Lee Kwai Ying v. Pang Wing Fai and Others
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 1680/2022 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 30 September 2022.
1. This case is a dispute between co-owners of a building in Aberdeen, namely Aberdeen Harbour Mansion (“the Building”). The plaintiff (“P”) is the owner of Flat 5J of the Building (“5J”). The defendants (“Ds”) are the co-owners of the Flat 6J of the Building (“6J”). 6J is the unit above 5J. P claims that Ds have made noise and have caused vibration affecting 5J, and the noise and vibration constitute nuisance infringing P’s enjoyment of 5J.
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DCCJ 1680/2022 [2022] HKDC 1043 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO. 1680 OF 2022 ____________________
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----------------- DECISION ----------------- 1.This case is a dispute between co-owners of a building in Aberdeen, namely Aberdeen Harbour Mansion (“the Building”). The plaintiff (“P”) is the owner of Flat 5J of the Building (“5J”). The defendants (“Ds”) are the co-owners of the Flat 6J of the Building (“6J”). 6J is the unit above 5J. P claims that Ds have made noise and have caused vibration affecting 5J, and the noise and vibration constitute nuisance infringing P’s enjoyment of 5J. 2.By a summons dated 16 June 2022 (“the Summons”), P seeks an interlocutory injunction against Ds. The material terms of the injunction sought by P are as follows[1]:
3.Ds oppose the Summons. 4.The parties have filed affirmations in relation to the Summons pursuant to the directions given by the court. I am not prepared to set out all the details of the evidence filed by the parties. Suffice for me to say that all the evidence filed, as well as the submissions made by the parties, have been duly considered. 5.In these proceedings (including P’s application as per the Summons), P is acting in person, and D is represented by Ms Gigi Ho of counsel. A. THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE CASES 6.These proceedings are at the very early stage. P has filed her Re-Amended Statement of Claim and Ds have filed their Defence. 7.P’s pleaded case is as follows:
8.Ds deny liability. Ds say that P is entitled to the relief as claimed or at all. Ds put P to strict proof of the alleged nuisance emanating from 6J to 5J. Ds say that their family have been residing in 6J for over 44 years since 1977 and have never received any complaints from any other persons about the alleged nuisance. All along, 6J has been used as an ordinary household unit and there has never been any heavy work inside 6J. B. THE PRINCIPLES 9.The principles concerning interlocutory injunctions are trite. The court would first consider whether there is a serious question to be tried. If yes, the court would proceed to consider whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the interlocutory injunction.[4] 10.A serious question to be tried is not a very steep hurdle. So long as there is a serious question, it matters not whether the court thinks that the plaintiff’s chances of success at trial are 90% or 20%. All that has to be seen is whether he has prospects of success which, in substance and reality, exist. Odds against success do not defeat him, unless those are so long that the plaintiff can have no expectation of success, but only a hope. If his prospects are so small that they lack substance and reality, then he fails, for he can point to no question to be tried which can be called “serious”, and no prospects of such success which can be called “real”. If the opposing party seeks to show there is no serious question to be tried, the threshold is high, as it would be necessary to demonstrate that the claim should be struck out.[5] 11.In considering the balance of convenience, the governing principle is that the court should first consider whether, if the plaintiff succeeds at the trial, he would be adequately compensated by damages for any loss caused by the refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction. If damages would be an adequate remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however strong the plaintiff’s claim appeared to be at that stage.[6] 12.The terms of the injunction order must not be vague, uncertain or too oppressive to the defendant. As an example, if the noises referred to in the injunction order can inevitably encapsulate all decibel levels of sounds at any time or the defendant and his family’s lives and their right of enjoyment of the house would be unduly infringed, the court cannot and will be make such an order.[7] 13.With these principles in mind, I turn to analyse the issues in P’s application. C. DISCUSSION C1. Any serious question to be tried? 14.In analysing whether there is a serious question to be tried, I would consider the causes of action relied upon by P in turn. C1.1. Nuisance 15.P has not made it clear that she is relying upon public nuisance or private nuisance in her pleading. 16.In order to succeed on a claim based upon public nuisance, a private individual must show that he or she has suffered a “particular, direct and substantial” injury above and beyond what is suffered by the rest of the public at large[8]. In my view, no case based upon public nuisance has been pleaded in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. 17.There is no dispute that P is the registered owner of 5J. According to a land search of 5J dated 21 June 2022, P has been the registered owner of 5J since 23 March 2020. The subject matter complained by P is the alleged noise and alleged vibration emanated from 6J to 5J. Viewed in context, the nuisance relied upon by P must be private nuisance. 18.Regarding private nuisance, the principles have been succinctly summarized in Elias Neil David and Anor v Cheng Sui Chu and Other[9]:
19.The test, namely what is reasonable according to ordinary usages of mankind living in a particular society, was held to be applicable in the context of interference nuisance disputes between neighbours in Hong Kong. In assessing the question of nuisance in the context of Hong Kong, the court should take into account the particular habits of Hong Kong people, in particular later bedtimes.[11] 20.In deciding whether the nuisance is substantiated, the court shall not take into account the subjective sense of the complainant.[12] 21.In determining whether the impugned activity is a reasonable use of the defendant’s land, locality and the character of the neighbourhood must be taken into account. As said in Sturges v Bridgman[13], “what would be a nuisance in Belgravia Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey”. 22.According to P, the nuisance is caused by noise (“the noise nuisance”) and vibration (“the vibration nuisance”) emanated from 6J. P says that that the vibration emitting from 6J has cracked her ceilings. Although both the noise nuisance and the vibration nuisance are mentioned in P’s case, P is focusing on the vibration nuisance. P in fact says that the vibration emanated from 6J is often soundless vibration.
23.In my view, putting aside the alleged vibration complained by P, P in fact is not saying that there has been unbearable noise originated from 6J. The noise nuisance alleged by P cannot stand alone. It would stand or fall together with the vibration nuisance alleged by P in her case. 24.In considering whether there is a serious question to be tried on nuisance, the following matters have to be borne in mind. 25.Firstly, the Building is an old building in Hong Kong. It is now 50 years old. There are around 170 units within the Building. It is built very close to a highway, bus stations and other buildings. Given all these, the residents in the Building would certainly experience some noise coming from the environment outside the Building and from different household activities in different units inside the Building during daytime and sometimes at night. 26.Secondly, P has made various complaints to the Management Office of the Building. The Management Office has conducted investigations and did not find any noise from 6J, nor any evidence showing that there may be some activities in 6J which would cause the vibration alleged by P.
27.Thirdly, P has made complaints to the Police, but the Police has not found any noise from 6J.
28.Fourthly, P has made complaints to the Building Department (“BD”). BD has conducted investigation. The conclusion reached by BD does not support P’s case.
29.P blamed Ds for being evasive by refusing the BD’s entry to 6J. However, Ds have allowed the Management Office to enter 6J to conduct investigations and to take photos of the interior of 6J. 30.The Management Office, the Police and the BD are independent third parties. They all have conducted their own investigations as a result of P’s complaints. The findings made by them do not lend any support to P’s case at all. 31.The most relevant evidence adduced by P is a site investigation report dated 7 May 2022 (“Ma’s Report”) and a letter dated 29 June 2022 (“Ma’s Letter”) from a Mr Jacky Ma Wai-kwong (“Mr Ma”). P relies upon these documents as expert evidence in support of her case that the cracks on 5J’s ceilings were caused by vibration emitted from 6J. It would not be necessary for me to set out the details of Ma’s Report and Ma’s Letter in this decision. Suffice for me to say that even assuming that Mr Ma is having the necessary expertise to give the opinion as stated in his report and his letter (for avoidance of doubt, as to whether Mr Ma indeed has such expertise, I make no finding on this issue), I would not attach any weight to Ma’s Report and Ma’s Letter for the following reasons:
32.P also relies upon a psychiatric report by Dr Li Derek Seung Yau (“Dr Li”) dated 28 May 2022. In this report, Dr Li stated that P has adjustment disorder and anxiety and depressive symptoms. Dr Li gave a conclusion that P’s mental disorder is precipitated and caused by noise disturbances created by her neighour. Understandably, P’s mental condition may well be a matter within the purview of Dr Li’s expertise. However, as to whether there has been any noise disturbance created by P’s neighbour, this a factual matter, in respect of which Dr Li cannot give any factual evidence. 33.As said in the above, P is focusing on the vibration nuisance, and the noise nuisance in fact would stand or fall together with the vibration nuisance. The vibration alleged by P is some “soundless vibration”. P suggests that D should be using a rubber hammer to do the hammering with a tablet press tool on the floor of 6J. She exhibited photos of rubber hammers and the google result of “9 Tips of Hammer Quietly & Not Disturb Your Neighbors” and said that soundless vibration could be created by “punching a cushion”. With respect, all these are mere speculations without support of any evidence. 34.P is in fact saying that Ds have maliciously[14] created some “soundless vibration” to annoy P. This is a serious allegation. I do not see any believable evidence in support of this allegation. 35.P has also adduced evidence from herself, her mother and her sisters, as well as the transcripts of some conversations between her and some people. Suffice for me to say that all these would not be sufficient to enable P to have prospects of success (which in substance and reality exist) in her claim based upon the “soundless vibration” as alleged by P in her case. 36.Having considered the evidence before the court, I am of the view that P’s case on nuisance does not have any substance and P has no prospect of success in reality. There is no serious question to be tried on nuisance. C1.2. DMC, Clause 10 37.Clause 10(c) of the DMC requires each co-owner of the Building:
38.For the reasons set out in [15] to [36] above, I am of the view that P has not shown a serious question to be tried concerning the alleged breach of Clause 10 of the DMC by Ds. C1.3. NCO, s 4 39.NCO, s.4 provides:
40.As defined by s.2 of the NCO, unless the context otherwise requires, “annoyance” in the NCO means “annoyance that would not be tolerated by a reasonable person”. 41.Even assuming that breach of NCO s.4 can constitute a cause of action in a civil case (there be no determination on this issue), P cannot show a serious question to be tried by relying upon this section.
C1.4. BO, s.25 42.BO, s.25 provides:
43.There is no evidence showing that Ds are not using 6J as a domestic unit. P cannot rely upon s.25 of the BO to show a serious question to be tried. C1.5. No serious question to be tried 44.Notwithstanding that a serious question to be tried is not a very steep hurdle, for the reasons above, I conclude that P has failed to show a serious question to be tried. C2. Damages being an adequate remedy to P 45.If I were wrong in concluding that there is no serious question to be tried, I would still refuse to grant an injunction to P, for I am of the view that the balance of convenience lies in favour of refusing the injunction. 46.As stated in [7(6)] above, P is only claiming for monetary compensation in these proceedings. Assuming that P succeeds to the full extent in this case, what P would obtain is monetary compensation. Ds are the owners of 6J. The land search concerning 6J dated 27 July 2022 shows that 6J is not subject to any encumbrance. With all these in mind, I am of the view that P would be adequately compensated by damages for any loss caused by the refusal of the interlocutory injunction, and Ds would certainly have the financial ability to pay the monetary compensation to P in the event that P succeeds at the trial. 47.For this reason, P’s application for an interlocutory injunction should be refused. C3. Terms of the injunction sought by P 48.A further reason for refusing P’s application is that the terms of the injunction sought by P are vague and uncertain. The injunction would restrain Ds from doing “any unusual knocking, hammering and dragging of heavy objects” in 6J. So according to the terms of the draft injunction order, usual knocking, hammering and dragging of heavy objects would not be caught by the injunction. The injunction would only prohibit unusual knocking, hammering and dragging of heavy objects. However, what is usual and what is unusual is undefined. The scope of prohibition is vague and uncertain. With respect, an injunction with the terms proposed by P would not be workable. C4. Refusing P’s application 49.For the reasons set out in the above, I must refuse P’s application and dismiss the Summons. D. DISPOSITION 50.I dismiss the Summons. 51.Costs should follow the event. I order that costs of the Summons be to Ds in any event, with a certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.
The plaintiff appeared in person Ms Gigi Ho, instructed by Ho & Associates, for the defendants [1] As per the draft revised ordered prepared by P dated 7 July 2022. “Room 2” referred to in the draft revised order is a room inside 5J. [2] sic [3] Re-Amended Statement of Claim, [13] [4] American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; Hong Kong Civil procedure 2022, Volume 1, §29/1/8 [5] Hong King Civil Procedure 2022, Volume 1, §29/1/10 [6] Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022, Volume 1, §29/1/11 [7] Kwan Chi Wai v Kwan Wing Tat [2022] HKCFI 75, [3] – [6] [8] Chiu Luen Public Light Bus Co. Ltd. v Persons Unlawfully Occupying or Remaining on the Public Highway & Ors. [2014] 6 HKC 298, [16] [9] [2019] 1 HKLRD 397, [85] [10] [1949] 1 All ER 237, 238-239 [11] Capital Prosperous Ltd v Sheen Cho Kwong [1999] 1 HKLRD 633, 639H-640I [12] Ng Yuen Han v Wong Fei Fu & Anor [2013] HKLRD 608, [21]; Kwan Chi Wai (supra), [8] [DA#2]. [13] (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 865 [14] Re-Amended Statement of Claim, [8] |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under DCCJ 1680/2022