HKSAR V Lam Tsz Ho
Read the full judgment text of CACC 121/2021 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 25 October 2022.
1. On 8 June 2021, following a trial before Wong J (the judge) and a jury the appellant was unanimously convicted of trafficking in a dangerous drug, namely 5,006 grammes of a crystalline solid of methamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known as Ice), contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap 134. He was sentenced to 26 years’ imprisonment.
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CACC 121/2021 [2022] HKCA 1618 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 121 OF 2021 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 26 OF 2020) _______________
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________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ Hon Zervos JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): Introduction 1.On 8 June 2021, following a trial before Wong J (the judge) and a jury the appellant was unanimously convicted of trafficking in a dangerous drug, namely 5,006 grammes of a crystalline solid of methamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known as Ice), contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap 134. He was sentenced to 26 years’ imprisonment. 2.The appellant attended a post office and collected a parcel that was found to contain dangerous drugs. The appellant claimed he collected the parcel on the instructions of a friend and did not know it contained dangerous drugs. The appellant did not give evidence or call any witnesses. He relied on his answers in his video recorded interview and his counsel’s cross-examination and submissions in putting his defence before the jury. The key issue at trial was whether the appellant knew the parcel contained the dangerous drugs. The jury by its verdict found that the appellant knew the parcel contained dangerous drugs when he collected it at the post office. 3.The appellant’s appeal against conviction is focused on a single ground, for which leave was granted by a Single Judge.[1] It is contended that the judge made “strong and inappropriate remarks” in his summing-up to the jury when he said:[2]
It is complained that these remarks amounted to a form of pressure and threat upon the jury in the evaluation process of the verdict which deprived the appellant of a fair trial. It is further complained that the appellant’s conviction was therefore unsafe and unsatisfactory. Discussion 4.As a fundamental principle care needs to be taken by a judge when summing up to the jury not to improperly pressure the jury to arrive at a verdict: Tam King Hon v HKSAR[3]. However, it is important that the jury are reminded of the need to follow faithfully the instructions of the trial judge and return their verdict based on the evidence. Sometimes firm language is required to ensure the jury does not engage in any impermissible conduct, such as doing their own research about the case on the Internet: HKSAR v Chan Huandai[4]. 5.The Court of Final Appeal in Tam King Hon held that appropriate directions on the decision-making process of the jury must communicate adequately the following three relevant principles:[5]
6.The Court of Final Appeal in Tam King Hon[6] cited with approval the principle stated in R v Watson and Others[7], namely:
7.This is the cardinal principle that runs through the fabric of our jury system and must be adhered to at all times. 8.It is imperative when considering whether a summing-up contains material misdirections, the impugned remarks must not be looked at in isolation but must be examined in their proper context. The ultimate object is to assess the effect of the summing-up as a whole on the jury and ensure that in the circumstances of the case it is fair: Tam King Hon[8]. 9.The judge commenced his summing-up on Friday, 4 June 2021. After briefly setting out the cases for the prosecution and defence, he explained to the jury their different functions, reminding them that:[9]
10.He then told the jury that as for the facts, they alone were the judges. He said:[10]
11.The above quoted remarks followed Specimen Direction 1.1 contained in the Judicial Studies Board’s specimen directions on the functions of judge and jury. 12.Immediately thereafter, the judge gave the jury the standard directions on the burden and standard of proof and reminded them in strong terms that they had to be sure of guilt and not base their decision on suspicion or probability.[11] 13.The judge then took the jury very carefully through the elements of the offence of trafficking in a dangerous drug, giving in comprehensive terms the relevant legal directions.[12] At this juncture, the judge turned to address the relevant directions in respect of the appellant. He reminded the jury of the appellant’s right of silence, which he exercised during the course of his video recorded interview, as well as his right not to give evidence or call any witnesses.[13] He finished this part of the summing-up on Friday and continued the following Monday, 7 June 2021, having warned them that he proposed to send them out to deliberate on Tuesday, 8 June 2021. 14.On the Monday, the judge reiterated to the jury that they must decide the case only on the evidence received in court and not talk to other people about it. He then stressed that they were not to conduct any research or investigation, including doing so on the Internet. He made the point that they were not investigators, that they had to decide the case on the evidence presented to them, and that they must not speculate or guess.[14] It was at this stage of his summing-up that the judge made the impugned remarks. It seems he did so because he knew the jury would be returning home that night and retiring to consider its verdict the next morning. It is appropriate to set out in full the relevant passage of the judge’s summing-up where the impugned remarks are made:[15]
15.When the judge reminded the jury of what he had previously said to them about not conducting any research or investigation, particularly on the Internet, he was referring to his introductory remarks to them after they had been empanelled on 31 May 2021. He had said:[16]
16.We will return to the judge’s introductory remarks to the jury when considering the impugned remarks because they are directly connected. 17.On the third day of his summing-up, Tuesday, 8 June 2021, before sending the jury out to consider its verdict, the judge repeated to them the importance of their task. He stressed:[17]
18.These remarks were consistent with Specimen Direction 55 in the Judicial Studies Board specimen directions on the concluding directions in respect of verdict and jury management. 19.There are two additional matters we would highlight from the judge’s concluding remarks, which concern his reiteration to the jury that they must decide their verdict on the evidence presented to them[18], and his instruction that if they felt they needed further direction about the law they should submit a written note to him.[19] 20.Mr James Tze, for the appellant, accepts that the judge’s impugned remarks were appropriate when instructing the jury not to rely on extraneous materials. However, he takes issue with the fact that the judge made his remarks in the context of “any of his directions” and therefore covered all the directions he gave to the jury. He contends that this was contrary to the principle that a jury must be free to deliberate without any form of pressure being imposed on them, whether by way of promise or of threat or otherwise. 21.Mr Tze also argues that the effect of the impugned remarks ran through the whole of the jury’s evaluating process in reaching a verdict and there was a real risk they would have felt compelled to return a unanimous verdict. In accordance with Specimen Direction 55, the judge stated that it was desirable they should all agree on their verdict, but if they could not do so they could return a majority verdict.[20] Mr Tze makes no complaint about the judge’s directions on returning a verdict which follows the relevant specimen direction and we do not agree that the judge’s impugned remarks would have compelled the jury to return a unanimous verdict. After all, the judge merely followed the specimen direction and told them that it was desirable that they should all agree on the verdict, not that they had to. 22.Mr Raymond Cheng[21], for the respondent, submits that the judge’s impugned directions have been approved by the Court of Appeal in HKSAR v Chan Huandai[22], where a direction in these terms was held to be appropriate in the context of jurors having accessed the Internet about the case. He also refers to various decisions from the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada of a similar nature in that they address the possible liability for contempt of court by jurors for breach of a direction not to seek and rely on extraneous materials.[23] 23.As correctly noted by Mr Cheng, the impugned remarks were only made on one occasion in the summing-up and immediately after the directions against speculation and seeking and relying on extraneous materials. He submits that the judge was making his remarks in respect of this direction when he said “any of my directions”. He accepts it would have been preferable had the judge been more specific, but submits that when the remarks are considered in their context, they did not have any adverse effect on the appellant. He adds that the remarks did not constitute any improper pressure or threat on the jury’s deliberations. 24.The suggestion by the judge to the jury that not following his directions may amount to contempt of court, obviously sought to convey to them the importance of following his directions and the serious consequences in not doing so. Whilst emphasising the likelihood of a criminal sanction if the jury does not comply with the judge’s legal directions in stringent terms, the jury are nevertheless properly reminded that the law is the province of the judge and they must follow his directions. 25.The judge also remarked that if they did not follow his directions, their verdict would be set aside by the Appeal Court and their efforts would be wasted. This Court in Chan Huandai[24], recommended that trial judges on directing the jury against doing their own research of a case should follow the suggested directions of the judicial commission of New South Wales. The suggested directions included a passage that states:
26.The Court in Chan Huandai[25] stated that trial judges may adopt the suggested directions, with necessary modifications, in their opening speech to the jury after empanelment, and may also wish to stress again in the summing-up the importance of not doing Internet research about the case. The Court went as far as to say that judges should also warn the jury that if they do not abide by the directions and carry out Internet search, the consequences would be very serious, possibly involving being prosecuted for contempt of court and if convicted being sentenced to imprisonment. 27.It seems clear that the judge must have had this Court’s comments in Chan Huandai in mind when using the terms he did both in his introductory remarks and summing-up to the jury. 28.When the summing-up is considered as a whole and in the circumstances that the jury were to return home before retiring to consider their verdict the following morning, we agree with Mr Cheng’s submission. In the context in which the judge’s remarks were made, he was emphasising with the jury the importance that they should not speculate or conduct their own research but be bound by the evidence presented before them. Even if the judge’s remarks were considered to apply to all his directions, in our judgment they did no more than express in stringent terms the obligation on the jury to follow the judge’s directions on the law. Having regard to the entire context, we consider that the judge’s remarks were not inappropriate to the circumstances of the case. 29.As we stated at the outset of our judgment, care needs to be taken to ensure that a jury is free to deliberate on the evidence presented to them without any form of improper or inappropriate pressure being imposed upon them in deciding their verdict. There are two important underlying principles that need to be strictly adhered to. First, the jury is to give a true verdict according to the evidence that has been presented to them. Secondly, the jury should arrive at its verdict free of any improper or inappropriate pressure upon them. However, it is well recognised that the Internet has become part of our daily lives and together with human curiosity, there is a risk that jurors may conduct their own research about the case. That is why a direction as suggested in Chan Huandai may need to be given. If it is decided that such a direction should be given, it should be explicitly in respect of a juror not investigating or conducting his or her own research of the case with extraneous sources, including the Internet.[26] It is a matter for the discretion of the judge as to the nature and terms of the warning that should be given, which will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case so as to ensure a fair trial. In our view, on most occasions, a direction in emphatic terms will suffice. Conclusion 30.We are therefore of the view that no miscarriage of justice has taken place in the present case and the appeal is dismissed.
Mr Raymond Cheng, SADPP, and Mr Raymond Chan, PP, of Department of Justice, for the respondent Mr James Tze, instructed by CMK Lawyers, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid, for the appellant [1] HKSAR v Lam Tsz-ho, unrep., CACC 121/2021, 14 March 2022, [2022] HKCA 425, per Zervos JA. [2] Appeal Bundle, 28B-E. [3] Tam King Hon v HKSAR (2006) 9 HKCFAR 206, at [36]. [4] HKSAR v Chan Huandai [2016] 2 HKLRD 384, at [45]-[52]. [5] Tam King Hon, at [28]. [6] Tam King Hon, at [36]. [7] R v Watson and Others [1988] 1 QB 690, at 700A-B. [8] Tam King Hon, at [15]. [9] Appeal Bundle, 17I-M. [10] Appeal Bundle, 17P-18I. [11] Appeal Bundle, 18J-U. [12] Appeal Bundle, 19A-25F. [13] Appeal Bundle, 25G-26L. [14] Appeal Bundle, 27D-28B. [15] Appeal Bundle, 27D-28D. [16] Appeal Bundle, 102F-103C. [17] Appeal Bundle, 73S-74E. [18] Appeal Bundle, 75D-E. [19] Appeal Bundle, 74S-75C. [20] Appeal Bundle, 74F-L. [21] With Mr Raymond H M Chan. [22] HKSAR v Chan Huandai [2016] 2 HKLRD 384, at [45]-[52]. [23] See AG v Dallas [2012] 1 WLR 991; Dallas v United Kingdom (2016) 63 EHRR 13; AG v Davey & AG v Beard [2014] 1 Cr App R 1; Her Majesty’s Solicitor General v Stoddart [2017] EWHC 1361; Registrar of the Supreme Court of South Australia v S & C (2016) 125 SASR 207 and R v Bains 328 CCC (3d) 149. [24] Chan Huandai, at [48] and [49]. [25] Chan Huandai at [49]. [26] See R v Thompson [2011] 2 All ER 83, at [11] and [12]. |
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