Globe Group Ltd v. Globalmax (Group) Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 4256/2019 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 8 June 2022.
1. This is the hearing of an appeal against the decision of Master Maurice Lam given on 27 September 2021 in relation to two applications respectively taken out firstly by the defendants on 25 March 2021 to strike out parts of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, and to vacate the registration of the writ against a property that the 2 nd defendant owns as one of the joint tenants ( “Defendants’ Summons” ), and secondly by the plaintiff on 26 July 2021 to amend the Re-Amended Statement of Claim bot
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DCCJ 4256/2019 [2022] HKDC 620 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO. 4256 OF 2019 -------------------------- BETWEEN
------------------------- Before: Deputy District Judge Jason Wong in Chambers (Open to public) Date of Hearing: 8 June 2022 Date of Decision: 8 June 2022 -------------------------- DECISION -------------------------- 1.This is the hearing of an appeal against the decision of Master Maurice Lam given on 27 September 2021 in relation to two applications respectively taken out firstly by the defendants on 25 March 2021 to strike out parts of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, and to vacate the registration of the writ against a property that the 2nd defendant owns as one of the joint tenants (“Defendants’ Summons”), and secondly by the plaintiff on 26 July 2021 to amend the Re-Amended Statement of Claim both as to the name of the plaintiff and the contents of the pleadings (“Plaintiff’s Summons”). 2.According to the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, the underlying proceedings concerned a partnership allegedly formed between Ms Ng Lam Man (“Ms Ng”), a director of the plaintiff, and the 2nd defendant, the sole director and shareholder of the 1st defendant, in the operation of a beauty palour in Fanling. By virtue of the partnership, both the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant were said to have expended in the setting up of that business. About a month later, the 2nd defendant sought to terminate the partnership which was agreed by the plaintiff. This gave rise to the signing of what was described as a loan agreement between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant on 17 July 2018 which, inter alia, required 1st defendant to repay the plaintiff an aggregate amount of $1,200,000 plus interest (“Loan Agreement”). For completeness sake, the defendants deny having signed the Loan Agreement. They were not aware of the agreement until these proceedings. 3.The original Re-Amended Statement of Claim was straightforward which consisted of two pages. The plaintiff brought these proceedings against the 1st defendant as the primary debtor and against the 2nd defendant as a personal guarantor. 4.Under the Defendants’ Summons, the defendants seek to strike out the following parts of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim:-
5.It is apparent that the 2nd defendant is seeking to sanitise all those claims against her as a personal guarantor leaving purely a contractual monetary claim under the Loan Agreement against the 1st defendant. It follows from this that the 2nd defendant also asks for the vacation of the registration of the writ in question as these proceedings no longer touch upon an interest in land. 6.Pausing here, it is to be noted that under the Defendants’ Summons, their application is merely brought under O 18, r 19(1)(b) and (d). Upon confirmation by Mr Lawrence Ngai, counsel for the defendants, at the hearing, the defendants also make their application on the ground that those paragraphs disclose no reasonable cause of action. 7.In response, the plaintiff seeks substantial amendments to the Re-Amended Statement of Claim under the Plaintiff’s Summons, attaching a draft Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim which now comes up to 7 pages. By the amendments, the plaintiff wishes to bring an additional cause of action of fraud against the 1st and 2nd defendants, and to supplement its claim against the 2nd defendant as a personal guarantor. 8.In the written submissions of Mr Jackson Poon, counsel for the plaintiff, he placed great emphasis on the construction of clauses 6 and 9 of the Loan Agreement. The crux of the argument is that on a proper interpretation of the relevant parts of those clauses, the 2nd defendant effectively signed in a personal capacity such as to give rise to a written guarantee enforceable by the plaintiff. Mr Poon also argues that the Loan Agreement was a home-made agreement when the Court construes the document. 9.Mr Poon accepts that this is a new point which is not in the proposed amendments. In fact, as will be discussed further below, the plaintiff takes an entirely difference stance in the draft Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim in that the 2nd defendant is alleged to have deliberately avoided signing the Loan Agreement in a personal capacity. It is on this basis the plaintiff founds it claim on fraud. 10.Having stood the matter down allowing further instructions to be taken, Mr Poon confirms that the plaintiff does not seek to include further proposed amendments or to rely on the new point described above. 11.Most of the amendments proposed in the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim are not opposed by the defendants. For the paragraphs originally specified under the Defendants’ Summons, the plaintiff makes the following amendments as crossed-out and underlined:-
12.For the remainder of the draft Re-re-amended Statement of Claim, the defendants opposes to the following newly added paragraphs:-
13.In support of the Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ Summonses, the parties have adduced a total of 6 affirmations. In my view, it is unnecessary to consider the evidence in any great detail for the purposes of their applications. One starts obviously with the pleadings. 14.I deal first with the plaintiff’s claim against the 2nd defendant as a personal guarantor. Formerly, the circumstances giving rise to that claim was not entirely clear. The original paragraph 4 provided that the 2nd defendant “has in the Loan Agreement entered into a collateral contract with the plaintiff”. The plaintiff had not pleaded any further particulars except to generally describe that the 2nd defendant guaranteed the 1st defendant’s performance of its obligations under the Loan Agreement in the capacity as a personal guarantor. There was a further averment in the original paragraph 5 that the 2nd defendant “has also agreed in Clause 6 of the Loan Agreement that she will pledge a property” as security for her performance of her obligation as a guarantor giving the plaintiff a right to auction if the 1st defendant failed to make payment. 15.The Loan Agreement, as pleaded in the original paragraph 3, was made between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. How then the 2nd defendant entered into a collateral contract under the Loan Agreement was not discernible, at least not from the original pleadings. Notwithstanding the ambiguity, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 2nd Defendant, as it would seem, was not founded upon the collateral agreement when the original paragraphs 11 and 12 continued to state that she failed to discharge her obligations as a guarantor “under the Loan Agreement”. 16.By removing the words “in the Loan Agreement” in the amended paragraph 4, the plaintiff’s position is much clarified in that the “collateral agreement” refers to an agreement separately entered from the Loan Agreement. The new paragraphs 4A and 4B provide further particulars of that collateral agreement which was alleged to be made orally between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant on the same day as the Loan Agreement. Briefly speaking, the collateral agreement, which is defined as the “Oral Guarantee”, requires the 2nd defendant to guarantee personally all amounts due by the 1st defendant under the Loan Agreement and to secure the 1st defendant’s debt by “putting up” her property. 17.The plaintiff has added two more new paragraphs one of which is paragraph 12A seen above. The other is paragraph 7A which provides,
18.It is to be noted that the new paragraphs 4A, 4B, 7A and most of paragraph 12A, subject to my findings below, are not objected by the defendants. In my view, the plaintiff, given that it has now made clear its position, must therefore be allowed to bring a claim under the Oral Guarantee against the 2nd defendant which necessarily will include the amended paragraphs 2 and 4. Whether or not the claim under the Oral Guarantee can be established as alleged will be a different matter altogether. 19.For the plaintiff’s fraud claim, this can be disposed of fairly shortly. The primary complaint raised by Mr Ngai, is that the factual allegations, namely the amended paragraph 5 and the new paragraphs 5A, 9A, 9B and 12E, are insufficient to support a plea of lifting the corporate veil of the 1st defendant. In this regard, Mr Ngai points out that the insufficiency speaks for itself when a number of allegations purportedly in support of such a plea raised in the affirmations of Ms Ng and Ms Kim Zoe (“Ms. Zoe”) filed by the plaintiff have not been pleaded in the draft Re-Re-amended Statement of Claim. These allegations are serious which include, for example, an instruction from the 2nd defendant to Ms Zoe to ban Ms Ng from attending the beauty palour, a confession by the 2nd defendant to Ms Zoe that the Loan Agreement was signed in the name of the 1st defendant to avoid personal liability, the issuing of receipts and promotional materials using a different entity, the moving of stock to a different location, the misappropriation of merchandise, the termination of staff and eventually the business without notice and so on. 20.I do not agree with Mr Ngai. Albeit the newly amended pleadings, as they now stand, may lack the same degree of particularity as described in the affirmations of Ms Ng and Ms Zoe, the basic elements are by and large present albeit the corresponding averments appeared to be scattered at different parts of the draft Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim. It was specifically pleaded that:-
21.In my view, it cannot be said that the plaintiff’s plea to lift the corporate veil is impossible or unarguably bad. The plaintiff now brings a new claim of fraud against the 2nd defendant that she used the 1st defendant as sham to evade liability under the Loan Agreement. The above assertions may or may not be excusable. This will be a matter for trial. In the event that the plaintiff succeeds in establishing fraud, it is not fanciful to seek to lift the corporate veil of the 1st defendant in order to hold the 2nd defendant liable for the Loan Agreement. If, as the defendants argue, there is an insufficiency in pleadings at this stage, this can be cured by further amendments. Alternatively, the defendants may seek further and better particulars for those paragraphs if they wish to understand what case they are to meet. 22.However, the same cannot be said in relation to the guarantee under the Loan Agreement. Mr Ngai refers me to the case of Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and Others [2013] 2 AC 415 and I accept his submissions that the plea to lift the corporate veil only entitles the plaintiff to claim a joint and several liability on the part of the 2nd defendant with the 1st defendant under the Loan Agreement. It does not give rise, even on establishing that plea, to creating a separate contract of guarantee. 23.In any event, as explained above, the claim by the plaintiff against the 2nd defendant as a personal guarantor is based on an oral guarantee. There is no pleading about the entering of a written guarantee between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant. Accordingly, I disallow paragraphs 11, 12, and the words “and/or allow the plaintiff to auction the Property for sale” in the new paragraph 12A of the Re-Re-amended Statement of Claim. 24.It follows from this, as I also accept the submissions of Mr Ngai, the oral guarantee fails to satisfy s.3 and s.5 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, Cap 219 and will be unenforceable in so far as the security in the property of the 2nd defendant is concerned. The argument that the Loan Agreement constitutes a written memorandum of the oral guarantee must also fail for being insufficient for the purpose of Conveyancing and Property Ordinance. The plaintiff has not pleaded that the Loan Agreement constituted a written memorandum as such in the first place. The claims in these proceedings therefore do not touch upon an interest in land and therefore the registration of the writ must accordingly be vacated. 25.That disposes both the Plaintiff’s and the Defendants’ Summonses. It will be unnecessary to deal with the other points raised by parties including the arguments on jurat of the plaintiff’s affirmations raised by Mr Ngai. I must make the remark that it is surprising for parties to have filed affirmations comprising hundreds of pages of documents in applications of this nature. Most of these documents have not been referred to either in oral or written submissions by either party. 26.As for costs, having heard submissions from Counsel and considering the matters in the round, I order that the costs of the Plaintiff’s Summons and the Defendants’ Summons, including the costs of the hearing before Master, to be in the cause. Costs of the amendments of course will be borne by the Plaintiff in any event. 27.In summary, I make the follow orders:-
Mr Jackson Poon, instructed by B Mak & Co, for the plaintiff Mr Lawrence Ngai, instructed by Chung & Kwan, for the 1st and 2nd defendants | ||||||||||||||||