Re Lakhvir Singh
Read the full judgment text of CACV 135/2022 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 20 July 2022.
1. This is an appeal by the applicant against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Deputy Judge”) set out in the Form CALL-1 dated 1 April 2022, by which the Deputy Judge refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Decision”) ( [2022] HKCFI 916 ).
Cited by 1 case · Cites 8 cases
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CACV 135/2022 [2022] HKCA 1010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 135 OF 2022 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1367 OF 2018) ________________________
________________________ Before: Hon Chu JA and B Chu J in Court Date of Judgment: 20 July 2022 ________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon B Chu J (giving judgment of the court): 1.This is an appeal by the applicant against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Deputy Judge”) set out in the Form CALL-1 dated 1 April 2022, by which the Deputy Judge refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Decision”) ([2022] HKCFI 916). 2.The intended judicial review is to challenge the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 6 July 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”), dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 24 March 2015 and 2 December 2016 (collectively referred as “the Director’s Decisions”) rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. 3.The appeal was listed to be heard on 6 July 2022. The applicant was directed to lodge two sets of skeleton argument on or before 8 June 2022 and was warned that if he failed to do so, he would be deemed to have waived his right to have an oral hearing for the appeal and the hearing date would be vacated with the appeal being determined on paper. The direction and the warning were communicated to the applicant by the Notice of Hearing dated 10 May 2022. 4.The requirement for lodging skeleton argument in an appeal is set out in Practice Direction 4.1. Due compliance with such requirement on the part of litigants is important for the proper and effective functioning of our appeal process. Skeleton arguments are important for the preparation of an appeal, both for the judges and the litigants. Non-compliance with such requirement can substantially impair the exercise of case management power of the presiding judge in an appeal, including the effective management of the oral hearing. Such failure on the part of a litigant is often the hallmark of ill-preparation of an appeal. In view of the heavy demand on the court’s time due to the large volume of appeals, unfocused oral presentation of materials at an oral hearing is not permitted, and this court has taken a firm stance on the requirement to lodge skeleton argument. Failure to comply with the requirement, despite being warned of the consequence of default, is treated as an abandonment of the right to an oral hearing. 5.As the applicant failed to lodge a skeleton argument by the stipulated time, the hearing date was vacated. We have proceeded to consider this appeal on paper based on the available materials. Background 6.The applicant is a national of India. On 1 January 2015, the applicant arrived in Hong Kong and was refused landing. On the same day, he lodged a non-refoulement claim on the basis that he would be harmed or killed by his paternal uncle and his sons if he was to return to India owing to a land dispute. 7.By a Notice of Decision dated 24 March 2015 (“the Director’s 1st Decision”), the Director rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. His decision covered all the then applicable grounds including torture risk[1], BOR3 risk[2] and persecution risk[3]. Taking into account all relevant circumstances, the Director considered that his non-refoulement claim was not substantiated. 8.By a Notice of Further Decision dated 2 December 2016 (“the Director’s 2nd Decision”), the Director assessed the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on the basis of BOR2 risk[4] and decided against it. 9.The applicant then appealed against the Director’s Decisions to the Board. The applicant attended an oral hearing before the Board on 30 August 2017 in person and gave evidence. On 6 July 2018, the Board dismissed his appeal. The Board found that the dispute between the applicant and his uncle was a private matter in nature. Having assessed the evidence, the Board considered that the applicant failed to substantiate his claim on all applicable grounds. The Board also found that state protection and internal relocation would be available to the applicant. Accordingly, the Board dismissed his appeal and confirmed the Director’s Decisions. The Leave Decision 10.On 12 July 2018, the applicant filed his Form 86 and supporting affirmation, applying for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision and relying on the following grounds:
11.On 3 March 2022, the applicant appeared in person for the oral hearing before the Deputy Judge and a Punjabi interpreter was also present to provide language assistance. 12.By the Leave Decision, the Deputy Judge refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. His reasons were set out in detail at [13] to [19] of the Form CALL-1:
The Appeal 13.On 13 April 2022, the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal to appeal against the Leave Decision. In his Notice of Appeal, he stated:
14.As noted above, contrary to the directions given by this Court on 10 May 2022, the applicant did not lodge any written submissions. Discussion 15.The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non-refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. 16.In an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. It is not the role of the Court of Appeal to examine a decision of the Board afresh as if it is a fresh application for judicial review. Otherwise, an applicant could flagrantly disregard the time limit in Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A. 17.Nowhere in his Notice of Appeal did the applicant identify any error made by the Deputy Judge in the Leave Decision. His complaints are solely directed at the Board and the Director. There is simply no proper ground of appeal and the appeal must be dismissed on this basis alone. 18.In any event, the applicant’s allegations are general and vague without any specific particulars in support. They are not viable grounds of appeal. More importantly, it is well-established that the assessment of evidence, Country of Origin Information and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director) as primary decision makers. The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13] and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11]. As correctly noted by the Deputy Judge, there was no error of law or irrationality or procedural unfairness in the proceedings before the Board. We see no basis to interfere with the Leave Decision. 19.For the reasons given above, the applicant’s appeal has no merit. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. |
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