我離開咗之後佢有冇講我唔肯定。

問： 係，佢呢個講法...

答： 係。

問： ...就話喺你面前，即係喺你同埋公公、婆婆面前佢有講過呢番說話。

官： 你睇下第一、二、三，第四行吖，...

答： 係。

官： ...「本人」即係你父親喇。

問： 「本人於兒子與答辯人的父母面前...」

官： 「兒子」係你喇。

答： 係。

官： 喀。

問： 「...告知本人已經決定與她離婚，以正式終止與她關係」。

官： 面前呀。

問： 即係意思喺你哋面前就話「我要同妳離婚，妳要畀--即係麻煩妳畀地址我，等我可以處理文件」。

答： 有提及過呢件事，但係--有提及過呢件事，就係話想搞離婚，但係就冇得到回應。

問： 冇咩嘢話？

答： 父親有提出過呢件事，但係母親冇回應。

官： 冇回應。

問： 唔係，有提出咩嘢事先？

答： 提出過想斷--想離婚嘅意願囉。

問： 係，即係想同阿媽離婚，...

答： 係。

問： ...喺你面前講...

答： 係。

問： ...話想同阿媽離婚？

答： 係。

問： 係，咁我想問，有冇喺你面前講話要求阿媽畀聯絡方法，好讓佢--呢度咁講「好讓我代表律師把相關嘅文件送給她」？

答： 我冇印象。

問： 即係入閘之前你都冇聽佢講呢樣嘢？

答： 係。”