The Queen v. Lee Chi Cheong

Read the full judgment text of CAAR 2/1984 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 13 April 1984.

1. The Attorney General applies for a review of the sentence passed on LEE Chi -cheong by a district judge.

Case No.CAAR 2/1984
Court
Court of Appeal
Date13 Apr 1984
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CAAR000002/1984

[Proper sentence for taxi robberies.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1984, No.2

(Application for Review)

BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN

AND

LEE Chi-cheong

Coram: Roberts, C.J., Yang & Barker, JJ.A.

Date: 13 April 1984

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D E C I S I O N

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Roberts, C.J.:

1. The Attorney General applies for a review of the sentence passed on LEE Chi -cheong by a district judge.

2. CHOY Kwai-chun (D.1), MAK Wai-keung (D.2) and LEE Chi-cheong (D.3) were charged with robberies of taxi drivers.

3. D.1 pleaded guilty to three such robberies and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment on each charge, the sentences to run concurrently.

4. D.2 pleaded guilty to two such charges and was sentenced to two and a half years' imprisonment on each charge, the sentences to run concurrently.

5. D.3 pleaded guilty to one charge of robbery and a training centre order was made against him. It is in relation to this order that the Attorney General seeks a review.

6. The facts of the charge against D.3 were that on the early morning of 7th November, 1983, a taxi driver pickedup three men at the Wah Fu Estate in Aberdeen and drove them to Wong Chuk Hang. There the driver was threatened by these men, at least two of whom were carrying knives. He was robbed of $200 in cash, a wrist watch, a gold ring, a ball-point pen and a wallet, though he suffered no injury.

7. The correct level of sentence for robbery of taxi drivers has been considered in a number of appeals. Among them, our attention was drawn to TAI Ming-keung v. R. (1) in which this court concluded that, in the case of a robbery of a taxi driver, the normal sentence was "in the region of 4 or 5 years' imprisonment" and that "only where there are exceptional circumstances, relating either to the offence or the offender, should that normal sentence not be imposed".

8. In the very recent case of LI Lun-hoi v. R. (2) this court stated that it would not "interfere in the normal case of taxi robberies with sentences of five and six years," though the judgment in this case would not have been available to the trial judge.

9. The judge could not, therefore, be fairly criticized for taking four years as his starting point, when considering the sentences for D.1 and D.2, though in future it should be 5-6 years. And he correctly differentiated between the sentences imposed on the three defendants, to take account of the number of offences to which they pleaded guilty.

10. On the basis of TAI, (1) we would have taken as a starting point, sentences of 5 years (D.1), 4 1/2 (D.2) and 4 years (D.3) [though in future these should each be about a year more, in view of LI (2)].

11. From these base figures we would have deducted 1 year in each case, to reflect their pleas of guilty, leaving the sentences at 4 years (D.1), 3 1/2 (D.2) and 3 years (D.3), unless there were circumstances which could be said to be special either to the offence or to the offender himself, so as to justify a reduction.

12. We were asked to say that this was an exceptional case, though it was conceded that there was nothing in the least unusual about the manner in which the robberies were carried out.

13. One of the reasons for leniency may be a genuine expression of regret. But it could not be said that D.3 had shown regret for his misconduct, since the probation officer noted that he displayed no remorse Nor could it be said that this was a young man who had never been in trouble before, since he had previously been convicted twice of shoplifting.

14. He certainly has a disturbed family history, with no proper family or parental supervision during his formative years. Alas, this is all too common and cannot by itself be an important factor in inclining a court towards leniency.

15. The only substantial argument for a reduction of sentence below the normal level was the age of D.3, who was 17 years and 4 months at the time of the robbery.

16. However, D.1, who was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, was one month older than D.3; and D.2, sentenced to two and a half years' imprisonment, was 16 years and 2 months at the time of the offernces.

17. Had we been asked to review the sentences on the three defendants, we would have said that they were all manifestly inadequate and that the proper sentences, taking the recent guidance of LI (2) into account, should have been six years, five and a half years and five years reduced by virtue of the pleas of guilty to five, four and a half and four years.

18. However, because we cannot interfere with the sentences of D.1 and D.2, who were sentenced to 3 and 2 1/2 years' respectively, we would not have thought it proper to impose a prison sentence on D.3 in excess of two years since he pleaded guilty only to one robbery as compared with the two robberies for which D.2 received two and a half years.

19. In addition, and in accordance with our normal practice, we would have made a discount for the fact that this was a review and would have felt a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment to be appropriate.

20. However, although in general terms it can be said that a sentence of imprisonment is more severe than a training centre order, we felt that a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment was so similar in its effect to a training centre order, which can remain in effect for up to three years, that we should not interfere with the order.

21. We would like to reiterate that robberies of taxi drivers are offences of a very serious nature, calling for a sentence of five to six years, save in exceptional circumstances.

22. We therefore refused the application by the Attorney General and confirmed the training centre order imposed on D.3.

Representation:

S. Westbrook (D. L. A.) for Applicant

J. L. Cagney, Senior Crown Counsel, for Crown.

(1) Review Case 14/81.

(2) Crim. App. No. 1387/83