Competition Commission v. Kam Kwong Engineering Company Ltd and Others

Read the full judgment text of CTEA 1/2018 on BabelCite. This CTEA judgment was delivered on 22 July 2022.

1. The present proceedings concern contravention of the First Conduct Rule in relation to tendering for renovation and redecoration work pursuant to the Hong Kong Housing Authority (“ HKHA ”)’s Decoration Contractor System (“ DCS ”).  On 3 June 2020 I entered judgment by agreement between the Commission and the 1 st , 2 nd and 4 th Respondents for declarations that the 1 st , 2 nd and 4 th Respondents had contravened or been involved in the contravention of the First Conduct Rule, pursuant to a

Cites 2 cases

Case No.CTEA 1/2018
Court
CTEA
Date22 Jul 2022
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CTEA 1/2018

[2022] HKCT 2

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION NO 1 OF 2018

________________

BETWEEN    
  COMPETITION COMMISSION Applicant

and

  KAM KWONG ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD 1st Respondent
  (金光工程有限公司)  
  GOLDFIELD N&W CONSTRUCTION 2nd Respondent
  COMPANY LTD (聯合金輝建築工程有限公司)  
  PACIFIC VIEW ENGINEERING LTD 3rd Respondent
  (豪景工程有限公司)  
  CHAN KAM SHUI (陳金水) 4th Respondent
  LAM PO WONG (林保旺) 5th Respondent

________________

Before: Hon Harris J in Chambers
Dates of Hearing: 24 September 2020
Date of Decision: 22 July 2022

__________________________________

DECISION ON PENALTIES

__________________________________

Introduction

1.The present proceedings concern contravention of the First Conduct Rule in relation to tendering for renovation and redecoration work pursuant to the Hong Kong Housing Authority (“HKHA”)’s Decoration Contractor System (“DCS”).  On 3 June 2020 I entered judgment by agreement between the Commission and the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents for declarations that the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents had contravened or been involved in the contravention of the First Conduct Rule, pursuant to a process analogous to the Carecraft procedure[1] used in director’s disqualification proceedings pursuant to the Securities and Futures Ordinance, Cap 571 and the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, Cap 622 to resolve applications, to which a respondent concedes.  In the Competition context it can conveniently be referred to as the Kam Kwong procedure.  That is how I shall refer to it in future.  The issue of penalties was adjourned.  The application came back on before me on 7 August 2020.  By that time an appeal had been issued in respect of the penalties imposed in CTEA 2/2017 by a judgment of G Lam J (as he then was) in those proceedings on 29 April 2020.  As the appeal concerned an issue, which was directly relevant to the penalties to be imposed in the present proceedings I awaited the handing down of the Court of Appeal’s judgment on 2 June 2022 before determining the penalties against the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents.

2.Subsequent to the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents conceding that they had contravened the First Conduct Rule, the 3rd and 5th Respondents agreed to do so.  On 4 August 2020 I entered judgment granting declarations that the 3rd Respondent had contravened the First Conduct Rule and that the 5th Respondent was involved in the contravention of the First Conduct Rule.  This was made on the basis of a Statement of Agreed Facts dated 3 August 2020, which is appended to this Decision.  The penalty stage of the proceedings was adjourned and heard by me on 24 September 2020.  I also delayed determining the penalties against the 3rd and 5th Respondents until the Court of Appeal handed down the decision to which I have referred to in the previous paragraph.  The penalties decision in respect of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents has been handed down on the same day as this decision.  In order to fully understand this decision, my decision dated 17 July 2020 dealing with the Kam Kwong procedure in respect of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents, today’s penalty decision in respect of those Respondents (“1st Penalties Decision”) and the Statement of Agreed Facts appended to this Decision should be read first as I have not repeated matters addressed in those two decisions or the Statement of Agreed Facts.  I use the definitions in this decision used in the earlier decisions.  A very brief summary of the case against the 3rd and 5th Respondents is as follows: the 3rd and 5th Respondents entered into an illicit arrangement, exploiting the 3rd Respondent’s privileged position of access to King Tai Court as a HKHA designated DC, which enabled the 5th Respondent as manager of the 3rd Respondent’s contracted works within the estate to enter into a market allocation and price fixing agreement with the 1st and 2nd Respondents, with a view to sharing the profits from this anti-competitive arrangement between them.

Penalties sought by the Commission

3.Having considered all the available materials, including evidence filed by the 3rd and 5th Respondents, the Commission proposes the following penalties and orders:

(1)     The 3rd Respondent shall pay to the Government a pecuniary penalty of $1,579,000 within 28 days from the date of the order.

(2)     The 5th Respondent shall pay to the Government a pecuniary penalty between $280,250 and $380,000 (precise figure to be decided by the Tribunal) within 28 days from the date of the order.

(3)     The 3rd and 5th Respondents be restrained from entering into any agreement or concerted practice involving any anti-competitive conduct or from being involved in any anti-competitive conduct in respect of any projects under the HKHA’s DCS.

(4)     The 3rd and 5th Respondents shall each pay 1/5 of the Commission’s costs of this action up to and including the hearing on 3 June 2020, 1/2 of the Commission’s costs of the present hearing, and 1/2 of the costs incurred for the preparation for the trial originally to commence on 15 September 2020 (with seven days reserved), to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for two counsel for the 3 June hearing, the present hearing and the original trial.

4.The Commission has calculated the pecuniary penalty it submits should be made against the 3rd Respondent as follows:

  R3
Step 1: Base Amount $1,330,199
Step 2: Adjustment for aggravation/mitigation +25%
=$1,662,748.8
Step 3: Statutory cap $4,135,425.4
Step 4: Adjustment for cooperation/inability to pay -5%
Resultant penalty
(rounded down to the nearest $1000)
$1,579,000

Should the 3rd and 5th Respondents be held jointly liable for the penalty?

5.The 3rd and 5th Respondents, who have the same legal representation, suggest an alternative approach to the penalties to be imposed on the 3rd and 5th Respondents, namely, that they be treated as one undertaking and argue that one penalty should be imposed for which they are jointly and severally liable.  This begs the question: why does the 5th Respondent suggest this as it increases his liabilities.  The 5th Respondent is a sole proprietor and personally liable for any penalty imposed on him.  This was not a question to which Mr Ngai, who acted for both the 3rd and 5th Respondents, could give a satisfactory answer other than that it might reflect an agreement between the 3rd and 5th Respondents and perhaps the 3rd Respondent has agreed to pay the full amount, because the 5th Respondent is in financial difficulties.  Given that it is the 3rd Respondent’s case (described in more detail in [26]–[28]) that the contravention was entirely the 5th Respondent’s doing and that he had been told in writing not to do the very thing that constitutes the contravention, it is unclear to me why the 3rd Respondent would so agree.

6.The 3rd and 5th Respondents’ submission gives rise to the question of whether the 3rd and 5th Respondents should be viewed for the purpose of sections 91 to 93 of the Competition Ordinance, Cap 619 (“Ordinance”) as one or two legal persons. Those sections are as follows:

91. Persons involved in contravention of competition rule

A reference in this Part to a person being involved in a contravention of a competition rule means a person who—

(a) attempts to contravene the rule;

(b) aids, abets, counsels or procures any other person to contravene the rule;

(c) induces or attempts to induce any other person, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, to contravene the rule;

(d) is in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in or a party to the contravention of the rule; or

(e) conspires with any other person to contravene the rule.”

93.     Tribunal may impose pecuniary penalty

(1)     If the Tribunal is satisfied, on application by the Commission under section 92, that a person has contravened or been involved in a contravention of a competition rule, it may order that person to pay to the Government a pecuniary penalty of any amount it considers appropriate.”

7.The sections themselves refer to “a person”. They also clearly envisage cases in which the Commission proceeds on the basis, and the Tribunal finds, that one legal person has contravened a competition rule and another legal person has been involved in a contravention of a competition rule.  The result is that there may be individual findings against each person and individual penalties imposed on each person.

8.The 3rd and 5th Respondents’ case is that the Ordinance in Hong Kong involves concepts of undertakings and economic entities that are not synonymous with legal persons. For example the term “undertaking” appears in section 2 (definitions) of the Ordinance and “means any entity, regardless of its legal status or the way in which it is financed, engaged in economic activity, and includes a natural person engaged in economic activity”.  The First Conduct Rule prohibits an undertaking engaging in the anti-competitive activities prohibited by sections 6 and 7 of the Ordinance not a person: broadly, agreements and practices that restrict or distort competition.  Similarly, the Second Conduct Rule also prohibits an undertaking not a person from engaging in the anti-competitive activities prohibited by sections 21 and 22 of the Ordinance: broadly, abuse of market position.

9.Mr Ngai from this foundation argued, based on European jurisprudence, that it should be the relevant undertaking that is penalised and that in the present case the undertaking is the 3rd and 5th Respondents jointly.  I disagree.  Hong Kong has decided to take a different approach at the penalties stage to the European Union.  This is clear from sections 91 to 93.  They do not refer to undertakings.  The Hong Kong approach is to treat each legal person forming part of an undertaking found to have contravened a conduct rule individually, when it comes to the imposition of penalties.

10.Mr Ngai’s argument also sits uncomfortably with the judgments which the 3rd and 5th Respondents agreed should be entered against them, namely, that the 3rd Respondent contravened the First Conduct Rule (s92(1)(a)) and the 5th Respondent was involved in the contravention of the First Conduct Rule (s92(1)(b)).  Given the materially different findings against them it is difficult to identify any grounds or principle, which justifies treating them as jointly liable for penalties imposed in respect of contraventions in which they were not involved.  This is very clear in the case of the 5th Respondent, who has not been declared by the Tribunal to have breached the First Conduct Rule.

11.I proceed on the basis that penalties should be imposed on the 3rd and 5th Respondents individually.  In [13]–[31] I deal with the penalty for the 3rd Respondent.  In [32]–[33] I deal with the penalty for the 5th Respondent.

Principles on the assessment of Penalties

12.The principles applicable to the assessment of penalties for contravention of the First Conduct Rule (section 6) are uncontroversial and explained in [7]–[10] of the 1st Penalties Decision.

Step 1

13.The Commission and the 3rd Respondent agree the following base amount under Step 1:

  R3
Value of Sales $5,542,496[2]
Gravity Percentage 24%
Duration Multiplier 1
Base Amount $1,330,199

14.The value of sales is derived from the 3rd Respondent’s own financial documents recording the value of the works the 3rd Respondent treated itself as having undertaken.  The documents were obtained as the result of the execution of a search warrant on 7 November 2017.  According to the affidavit of Lee Hiu Leung, Head of Litigation at the Commission, filed on 11 September 2020, the 3rd Respondent has been requested to provide additional financial documents, which assist in assessing the gross and net profit made by the 3rd Respondent. It has not provided them.  The Commission has not sought an order for their disclosure.  This is not satisfactory for the reasons that I explain in the next two paragraphs.  Although as matter of expediency I will use in the present case the agreed value of sales in a similar case in the future I will expect the Commission to seek full discovery of a corporate respondent’s financial documents for the relevant period.

15.The 3rd Respondent is a limited company.  It is required by the Companies Ordinance, Cap 622 to keep the financial documents and prepare audited financial statements pursuant to sections 373 and 379 of the Companies Ordinance.  It is also required to submit a tax return to the Inland Revenue Department.  The 3rd Respondent should, therefore, have had the documents requested by the Commission.

16.On 27 August 2020 the sole director and shareholder of the 3rd Respondent, Chan Hong Wing, filed an affirmation containing evidence said by the 3rd Respondent to be relevant to the determination of penalties.  Mr Chan says that the 5th Respondent was to carry out works at King Tai Court in the name of the 3rd Respondent. The 3rd Respondent had no involvement or knowledge at all of the work undertaken by the 5th Respondent pursuant to this arrangement. The 5th Respondent was, however, to receive 70% of the profit made on the works, but would not be responsible for any loss; self-evidently a highly beneficial arrangement for the 3rd Respondent, although Mr Chan says that the 3rd Respondent never received anything from the 5th Respondent and, as he had no knowledge of what the 5th Respondent was making, the profit split was academic.  Mr Chan hints, but does not actually say, that the 3rd Respondent had not anticipated receiving anything, which seems to me unconvincing as he gives no reason for entering into the arrangement other than in anticipation of receiving what amounted to a fee for lending the 3rd Respondent’s licence to the 5th Respondent.  What is clear, but is not commented on by Mr Lee (who had Mr Chan’s affirmation when preparing his affidavit) is that the documents obtained in November 2017 are, if Mr Chan’s evidence is correct, which seems likely, bogus.  The 3rd Respondent had no turnover generated by contracts for building works.  The agreement entered into with the 5th Respondent was for the payment of a licence fee, the amount of which would be dependent on the profit made by the 5th Respondent. It was the 5th Respondent that carried out the works and generated the associated turnover.  This ramifications of this kind of arrangement for the calculation of the value of sales needs to be given more thought in future cases.  The Commission also needs to be alert to obtaining documents and information that suggest that offences other than contravention of the Ordinance may have taken place.  It would appear on Mr Chan’s own case that he caused false accounting documents to be produced and, presumably, this led to false and misleading statements being made to the auditors, the preparation of false and misleading audited financial statements and their submission to the Inland Revenue.

17.As can be seen the Commission and the 3rd Respondent agree a 25% uplift for the gravity of the contravention is appropriate.  This is consistent with W Hing 3 and 1st Penalties Decision.  I accept that it is appropriate to use the same percentage in respect of the 3rd Respondent.

Step 2—Uplift for aggravating circumstances

18.The Commission seeks an uplift because, it contends, the contravention is part of a long standing and wide-spread industry practice.  I dealt with the same argument and rejected it in respect of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents: see [20]–[21] of the 1st Penalty Decision. I will do the same in respect of the 3rd and 5th Respondents; although it is necessary to say more about it given what in my view is the unsatisfactory way in which the Commission had attempted to deal with this matter in respect of the 3rd and 5th Respondents.

19.The judgment of 4 August 2020 contained conventional directions for the penalty stage of the proceedings.  This included directions giving the 3rd and 5th Respondents’ leave to file further evidence relevant to the penalties no later than 27 August 2020 and the Commission leave to file evidence in reply by 11 September 2020.

20.On 20 August 2020 the Commission filed without leave an affirmation from Chan Wai Ching the Head (Intelligence, Forensics and Leniency) in the Operations Division of the Commission dealing exclusively with whether or not there was a wide-spread practice of contractors acting as a cartel and contravening the First Conduct Rule in the manner that has occurred in the present case.  Mr Chan makes substantial reference to the evidence in Competition Commission v W Hing Construction Co Ltd (No 2) [3](“W Hing 2”), which concerned the same kind of conduct.  The 3rd and 5th Respondents did not respond to this evidence in their affirmations filed on 27 August 2020 and, understandably, objected to its admission at the hearing.

21.I agree that the new evidence should not be admitted. I would have thought it self-evident that it cannot be correct for the Tribunal to be put in the position of having to determine this issue on the basis of different evidence in the case of (A) the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents and (B) the 3rd and 5th Respondents.  It is also not satisfactory that the 3rd and 5th Respondents were put in the position at short notice of having to consider how to respond to this argument, which was made all the more challenging as such evidence as had been filed by the Commission on 20 August 2020 to a considerable extent relied on the Commission’s familiarity with W Hing 2 and its access to the evidence that had been advanced in those proceedings.  If the Commission wished to seek an uplift based on a pervasive and wide-spread practice it should have thought through with considerably more care well in advance of the August penalty hearing in respect of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents, what evidence was required.

Step 2—mitigating factors

22.The Commission argues that there are no mitigating factors in the present case.  The 3rd and 5th Respondents suggest there are two.  First, their consent to Statement of Agreed Facts, which justifies a 5% reduction.  Secondly, the uncertainty as to the state of the law, which they also suggest justifies a further 5% reduction. The Commission accepts that conceding contravention is a mitigating matter.  It contends that it should be taken into account at stage 4: see [28]–[37] of the 1st Penalty Decision.

23.The argument that a discount for admitting the facts that constitute the alleged contravention should result in a reduction under Step 2, necessarily involves the assumption that a reduction for cooperation under Step 4 does not include an element for admitting the facts. It seems to me that this is obviously wrong and I note that the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents’ counsel did not suggest that a separate deduction for agreeing the Statement of Facts should be made under Step 2.  In making a deduction for cooperation after proceedings are commenced the Tribunal is taking into account the saving of time and costs that results from a respondent’s concession that it has contravened the Ordinance. Necessarily in a case such as the present in which the Kam Kwong Procedure is adopted the deduction takes into account agreeing a Statement of Agreed Facts.  The suggestion, inherent in the 3rd and 5th Respondents’ Counsel’s submission, that the deduction given to the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents did not take into account their agreement to the Statement of Fact is unsustainable.

24.The 3rd and 5th Respondents’ argument is based on an obtuse readings of [14.053] of European Union Law of Competition, 8th ed., ed David Bellamy and [64] of Kier Group Plc v Office of Fair Trading[4].  The passage in European Union Law of Competition suggests that the Commission may reduce a fine where the undertaking acknowledges the facts and the infringement.  This tells us nothing about the stage of the penalty assessment with which I am concerned, at which the reduction is to be made.  Paragraph 64 of Kier says this:

“Separately, in response to the Statement of Objections, the OFT received new admissions from a number of undertakings that had not applied for leniency and that had not accepted the FTO in respect of one or more of their alleged infringements. Although those admissions were made at a very late stage of the investigation, the OFT decided to reduce the fine imposed at Step 4, albeit the discount was smaller than the one given to companies which had accepted the FTO. The following discounts were granted in these circumstances:

(a) where a company made a clear admission of the facts, or alternatively a clear positive statement that it did not dispute or contest the facts, it was given a 10% discount;

(b) where, in addition to the above, a company had clearly admitted that its conduct constituted an infringement of the 1998 Act, the OFT made a 15% reduction in the fine instead of the discount noted in the previous subparagraph. (Decision, VI.323-8)”

25.A fair reading of this paragraph is that (A) the discount for admitting the facts was taken into account at Step 4 and (B) it was subsumed into a 15% reduction for ultimately admitting not only the facts, but the contravention itself.  In other words it is inconsistent with the 3rd and 5th Respondents’ argument, which I reject.

26.The second matter is what is said to be the uncertainty in the state of the law.  There is nothing in the evidence filed by either the 3rd or the 5th Respondent, which suggests that they misunderstood the law and that this in some way contributed to the contravention.  I have already referred to the affirmation of Mr Chan Hon Wing.  Mr Chan describes the arrangement that he entered into with the 5th Respondent as “licence borrowing” in [25] of his affirmation and he suggests it is common industry practice, although he does not make clear whether he is referring to the construction industry generally or HKHA’s DCS in particular.  Mr Chan does not address clause 16 of the undertaking he signed with the HKHA when the 3rd Respondent was admitted to the HKHA’s list of approved decoration contractors, which expressly prohibits sub-letting work; although it is implicit in some of what he says that because of the way in which the contractors worked, including using a site office provided by the HKHA, that the HKHA’s staff must have known that licence borrowing was taking place.  In [40]–[41] Mr Chan says this:

“40. Apart from a simple PowerPoint slide on no pie-sharing used by the HA, there is no other notice or warning, whether from the estate management, the HA, the Commission or any other authority, informing the designated contractors that their conducts could amount to a breach of the new competition laws in Hong Kong Futther, to my understanding, there was not a single act taken against any of the designated contractors in relation to any anti-competition conduct prior to the involvement of the Commission.

41. Indeed, during the relevant period of carrying out the Works at the Estate, there was uncertainty as to the lawfulness of the conducts in question. In any event, the 3rd Respondent is now willing to concede on its liability.”

27.Mr Chan does not explain what “uncertainty” he is referring to, how he suggests it was caused or what difference it made. Mr Chan exhibits to his affirmation an email to the 5th Respondent (who is a sole proprietor) dated 5 January 2017 which says (in translation from Chinese):

“In relation to the decoration project for Hong Kong Authority’s Home Ownership Scheme flats in King Tai Court, San Po Kong, please do not engage in price fixing and / or conduct of ‘pie sharing’ with other contractors, and all decoration work shall fulfill the requirements under Hong Kong legislations and of the HA.”

28.The 5th Respondent confirms the arrangements described in Mr Chan’s affirmation to be correct in the evidence he also filed on 27 August 2020.  I can see no sensible reason for concluding that either the 3rd or 5th Respondent were confused about the state of the law and this contributed in any shape or form to their contravention of the Ordinance.  No reduction in the penalty should be made on this ground.

29.Mr Ngai argued that if reject, as I do, his argument that the 3rd and 5th Respondents should be treated as one entity for the purpose of imposing a penalty there are other mitigating matters specific to the 3rd Respondent’s position.  They are that the 3rd Respondent was not directly involved in the contravention and the fact that it did not make a profit out of it.  I do not consider these justify any reduction in the penalty.  The 3rd Respondent’s readiness to breach its undertaking to the HKHA not to sub-licence the work and its failure to provide any supervision at all in my view cannot sensibly be viewed as ameliorating the contravention.  As I explain in [20] of the 1st Penalty Decision, properly understood it is the converse of the matters relied on by the 3rd Respondent, knowing of a pie-sharing arrangement and making a profit out of it, which might be viewed as aggravating factors.  The absence of them does not in my view mitigate responsibility for the contravention.

Step 3

30.Step 3 is the statutory cap.  The 3rd Respondent relying on its now audited turnover for the relevant period, HK$44,584,104, submits that the cap is HK$4,458,410.40, representing 10% of the undertakings total turnover for each year in which the contravention occurred (s93(3)(a)) which is more than the HK$4,135,425.40 penalty proposed by the Commission. Nothing turns on this other than, as I have already explained, it appears inconsistent with Mr Chan’s explanation of his agreement with the 5th Respondent.

Step 4

31.The 3rd and 5th Respondents seek a 10% discount for conceding contraventions of the Ordinance.  I have dealt with the approach to the assessment of a reduction to reflect cooperation and admission of liability in the 1st Penalty Decision. In that case I made a reduction of 12% for the reasons explained in the 1st Penalty Decision.  The concessions were made later in the present case.  This has made disposing of the proceedings more time consuming and complicated.  It seems clear that the 3rd and 5th Respondents had no defence to the complaint and no reason has been advanced for them not conceding earlier.  There is a limited amount of science that can be applied to the calculation of a reduction.  Over time a rough scale will probably emerge as more cases are determined.  In the present case I will made a reduction of 9%.

Pecuniary Penalty for 5th Respondent

32.As I have explained, the 3rd and 5th Respondents’ principle argument is that there should be one penalty imposed for which both the 3rd and 5th Respondents are jointly liable.  I have rejected that argument.  Submissions have not been advanced by the 5th Respondent, which address an assessment of a penalty on the 5th Respondent pursuant to sections 91 to 93.  Although, I do not consider the absence of any financial information provided by the 5th Respondent to be satisfactory, in the absence of an objection to the Commission’s assessment of the works or the profit margin I find the value of the sales to be HK$528,754.

33.I accept the Commission’s submission that the value of sales should be the starting point in assessing the penalty.  The Commission does not suggest that the amount should be increased by virtue of aggravating factors.  It is implicit in the Commission’s proposal that the penalty should be between HK$280,250 and HK$380,000, that unless I differ from the Commission’s view, the penalty will be favourable to the 5th Respondent in that it will be less than the value of sales.  I will order that the 5th Respondent pay a penalty of HK$280,000.

Injunctive Relief

34.The Commission seeks injunctions (as it did against the 1st and 4th Respondents) restraining the 3rd and 5th Respondents from future contraventions of the First Conduct Rule.  The 3rd and 5th Respondents offer undertakings instead.  These I am willing to accept, although their precise language has not been provided to the Tribunal.  The Commission and the 3rd and 5th Respondents should endeavour to agree the terms of the undertakings and send them to my Clerk.

Costs

35.The Commission seeks the following costs order against the 3rd and 5th Respondents:

(1)     The 3rd and 5th Respondents shall each pay 1/5 of the Commission’s costs of this action up to and including the hearing on 3 June 2020.

(2)     The 3rd and 5th Respondents shall each pay 1/2 of the Commission’s costs of the present hearing, including the costs incurred for the preparation of the trial originally to commence on 15 September 2020 (with 7 days reserved).

(3)     There be certificate for two counsel for the hearing on 3 June 2020, the present hearing and the original trial.

(4)     All costs are to be taxed if not agreed.

36.The 3rd and 5th Respondents accept that they should be liable for 1/5 of the Commission’s costs reduced by 30% to reflect two matters.  First, that the costs order the Commission seeks would result in the 3rd and 5th Respondents having to pay for costs of preparation for trial that have not been incurred. This is not correct.  The Commission can only recover on taxation what it has actually incurred.  Secondly, that a discount of 20% on costs was given in W Hing 3, it being one of the first cases before the Tribunal.  I can see no basis for making such a reduction in the present case. The matter was not complicated and the 3rd and 5th Respondents clearly contravened the First Conduct Rule.  If they gave accurate instructions to their lawyers and were given sensible advice they should have conceded their contravention at a much earlier stage.  I will make a costs order in the terms sought by the Commission.

Disposition

37.I will make an order in the terms of [3] subject to the changes in respect of the following matter:

(1)     A reduction of 9% to reflect the 3rd Respondent’s cooperation.

(2)     The 5th Respondent’s pecuniary penalty is HK$280,000.

(3)     The Undertakings to be given by the 3rd and 5th Respondents instead of injunctions, if the language of the Undertakings can be agreed.

(Jonathan Harris)
President of the Competition Tribunal
High Court

Mr Abraham Chan SC and Mr Issac Chan, instructed by King & Wood Mallesons, for the applicant

Mr Matthew Ngai and Ms Mandy Chan, instructed by Dundons, for the 3rd and 5th respondents

 Appendix

STATEMENT OF AGREED FACTS (“STATEMENT”) BETWEEN THE
COMPETITION COMMISSION (“COMMISSION”) AND THE 3rd RESPONDENT AND THE 5th RESPONDENT

(For the purposes of a settlement pursuant to Rule 39 of the Competition Tribunal Rules, Cap.619D (“CTR”) and Paragraph 72 of the Competition Tribunal Practice Direction 1 (“CTPD1”))

PART A — INTRODUCTION

1.     On 6 September 2018, the Commission issued these proceedings pursuant to ss.92, 94, 96, 101 and 102 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (“Ordinance”) against, inter alia, the 3rd and 5th Respondents, seeking an order for, amongst other things:

(a)     A declaration that the 3rd Respondent has contravened the First Conduct Rule pursuant to s.6 of the Ordinance;

(b)     A declaration that the 5th Respondent has been involved in a contravention of the First Conduct Rule, within the meaning of s.91 of the Ordinance;

(c)     A pecuniary penalty to be assessed;

(d)     An order that the 3rd and 5th Respondents shall cease entering into any agreement or concerted practice involving any anti-competitive conduct, or aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring, and/or being knowingly concerned in any anti-competitive conduct, in respect of any projects under the Housing Authority’s Decoration Contractor System (“DC System”);

(e)     An order that the 3rd and 5th Respondents pay the Government an amount equal to the amount of the costs of and incidental to any investigation into the conduct or affairs of the 3rd and 5th Respondent, that has been reasonably incurred by the Commission in connection with these proceedings;

(f)     Costs of the proceedings; and

(g)     Such further and/or other relief as the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) may consider appropriate.

2.     Subject to the approval of the Tribunal, the Commission and the 3rd and 5th Respondents agree to enter judgment on liability by way of the summary procedure as provided for in Rule 39 CTR and paragraph 72 CTPD1 and applied by the Honourable Mr Justice Harris in his Reasons for Decision dated 17 July 2020 in these proceedings ([2020] HKCT 3).

3.     This Statement is intended to be submitted pursuant to Rule 39 of the CTR and paragraph 72 of the CTPD1 for the purpose of settling the factual basis upon which the Tribunal is asked to make the orders sought.

4.     For the purpose of resolving these proceedings summarily, by reference to the facts as set out in Part B below, the Commission contends and the 3rd and 5th Respondents accept that between 16 June and 7 November 2017 (“Relevant Period”):

(a)     The 3rd Respondent had contravened the First Conduct Rule by having made and given effect to a market allocation and price-fixing agreement with Kam Kwong Engineering Company Limited (“1st Respondent”) and Goldfield N & W Construction Company Limited (“2nd Respondent”) (“Contravention”);

(b)     The 3rd Respondent had permitted the 5th Respondent to manage all renovation works to be carried out in the name of the 3rd Respondent at King Tai Court, San Po Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong (“Estate”); and

(c)     By his conduct, the 5th Respondent was involved in the Contravention within the meaning of s.91 of the Ordinance.

5.     The Commission, and the 3rd and 5th Respondents accept and acknowledge that none of the admissions made by the 3rd and 5th Respondents in this Statement shall be binding against any other Respondent in these proceedings.

6.     In the event that the Tribunal does make the proposed orders set out in Part C below, the Commission reserves the right to refer to this signed Statement for all purposes connected with or ancillary to these proceedings.

PART B – UNDISPUTED FACTS

B1.     The Estate

7.      The Estate was, at all material times, a housing estate consisting of one domestic block developed by the Housing Authority (“HKHA”) under the Green Form Subsidized Home Ownership Pilot Scheme (“GSH”).

8.     The Estate was completed in 2017, and the new owners began collecting the keys to their respective units on 20 June 2017.

9.     The Estate consists of 857 units spread over 32 floors.

B2.     The HKHA and the DC System

10.     HKHA is a statutory body which seeks to provide affordable rental housing to low-income families with housing needs, and help low-income to middle-income families to gain access to subsidised home ownership. The Estate is one of such initiatives by the HKHA.

11.     At all material times, the HKHA has operated the DC System for newly completed public rental housing estates as well as newly completed buildings for one of the HKHA’s ownership scheme, including the buildings under the GSH such as the Estate. The aim of the DC System was to protect tenants of public rental housing estates or owners of the buildings under the ownership schemes by preventing infiltration of illegal elements so that decoration works in new estates and courts can be carried out in an orderly manner.

12.     Under the DC System:

(a)     The HKHA maintains a “Reference List of Decoration Contractors” (“Reference List”). Anyone may apply to be put on the Reference List but, to be successful, a contractor has to meet the eligibility criteria set by HKHA and will be checked by the police for triad connections;

(b)     When a new building is about to be ready for owners to move in, the HKHA will grant licences to a number of contractors on the Reference List for undertaking decoration works for the tenants (“Licence”). The number of contractors thus appointed (“Designated DCs”) is based on the ratio of one contractor to every 250 flats;

(c)     Contractors are selected for appointment from a ballot‑generated priority list of all those on the Reference List.  When offered an appointment, a contractor is obliged to take it up, although if there are unforeseen circumstances or valid reasons, it may decline the opportunity once during its registration on the Reference List;

(d)     Before obtaining the Licence, a contractor has to provide to HKHA (i) a valid business registration certificate, (ii) documents to prove it meets the eligibility criteria in respect of cash at bank or unutilised overdraft facility, and (iii) a surety bond;

(e)     The Designated DCs will be invited to attend a briefing session which includes a presentation about HKHA’s relevant regulations with one of the regulations being that the Appointed DCs should not agree among themselves to allocate flats to a certain contractor (referred to as “pie-sharing” in the HKHA’s briefing), but should allow tenants to choose freely which contractors they want to engage;

(f)     The tenants/owners are free to decide whether they wish to have their units decorated and, if they do, whether to engage a Designated DC or any other contractor or to decorate it themselves or by their friends or relatives;

(g)     The scope and price of any decoration works undertaken by the Designated DC for a tenant/owner is a matter between the tenant/owner and the Designated DC to negotiate; and

(h)     Designated DCs are not agents or representatives of the HKHA and any dispute or claim for loss or damage arising from the decorative works is to be dealt with and resolved between the Designated DC and the tenant/owner concerned.

13.     Each Designated DC has to enter into the Licence which is an agreement by deed with HKHA, with the title “Licence for Tenants’ Decoration Works”.  By this, HKHA grants to the Designated DC the right to enter the estate and carry out decoration works on behalf of tenants.

B3.     The Contravention

B3a.     Appointment as a Designated DC for the Estate

14.     The 3rd Respondent is a limited liability company with a single director and shareholder. The 3rd Respondent has been on the HKHA’s Reference List since 2016.

15.     By letter dated 14 November 2016, HKHA invited the 3rd Respondent to be a Designated DC at the Estate.

16.     On 16 November 2016, the 3rd Respondent, by its authorized person, Chan Hon Wing, accepted HKHA’s invitation to be a Designated DC at the Estate.

17.     In early 2017, the 3rd Respondent asked and the 5th Respondent agreed, that the 5th Respondent would be responsible for managing the works on behalf of the 3rd Respondent at the Estate, and would also be responsible for recruiting onsite personnel for and on behalf of the 3rd Respondent.  It was agreed that the profits would be shared by the ratio of 70% for the 3rd Respondent and 30% for the 5th Respondent, if any.

18.     At all material times (including during the Relevant Period):

(a)     The 3rd Respondent was the Designated DC of the Estate having been duly appointed pursuant to the DC System described above;

(b)     The 5th Respondent acted for and on behalf of the 3rd Respondent at the Estate, recruited all on-site personnel to work for and on behalf of the 3rd Respondent, and gave instructions to those personnel.

19.     The 3rd Respondent accepts that for the purpose of the Ordinance, the acts / omissions of all of its employees, agents, and representatives including but not limited to, the 5th Respondent are attributable to the 3rd Respondent such that it is liable for any contraventions of the First Conduct Rule that were carried out in the name of the 3rd Respondent by any of its employees, agents and/or representatives.

B3b.    Market Allocation

20.     In order to ensure that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents would not actively compete with each other for the decoration works at the Estate, the 5th Respondent, on behalf of the 3rd Respondent, entered into an allocation arrangement (“Allocation Arrangement”) with the 1st and 2nd Respondents whereby they agreed to allocate potential customers from the Estate between themselves with reference to the owners’ unit and floor number. Specifically, the agreed allocation between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents was as follows:

  Units on 1st and 2nd Floors                       Floors
  1st Respondent   101-104, 221-226   5,8,9,12,15,18,21,24,27,30
  2nd Respondent   105-108, 207-220 4,7,10,13,16,19,22,25,28,31
  3rd Respondent 109-110, 201-206, 227-228 3,6,11,14,17,20,23,26,29,32

(“Agreed Allocation”).

21.     The Allocation Arrangement was entered into in on or around June 2017 after the site office was erected at the Estate.

22.     During the Relevant Period, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents carried out the decoration works in accordance with the Allocation Arrangement.

Particulars

(a)     In order to facilitate the performance of the Allocation Arrangement, persons acting for and on behalf of the 3rd Respondent (including the 5th Respondent) had in their possession notebooks which recorded the units and floors assigned to the 3rd Respondent under the Agreed Allocation (“Notebooks”).  As the person responsible for the works on behalf of the 3rd Respondent, the 5th Respondent instructed persons acting for and on behalf of the 3rd Respondent to only solicit business from persons living in units/floors assigned to the 3rd Respondent.

(b)     The Notebooks were used by the 5th Respondent and persons acting on behalf of the 3rd Respondent as a point of reference during the course of business in particular, to identify owners from whom to solicit (and/or not solicit) business at the Estate. Persons acting on behalf of the 3rd Respondent were asked to distribute business cards at the floors allocated to the 3rd Respondent;

(c)     Whenever a person acting for and on behalf of the 3rd Respondent:

(1)     was approached by a unit owner in the Estate; or

(2)     wished to solicit a person who appeared to be a unit owner in the Estate,

(d)     If the owner’s unit or floor was allocated to either the 1st or 2nd Respondent, persons acting on behalf of the 3rd Respondent (including the 5th Respondent) would decline to accept the business and/or direct the owner to the relevant Respondent which had been allocated with such unit or floor; and

(e)     As a result of the Allocation Arrangement, the 5th Respondent on behalf of the 3rd Respondent performed decoration works exclusively on Units and floors allocated to it, namely on the 3rd, 6th, 11th, 14th, 17th, 20th, 23rd, 26th, 29th and 32nd floor as well as units on the 1st and 2nd floor. In total, the 3rd Respondent performed decoration works in at least 63 units.

23.     At all material times, the 5th Respondent:

(a)     Had recruited all on-site personnel to work for, and on behalf of, the 3rd Respondent;

(b)     On behalf of the 3rd Respondent agreed to the Agreed Allocation;

(c)     Had actively dealt with potential customers in accordance with the Allocation Arrangement and the particulars as set out at paragraph 22 above; and

(d)     Had directed the agents, and/or representatives of the 3rd Respondent to give effect to the Allocation Arrangement by only soliciting business from the units/floors allocated to the 3rd Respondent in accordance with the Agreed Allocation in accordance with the particulars as set out at paragraph 22 above.

24.     In the premises:

(a)     By virtue of the matters stated at paragraphs 20 to 22 above, the Allocation Arrangement was a market and/or customer allocation agreement which allocated the owners (i.e. actual or potential customers) between the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents.  The object of the Allocation Arrangement was to prevent, or restrict, or distort competition in relation to the provision of decoration works for the Estate;

(b)     The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents had accordingly made and gave effect to an agreement/concerted practice with the object of preventing, or restricting, or distorting competition in Hong Kong, in contravention of the First Conduct Rule; and

(c)     Such conduct constitutes ‘serious anti-competitive conduct’ within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Ordinance.

25.     Also, with regards to the Allocation Arrangement, the 5th Respondent was a person involved (within the meaning of s.91 of the Ordinance) in a contravention of the First Conduct Rule as the 5th Respondent had:

(a)     On behalf of the 3rd Respondent entered into the Allocation Arrangement with the 1st and 2nd Respondents;

(b)     Been knowingly concerned in the entering of the Allocation Arrangement as per paragraph 23 above; and

(c)     Aided, abetted, counseled, and/or procured, the giving effect of the Allocation Arrangement by the 3rd Respondent as per paragraph 23 above.

B3b.    Price Coordination Arrangement

26.     On 16 June 2017, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents had also engaged in the concerted practice of exchanging and coordinating the content and price of the standard decoration packages on offer to the owners of the units in the Estate (“Price Coordination Arrangement”).

27.     As respects the Price Coordination Arrangement, the 5th Respondent, on behalf of the 3rd Respondent, agreed with representatives of the 1st and 2nd Respondents that the 4th Respondent would procure and produce in Chinese text leaflets for use to promote certain standard packages for decoration services.

28.     In accordance with this agreement, sometime before 16th July 2017, the 5th Respondent liaised with the 4th Respondent to determine the 3rd Respondent’s proposed prices to various standardised decoration packages.

29.     The 4th Respondent subsequently produced one set of leaflets for each of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents (“Leaflets”, attached herein together with the agreed English translations, as Annex A). The Leaflets for each of these contained substantially identical features:

(a)     The 3 sets of Leaflets adopted the same layout and design;

(b)     The 3 sets of Leaflets listed the same 10 items of decoration works; and

(c)     Save for the smallest Unit, there were two packages labelled “Package A”, which included items 1 to 4, and “Package B”, which included items 1 to 10, on offer, respectively.

30.     Persons acting on behalf of the 3rd Respondent (including the 5th Respondent) used the Leaflets in the course of business at the Estate.

31.     The Leaflets also stated a package price for each of the basic packages on offer in respect of each of the Units (“Package Prices”) which only differed marginally:

Unit Size
Respondent
Package A
(HKD)
Package B
(HKD)
1 to 2 person
1st Respondent
5,680
-
 
2nd Respondent
5,780
-
 
3rd Respondent
5,580
-
2 to 3 person
1st Respondent
8,580
22,980
 
2nd Respondent
8,380
23,180
 
3rd Respondent
8,480
23,180
1-bedroom
1st Respondent
13,680
35,580
 
2nd Respondent
13,780
35,680
 
3rd Respondent
13,580
35,880
2-bedrooms
1st Respondent
15,380
39,480
 
2nd Respondent
15,280
38,680
 
3rd Respondent
15,480
39,180

32.     In the premises, it is the Commission’s case (which is not disputed by the 3rd and 5th Respondents) that:

(a)     By virtue of the matters stated in paragraphs 26 to 31 above, the Price Coordination Arrangement was an agreement/concerted practice entered into by the 5th Respondent on behalf of the 3rd Respondent with the 1st and 2nd Respondents to facilitate the Allocation Arrangement by reducing the incentive of potential customers to seek out other Respondents once the said potential customers had been approached by the Respondent which had been allocated such particular units or floors;

(b)     Together, the Allocation Arrangement and the Price Coordination Arrangement were part of a single overall agreement/concerted practice, with each instance of customer allocation and price coordination under the respective agreements/concerted practices being in pursuit of a common objective of giving effect to the single overall agreement/concerted practice with the object of such agreement being to prevent, or restrict, or distort competition in Hong Kong in contravention of the First Conduct Rule; and

(c)     Such conduct constitutes ‘serious anti-competitive conduct’ within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Ordinance.

33.     Also, with regards to the Price Coordination Arrangement, the 5th Respondent was a person involved (within in the meaning of s.91 of the Ordinance) in a contravention of the First Conduct Rule as the 5th Respondent:

(a)     Had actual knowledge of the Price Coordination Arrangement between the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondent;

(b)     Had agreed to the Price Coordination Arrangement by liaising the 4th Respondent on the 3rd Respondent’s proposed Package Prices;

(c)     In his capacity as the person responsible for the works on behalf of the 3rd Respondent at the Estate, had directed the agents, and/or representatives of the 3rd Respondent to give effect to the Price Coordination Arrangement by using the Leaflets printed by the 4th Respondent when marketing the services of the 3rd Respondent to potential customers; and

(d)     Had, himself, given effect to the Price Coordination Arrangement by using the Leaflets and the Package Prices therein in the course of soliciting business from potential customers, and had used the Package Prices as an anchoring reference point from which to begin negotiations.

PART C – PROPOSED ORDERS

34.     On the basis of the facts not in dispute as set out in Part B above, the Commission and the 3rd and 5th Respondents agree that judgment should be entered against the 3rd and 5th Respondents.  There shall be a declaration that the 3rd Respondent has contravened the First Conduct Rule and that the 5th Respondent was a person involved (within the meaning of s.91 of the Ordinance) in the contravention of the First Conduct Rule.

35.     As for the further reliefs that are sought by the Commission, the Commission and the 3rd and 5th Respondents agree that a separate hearing should be held for the determination of the appropriate reliefs to be imposed by the Tribunal.

36.     If, pursuant to this Statement, the Tribunal disposes of these proceedings summarily, 3rd and 5th Respondents agree that there should be an order that they do pay the Commission’s costs of these proceedings.

PART D – AGREED MITIGATING FACTOR

37.      In agreeing to deal with the present proceedings in accordance with Rule 39 CTR and Section 72 CTPD1, the 3rd and 5th Respondents have adopted a reasonable cause of action which has saved time and costs of the Commission and that of the Tribunal.

38.     Further, the 3rd Respondent had no actual knowledge of the anti-competition conduct of the 5th Respondent acting in its name at the Estate. It admits liability on the basis that under the Ordinance, the 3rd Respondent and those acting on behalf of the 3rd Respondent at the Estate constitute a single undertaking.

39.     As of the date of this Statement, the 3rd Respondent has not received any payment from the 5th Respondent.

40.     The Commission will recommend to the Tribunal that the above factors be taken into account (subject to the Commission’s submissions on weight) should the Tribunal decide that an order for pecuniary penalty against the 3rd and 5th Respondents be appropriate.

Dated this the 3rd day of August 2020.

 
King & Wood Mallesons
For and on behalf of the Commission

Dundons Solicitors
Solicitors for the 3rd and 5th Respondents

[1] See [3] of the 3 July 2019 decision.

[2] Based on the 3rd Respondent’s assertion that works in respect of one of the units appearing on the work orders did not in fact materialize.

[3] [2019] HKCT 3.

[4] [2011] CAT 3.