Kwok Cheuk Kin v. Ms Ip Lau Suk Yee, Exco Convenor and Exco Members
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1155/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 3 November 2022.
1. In my Judgment dated 21 October 2022 [2022] HKCFI 3225 – the definitions and abbreviations from which I shall continue to use – I held that the Secretary for Health did not have the power under Cap 599L to invalidate the approximately 20,000 Questionable MECs issued by the 7 Doctors.
Cites 3 cases
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HCAL 1155/2022 [2022] HKCFI 3341 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1155 OF 2022 ________________________
________________________ Before: Hon Coleman J in Chambers (Open to Public) Date of Decision: 3 November 2022 _____________ D E C I S I O N _____________ A. Introduction 1.In my Judgment dated 21 October 2022 [2022] HKCFI 3225 – the definitions and abbreviations from which I shall continue to use – I held that the Secretary for Health did not have the power under Cap 599L to invalidate the approximately 20,000 Questionable MECs issued by the 7 Doctors. 2.The Secretary and the HKSAR Government chose not to appeal from my Judgment, and so must be taken to have accepted it. As has been said elsewhere, and as I also indicated in the Judgment by reference to the Government’s acceptance of my interim ruling, that acceptance might be seen as an example of the rule of law in action in Hong Kong. 3.Instead, a decision was made to amend Cap 599L (“Amendments”), in an exercise that has been described by some as “closing the loophole”. Though that phrase may have been used loosely, it is not really apt. Implicit in the idea of a “loophole” is possibly the idea that the legislature had intended to grant the Secretary power to invalidate MECs, but had somehow failed to achieve that. Whereas implicit in my Judgment was the opposite finding that the legislature had not intended to grant the Secretary the power to invalidate MECs issued by the registered medical practitioners to whom the legislature had given the relevant powers of certifying exemption, and where the MECs’ validity was required to be limited to the period of certified exemption and would expire through effluxion of time. 4.Of course, in what might be seen as unforeseen changed circumstances, it may be that the Government has simply changed its mind – hence the Amendments. The changed circumstances would include the understandable wish to penalise those who can be shown in fact to have abused the MEC system – though amending Cap 599L would not be necessary to achieve that, as demonstrated by the already issued criminal charges and potential professional misconduct charges. 5.However, there may well be room for some people to ask whether it was necessary to make such amendments, when the vast majority of the Questionable MECs would expire anyway within a few weeks or so, and the number of persons holding the Questionable MECs – roughly the number of people on just five or six MTR trains during rush hour on any given weekday morning – might be of marginal statistical relevance to a main stated purpose of Cap 599L to encourage vaccination, against the facts that over 92% of the population has received at least 2 Covid-19 vaccinations, over 77% of the population has received at least 3 Covid-19 vaccinations, and probably millions have achieved some natural immunity from being previously infected. The point may seem even more obvious when it is recognized that the amendments allow the Secretary to invalidate even one single MEC. 6.There may well also be room for some people to wonder – in light of those vaccination and immunity figures, the apparent broad attainment of the stated purpose of Cap 599L, and the consequential general movement to relax restrictions – why the simultaneous amendment was made to extend the entirety of the various elements of control authorized by Cap 599L to as late as 30 June 2023, a date more than 8 months away from the date the amendment was made. 7.In any event, the Applicant (who succeeded in the last challenge) has now sought to challenge the Amendments in these new judicial review proceedings. He seeks leave to apply for judicial review on paper. Having considered the papers, I am satisfied that this is an application suitable to be disposed of in that way. 8.This is my Decision. B. The Intended Grounds of Review 9.Though in his application, the Applicant has referred to and sought to challenge “599E”, I think it is clear that he means to challenge Cap 599L, and I read his intended challenge in that light. 10.In his Form 86, the Applicant said that he is seeking the Court to make an order that Cap 599L is invalid legislation, because the ExCo members and the Convenor have amended it, but it has no appeal mechanism. As Mr Kwok puts it, whilst the legislation authorizes the Secretary to act, if those affected are dissatisfied they have no way to appeal. If the 20,000 people are to appeal, they can only turn to the Court to initiate actions, but the Court would be unable to handle that, and the opportunity for them to lodge appeals will be affected. 11.In his supporting affirmation, the Applicant stated (in translation, and correcting the references to Cap 599L):
12.In a second affirmation, the Applicant stated (in translation):
13.In essence, from these materials, I think there are perhaps three intended grounds of review, namely that the amendments are unlawful and/or unreasonable because:
14.I can deal with each in turn. C. Merits 15.As to the first intended ground:
16.As to the second intended ground:
17.As to the third intended ground, this appears to be a wholesale attack on Cap 599L and the Vaccine Pass, but without any real direction or particularization. Whilst I accept that time has moved on since my Decision in Law Yee Mei v Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR [2022] HKCFI 688, I did there traverse some of the ground in holding that the Vaccine Pass regime pursues the legitimate aim of protecting public health, which includes a proper desire to boost vaccination rates so as to reduce cases of death or severe illness. Any challenge now would have at least to be brought with some particularity, as it is not for the Court to try to identify grounds for review from a general complaint. As to this point, see also my Decision in HCAL 990/2022, [2022] HKCFI 3159, handed down at the same time as this decision. 18.None of the three grounds apparently advanced by the Applicant are arguable with any realistic prospect of success. D. Disposition 19.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. 20.I make no order as to costs.
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