Mcyp v. Cwyw
Read the full judgment text of FCMC 11432/2018 on BabelCite. This Family Court judgment was delivered on 10 October 2022 before Deputy Judge R. Chow.
Matrimonial causes – Third-party discovery – Leave to appeal – Admissibility of expert evidence – Necessity of discovery – Costs – Respondent sought leave to appeal against decision dismissing application for third-party discovery – Court considered whether appeal had reasonable prospect of success under s.63A(2) District Court Ordinance – Held that prospect was more than fanciful; leave granted – Costs of summons in the cause of the appeal
Legal issues: Leave to appeal
Outcome: Leave to appeal granted
Cites 2 cases
|
FCMC 11432/2018 [2022] HKFC 221 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 11432 OF 2018 ------------------------
------------------------ Before Coram: Deputy Judge R. Chow (Paper Disposal) Dates of Submissions: 9 August 2022 Date of Decision: 10 October 2022 -------------------------- DECISION ( Leave to Appeal ) --------------------------- Background 1.The Respondent (“the Wife”) sought leave to appeal against my decision (“the Decision”) made on 26 July 2022 dismissing her application for third-party discovery by the companies (“the Third Party”) that the Petitioner (“the Husband”) has interests in. 2.In the Decision, I refused to accept the notes prepared by the expert of the Wife (“the Expert”) for non-compliance of O.38 r.37C of the Rules of High Court and found that the Wife had failed to demonstrate the necessity for seeking third-party discovery on most of the documents sought. Draft Grounds of Appeal 3.The Wife has 4 draft grounds of appeal. 4.Ground 1 is that I erred in refusing to accept the Expert’s notes exhibited to the Wife’s affirmation by reason of non-compliance of O.38 r.37C of the Rules of High Court and argued that the evidence of the expert could have been admissible by reason of O.38 r.2(3) and r.36 and s.47(1) of Evidence Ordinance (Cap. 8). Alternatively, even if there was procedural irregularity, the proper approach was to nevertheless admit the expert’s evidence for the purpose of the interlocutory application. 5.Ground 2 is that I erred in adopting an overly restrictive approach to assess “necessity” of the third-party discovery and the Husband and the Third Party should not be permitted to deny the necessity or what the expert deemed were necessary documents for the purpose of compiling his expert report for the Wife unless they could show that the specific discovery was clearly and plainly irrelevant or oppressive. 6.Ground 3 is that I erred in misunderstanding and misreading the Expert’s evidence. 7.Ground 4 concerns costs, the Wife argued that the Third Party should not be awarded costs when they acted unreasonably and strenuously argued against the third-party discovery application. As far as the Husband was concerned, the Wife argued that he failed to discharge his on-going full and frank disclosure obligation, costs should have been awarded against him. Discussion 8.S.63A(2) of District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336) provides that leave should not be given unless the court is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. 9.It is trite that a reasonable prospect of success means an appeal with prospects that are more than “fanciful” but which do not need to be shown to be “probable”. (KNM v HTF, HCMP 288/2011) 10.As I am unable to say the prospect of success of the Wife’s appeal is no more than fanciful, I will grant the Wife leave to appeal. 11.By reason of the foregoing, I make the following orders:
Withers, Solicitors, for the Petitioner (Husband) Ms Anita Yip, SC and Ms Lily Yu instructed by Chaine, Chow & Barbara Hung, Solicitors, for the Respondent (Wife) Deacons, Solicitors, for the Third Party | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under FCMC 11432/2018