Re Irangan Ariel Suabillo

CACV 549/2021

[2022] HKCA 956

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 549 OF 2021

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 2246 OF 2018)

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BETWEEN

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Before:  Hon Au JA and Lisa Wong J in Court

Date of Judgment:  30 June 2022

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving judgment of the court):

1.On 4 March 2022, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this Court’s (Au JA and Lisa Wong J)  judgment of 28 February 2022 (“the Judgment”)  ([2022] HKCA 336). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Deputy Judge”)  dated 2 December 2021, by which the Deputy Judge refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2021] HKCFI 3452).

2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this Court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this Court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“I would like to infomr the Honourable Court that there is some error of law in my decision. Decision maker just relied on COL Information and my previous facts which were in favor while rejecting my claim. Acual life occur different situation then what is mentioned in COL Information. The Officer and cours prefers to ignore the overwhelming of the evidence of this violence towards minorities searching for unrealistic silver lining. The Decision is betrary a bias and formula approach unlikely fairly access the danger of my life and clearly not reasonable.” (sic)

5.Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged his written submissions on 12 April 2022.  In his written submissions, he cited ST v Director of Immigration [2014] 4 HKLRD 277 and Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 and contended that high standards of fairness were required in the determination of a torture claim.  He submitted that the Board acted in a procedurally unfair manner without properly assessing his credibility.  He referred to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 and R v Ministry of Defence ex p Smith[1996] QB 517 for the proposition that a decision of an administrative body was liable to be set aside if it was reached unreasonably.  He also cited section 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 regarding late filing of the Notice of Appeal to the Board.  It is noted that his submissions were all general propositions and the applicant failed to show specifically how they were relevant to his case.

6.In our view, his application is devoid of merit.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  The matters raised in his written submissions are essentially mere regurgitation of those submissions he previously made before this Court: see [10] of the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014)  at [2] and [3].  His arguments had already been fully considered and rejected by this Court at [12] - [19] of the Judgment and the applicant has failed to identify with specific particulars any error in the Judgment.  As such, nothing set out in the Notice of Motion can be construed as viable grounds of appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

7.Further, as stated at [17] of the Judgment, it is trite that assessment of evidence, Country of Origin materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director)  as primary decision makers.  The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11].

8.In any event, even taking his case at its highest, his allegations are fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

9.Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

10.For these reasons, the Notice of Motion filed on 4 March 2022 is dismissed.

The applicant acting in person