Read the full judgment text of on BabelCite. was delivered on 14 October 1987 before Cons, V-P., Fuad JA, Clough JA.
Civil procedure – appeal to Privy Council – Order in Council – Rule 2 – matter in dispute exceeding $500,000 – aggregation of claims by multiple plaintiffs properly joined in a single action – whether individual or aggregate threshold applies – whether leave to appeal as of right lies. In February 1982 an accident occurred on Castle Peak Road when a coach carrying a party of children veered across the central reservation and collided with a public light bus travelling in the opposite direction; one passenger in the bus was killed, and the driver and three passengers were injured. An action for damages and other relief was brought by or on behalf of those injured and by the administrators of the estate of the deceased, all joined in a single action. At first instance the trial judge was asked to deal with liability alone and found for the plaintiffs, but the Court of Appeal reversed that decision. The five plaintiffs then sought leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council. For the purposes of the application it was agreed that the aggregate of the five claims exceeded $500,000, although no individual claim could reach that amount. Rule 2 of the Order in Council provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any final judgment where the matter in dispute on the appeal amounts to or is of the value of $500,000 or upwards, or where the appeal involves directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property or some civil right amounting to or of the value of $500,000 or upwards. The central question was whether properly joined claims by multiple plaintiffs could be aggregated to satisfy that monetary threshold. Held: properly joined claims may be aggregated. The court followed the New Zealand decisions in Good v. Bruce and Bankier v. New Zealand Waterside Workers' Union, which held that the aggregate potential liability of the defendant to all possible plaintiffs was sufficient to bring the matter within a similarly worded rule even though no one plaintiff recovered the minimum amount. Allan v. Pratt was distinguished as not being of assistance on the aggregation of separate claims. The court further held that the natural, commonsense construction of 'matter in dispute on the Appeal' in Rule 2 was not technical language; it did not refer to causes of action, claims, or parties, and, with the aid of Rule 1 (which provided that words in the singular include the plural), comprehended joined claims which in the aggregate exceeded the stipulated amount. The object of the rule was to ensure that their Lordships were not troubled by trivial appeals, and this appeal was not trivial. The plaintiffs were therefore entitled to leave to appeal as of right. The court declined to decide whether, in the alternative, discretionary leave could be granted on the basis of questions of great general or public importance, and indicated that, in any event, that condition had not been satisfied. Leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council granted as of right.
Legal issues: Aggregation of properly joined plaintiffs' claims to satisfy the $500,000 threshold for appeal as of right to the Privy Council
Outcome: Leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council granted as of right.