Ren Rong t/a Wah Yung Engineering Co v. Inland Revenue Board of Review
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 917/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 September 2022.
1. This application for leave to apply for judicial review (the “ Application ”) concerns the decision of the Inland Revenue Board of Review (the “ Board ”) dated 27 April 2021 (“ Decision ”) refusing to grant an extension of time to the applicant to appeal out of time against the determination of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (the “ Commissioner ”) on 6 July 2020 (“ Determination ”). The applicant lodged her notice of appeal (“ Notice of Appeal ”) (dated 3 November 2020) on 4 Novemb
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HCAL 917/2021 [2022] HKCFI 2816 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 917 OF 2021 ________________________ BETWEEN
________________________ Before: Hon Wilson Chan J in Court Date of Hearing: 4 August 2022 Date of Judgment: 15 September 2022 ________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.This application for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Application”) concerns the decision of the Inland Revenue Board of Review (the “Board”) dated 27 April 2021 (“Decision”) refusing to grant an extension of time to the applicant to appeal out of time against the determination of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (the “Commissioner”) on 6 July 2020 (“Determination”). The applicant lodged her notice of appeal (“Notice of Appeal”) (dated 3 November 2020) on 4 November 2020, ie outside the 1-month appeal period (“Appeal Period”), due to her own mistaken belief that all the government departments were closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and that she may lodge the Notice of Appeal when the pandemic is over. B. BACKGROUND FACTS 2.The background facts of this case are not in dispute and can be summarised as follows. 3.On 8 July 2020, the Commissioner delivered by registered mail a notice to the applicant, that her objection to additional assessment was dismissed and the additional assessment had been determined as contained in the attached Determination. 4.On 8 August 2020, the applicant’s 1-month Appeal Period against the Determination fell due. 5.On 4 November 2020, the applicant lodged her Notice of Appeal with the Board, which stated her causes of delay. 6.On 23 February 2021, the applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal against the Determination was heard by the Board (the “Hearing”). 7.On 27 April 2021, the Board issued the Decision, refusing to grant an extension of time to the applicant for giving notice of appeal under section 66(1A) of the Inland Revenue Ordinance, Cap 112 (“IRO”). C. RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES 8.The Board is a creature of statute, so it has no inherent jurisdiction such as to extend time for appealing. Any powers that the Board has must come from the statute. (see Chan Min Ching (t/a Chan Siu Wah Herbalist Clinic) v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999] 2 HKC 848 per Yuen J (as she then was) at 851B) 9.Section 66(1A) of the IRO provides the mechanism on how the Board may exercise its discretion to allow an appeal out of time:
10.The burden was on the applicant to demonstrate to the Board that she had been prevented from lodging the Notice of Appeal in time by one or more matters mentioned in section 66(1A) of the IRO. Absent a qualifying reason (illness, absence from Hong Kong, or some other reasonable cause) which prevented the filing of such notice, the Board of Review has no power to extend time. (see Excelter Investment Ltd v Inland Revenue Board of Review [2021] HKCA 1049 at §§23-25) 11.In Chow Kwong Fai v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2005] 4 HKLRD 687, Woo VP in dismissing the appeal of the taxpayer held the following on the interpretation on Section 66(1A) of the IRO at §20:
12.Any unilateral mistakes made by the taxpayer, for example, misunderstanding of requirements for a valid appeal, cannot be properly described as a reasonable cause which prevented the taxpayer from lodging the notice of appeal within time. (Chow Kwong Fai (ibid) at §45) 13.As for this leave application, it is well-established that the applicant needs to satisfy the court that there is a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success: Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. D. DISCUSSION 14.Counsel for the applicant has put forward two main lines of arguments:
15.In my view, the applicant’s contentions lack focus and wholly ignore the substance of the Decision. 16.At paragraphs 9 and 23 of the Decision, the Board stated as follows:
17.At the hearing before this court, counsel for the applicant raised no dispute as to the factual accuracy of the matters set out at paragraphs 9 and 23 of the Decision. 18.At paragraph 25 of the Decision, the Board went on to state that:
19.It is apparent from the Decision that the applicant was given ample opportunities to explain to the Board any difficulty that she might face during the COVID-19 pandemic that prevented her from filing the Notice of Appeal in time:
20.Since the applicant was not sick, hospitalized or away from Hong Kong at the material time, the applicant could only rely on “other reasonable cause” to apply to appeal out of time under section 66(1A) of the IRO. 21.The applicant’s excuse for her delay is thus plain and simple: it is only her wrong assumption that all the government departments were closed due to the pandemic and she could lodge her Notice of Appeal when the pandemic is over. This is nothing but a unilateral mistake on her part, which cannot be properly described as a reasonable cause preventing her from lodging the Notice of Appeal within time. 22.The Board was perfectly entitled in its fact finding process to conclude, with good reasons and common sense, that the applicant and her husband were able but failed to (as distinct from “unable to”) lodge the Notice of Appeal in time due to their ignorance, the reasons being:
23.I agree that such assessment was made with proper and detailed inquiry on the claimed difficulty that the applicant faced in preparing her notice of appeal during the COVID-19 pandemic, which cannot be faulted in any public law sense. As such, it is not unlawful or irrational at all for the Board to conclude, based on the materials before it and with adequate reasons, that the applicant has failed to put forward “other reasonable cause” to justify her substantial delay, and therefore the Board had no reason or basis to extend time under the IRO. E. CONCLUSION 24.For the reasons stated above, the applicant’s Application is dismissed. 25.In the present case, the hearing of the Application was conducted inter partes. The assistance provided to the court by Mr Tong acting for the Putative Interested Party has been helpful. I order that the costs of the Application (including all costs reserved, if any) be paid by the applicant to the Putative Interested Party, such costs are to be taxed if not agreed. 26.The above order as to costs is nisi and shall become absolute in the absence of any application within 14 days to vary the same. 27.Lastly, I thank Ms Lok and Mr Tong for their helpful assistance in this matter.
Ms Jenny Lok, instructed by Messrs C W Heung & Partners, for the applicant Mr Andrew Tong, Senior Government Counsel (Acting) of the Department of Justice, for the Putative Interested Party |
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