Chau Lai Bing v. Li Rongqiang and Others

Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 2025/2021 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 29 November 2022.

1. This is yet another case of telephone fraud.

Cited by 1 case · Cites 4 cases

Case No.DCCJ 2025/2021[2022] HKDC 1389
Court
District Court
Date29 Nov 2022
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

DCCJ 2025/2021

[2022] HKDC 1389

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 2025 OF 2021

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BETWEEN

  CHAU LAI BING Plaintiff
  and  
  LI RONGQIANG 1st Defendant
  PAO HWA TRADING COMPANY LIMITED 2nd Defendant
  WONG WING-SHAN (also known as WONG WING SHAN) 3rd Defendant

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Before:  Deputy District Judge Gary C.C. Lam in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  24 November 2022

Date of Decision:  29 November 2022

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DECISION

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INTRODUCTION

1.This is yet another case of telephone fraud.

2.Before me are two summonses, namely:-

(1)  The plaintiff’s summons filed on 23 June 2022 for summary judgment and/or interim payment (“P’s Order 14 Summons”):-

(a)  against the 2nd defendant for HK$1,000,000; and

(b)  against the 3rd defendant for HK$268,809.[1]

(2)  The 2nd defendant’s summons filed on 15 November 2022 (“D2’s Amendment Summons”) for amending its defence filed on 9 July 2021.

THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE

3.According to the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, at or around 3pm on 27 September 2020, the plaintiff received a telephone call from a male claiming to be calling from SF Express. He told the plaintiff that upon investigation, the Beijing Police found that the plaintiff had couriered “黑心口罩” (masks with poor quality) to Chaoyang District, Beijing, and suspected that the plaintiff was involved in other similar cases.

4.In the same telephone conversation, the plaintiff denied the allegation of involvement in any masks with poor quality. However, the male at the other end of the line asked the plaintiff to make a report to the Beijing Police to evidence her innocence, or the plaintiff may be caught in some bigger trouble. Eager to vindicate herself, the plaintiff agreed that her phone line be transferred to a hotline purported to be the hotline of the Police of the Chaoyang District, Beijing.

5.According to the plaintiff, a male who purported himself to be a Beijing Police officer named Ma Zhijie (the “Purported Officer”) answered the transferred call. During the call, the Purported Officer suggested the plaintiff to search online for the telephone number of the Police hotline of Chaoyang District, Beijing. He then called back the plaintiff with the same caller ID number as the plaintiff had just found online, telling the plaintiff that there was a technical glitch of the telephone system he was using, and thus he had to switch to Whatsapp for communication with the plaintiff. Then, via Whatsapp, the Purported Officer sent a photo of his purported Police ID and made a video call with the plaintiff. The Purported Officer requested various contact details and bank account details of the plaintiff, which the plaintiff imparted the Purported Officer.

6.The plaintiff says that in the afternoon on 29 September 2020, the Purported Officer called the plaintiff again, alleging that a prosecutor named Chen Yunlong (the “Purported Prosecutor”) would be in charge of the plaintiff’s case. Then, a male who identified himself as Chen Yunlong informed the plaintiff that he would send the Purported Officer to Hong Kong to bring the plaintiff to Beijing for custody.

7.The Purported Officer then purportedly sought indulgence on the plaintiff’s behalf from the Purported Prosecutor. As a result, the plaintiff was told that as an alternative to custody, the plaintiff had to transfer her funds to “公證處監管科” for investigation, which, according to what the Purported Prosecutor told the plaintiff, would be returned after the investigation into the funds.

8.The plaintiff avers that she relied on what the Purported Officer and the Purported Prosecutor had told her, and eager to avoid being taken to custody in Beijing, she transferred her funds from his bank accounts in three tranches to local bank accounts per the account details given by the Purported Prosecutor, namely, (1) HK$2,010,000 to Cheung Kwai Kong (“KK Cheung”) on 29 September 2020, (2) HK$395,000 to Zheng Nian Ping (“Zheng”) on 30 September 2020, and (3) HK$61,000 also to Zheng on 1 October 2020.

9.Upon the transfers, via Whatsapp, the Purported Officer sent to the plaintiff three certificates of acknowledgement of the transfers, issued in the name of the Supervisory Unit of the Beijing Supreme People’s Procuratorate. Each certificate was affixed with a chop purported to be the chop of the Beijing People’s Procuratorate, countersigned by the Purported Prosecutor and the Purported Officer.

10.On 2 October 2020, the plaintiff came to her sense. She suspected that she was defrauded and thus she reported the incident to the Hong Kong Police. She made a statement to the police on 2 October 2020, and another on 5 December 2020. Upon investigation and in response to the enquiries made by the plaintiff’s solicitors, by letters dated 26 March 2021 and 22 April 2021, the Hong Kong Police informed the plaintiff that the monies she had transferred were traced to the respective bank accounts of the 1st defendant, the 2nd defendant and the 3rd defendant, and the Hong Kong Police had requested the banks to freeze the accounts. In particular:-

(1)  On 30 September 2020, Cheung transferred HK$1,000,000 to a bank account in the name of Chan Koon Ho (“Chan”), who then transferred HK$10,000 and HK$990,000 totaling HK$1,000,000 to the 2nd defendant on 1 October 2020.

(2)  On 30 September 2020, Zheng transferred HK$168,809 to a bank account of the 3rd defendant (“D3’s First Sum”) and HK$226,318 to a bank account in the name of Wong Chi Kei (“CK Wong”) (who is the 3rd defendant’s brother).

(3)  On 1 October 2020, CK Wong transferred HK$100,000 to the account of the 3rd defendant (“D3’s Second Sum”).

11.On 30 April 2021, the plaintiff issued the Writ of Summons herein, claiming that the Purported Officer and the Purported Prosecutor had defrauded her into transferring the monies to KK Cheung and Zheng, which were then transferred to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants respectively. The plaintiff’s cause of action is unjust enrichment. The plaintiff does not allege that any of the defendants was involved in the fraud.

THE PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENCE

12.The plaintiff’s case is supported by her 2nd Affirmation filed on 13 July 2021 in support of her application under section 21 of the Evidence Ordinance for a disclosure order against certain banks. The application was granted by HH Judge MK Liu on 7 September 2021.

13.In support of the present application for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed her 4th affirmation on 23 June 2022, adopting the 2nd affirmation and adding a few more matters.

14.None of the 2nd and the 3rd defendants has any personal knowledge of the matter averred and deposed to by the plaintiff in relation to her conversations with the Purported Officer and the Purported Prosecutor. Further, the evidence of the transfers of the monies from the plaintiff to Cheung Kwai Kong and Zheng Nian Ping, which were then transferred to the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ respective bank accounts, is indisputable.

15.Thus, on the face of it, the plaintiff has established that the 2nd and the 3rd defendants have been enriched at the plaintiff’s expense, and on the plaintiff’s case the enrichments were indeed without any reason and thus unjust.

16.I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case for the purpose of the application for summary judgment. Thus, the burden lies upon the 2nd and the 3rd defendants respectively to raise triable issues and/or arguable defence. I shall first deal with the 2nd defendant’s opposition to the plaintiff’s application, and then the 3rd defendant’s.

THE 2ND DEFENDANT’S DEFENCE

17.The 2nd defendant filed its defence on 9 July 2021. The 2nd defendant was incorporated in Hong Kong in 1980. It alleges that it has since been carrying on its business in seafood trading in Hong Kong, Mainland, Africa, North America and South America, and that it was a necessary part of the 2nd defendant’s business venture to trade and/or receive payment in the form of Hong Kong dollars and Renminbi (RMB).

18.According to the 2nd defendant’s defence, by an invoice dated 19 September 2020, the 2nd defendant agreed to sell and a Mr Ng Man Bing (“Ng”) agreed to buy 25 kilograms of sea cucumbers for RMB 872,000. The sea cucumbers had been delivered. Subsequently, but also in September 2020, one of the 2nd defendant’s business contact Mr Lam Yuen Mau (“Lam”) approached the director of the 2nd defendant Mr Chenug Wing Man (“Cheung”), telling the latter that Lam’s business contact Chan was in urgent need for RMB for his business. As a result, “it was eventually agreed that Mr Chan would transfer HK$1 million to the 2nd defendant following which the 2nd defendant would procure RMB868,000 to be transferred to Mr Chan as its Hong Kong dollar equivalent”: see paragraph 5 the 2nd defendant’s defence.

19.I pause to note that no particulars were given as to who were the parties to the agreement. Was it a bilateral agreement merely between the 2nd defendant and Chan? Or was it a tripartite agreement among the 2nd defendant, Chan and Ng? Further, no particulars given as to the date, time, venue, and the mode of the agreement were given.

20.According to the 2nd defendant’s defence, on 1 October 2020, upon Lam’s instructions, the 2nd defendant directed Ng to transfer RMB868,000 directly to Chan and a Ms Wong purportedly nominated by Chan to receive part of the funds. On the same day, Ng transferred RMB826,970 to Ms Wong and RMB41,030 to Chan.

21.Based on these facts, the 2nd defendant raises the defence of bona fide change of position and bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The change of position and the purchase was the 2nd defendant’s agreement to release Ng from paying the 2nd defendant and to accept payment from Chan.

THE 2ND DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE

22.The 2nd defendant, represented by Mr Roy Chui, filed the affirmation of Cheung Wing Man (its director) (the “2nd defendant’s affirmation”) on 19 September 2022 in opposition to the plaintiff’s application. The 2nd defendant’s affirmation does not entirely support the 2nd defendant’s defence:-

(1)  While in the 2nd defendant’s defence, it was pleaded that it was Chan who was in urgent need of RMB, now in the 2nd defendant’s affirmation, it was deposed that it was Lam himself who was in need of RMB. In the 2nd defendant’s affirmation, this discrepancy (which is material in my view) is described as “a clerical error”. No explanation has been proffered as to why there was such “a clerical error”, so much so that in the 2nd defendant’s defence, the full name of Chan was set out. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not accept it to be a clerical error. Rather, more accurately, it was a change of the main plank of the 2nd defendant’s defence.

(2)  While in the 2nd defendant’s defence, it was merely pleaded in paragraph 5 that “it was eventually agreed that Mr Chan would transfer HK$1 million to the 2nd defendant following which the 2nd defendant would procure RMB868,000 to be transferred to Mr Chan as its Hong Kong dollar equivalent”, in the 2nd defendant’s affirmation it was deposed in paragraphs 27- 28 that:-

“27. I therefore agreed with Mr Lam that if he was willing to enter into a tripartite arrangement with Mr Ng and the 2nd Defendant, whereby he would repay the equivalent of HK$1 million of goods delivered and unpaid purchase price Mr Ng owed to the 2nd Defendant, Mr Ng would transfer the equivalent amount according to the prevailing exchange rate to him in RMB in mainland China.

28. Both Mr Ng and Mr Lam agreed to this tripartite arrangement for the Sea Cucumber.”

I pause to note that still, there are no particulars as to the date, time, venue, and the mode of the agreement.

(3)  While in the 2nd defendant’s defence, it was pleaded that the 2nd defendant had sold to Ng sea cucumber of 25 kilograms, in the 2nd defendant’s affirmation, it was deposed that it should be tonnes, instead of kilograms. Again, this discrepancy is described as “a clerical error”. Again, no explanation has been proffered as to why there was such “a clerical error”. Was it because of the solicitors’ oversight? Was it because the 2nd defendant’s miscommunication?

23.It is where D2’s Amendment Summons comes in. It seeks to amend the 2nd defendant’s defence to bring it in line with the 2nd defendant’s affirmation. I see no prejudice to the plaintiff if I allowed D2’s Amendment Summons, and thus at the outset of the hearing I allowed the same accordingly with costs to the plaintiff to be summarily assessed. In any event, it is trite that in a summary judgment application, the defendant is not bound by its pleadings and the Court has to consider all the materials before it to determine whether there is any triable issue and/or arguable defence. Thus, I will consider the above evidence as well as the draft amended 2nd defendant’s defence attached to D2’s Amendment Summons.

24.That said, where an alleged defence is inconsistent with the defence previously put forward or where the defence is only recently raised despite opportunity being given to the defendant to respond earlier are both relevant to bona fide and credibility of the defence: Paul Y Management Ltd v Eternal Unity Development Ltd & Anor (Unreported, CACV 16/2008, 12 August 2008) at §19 per Cheung JA.

ANALYSIS OF 2ND DEFENDANT’S DEFENCE

25.The first issue I have to determine is whether the existence of the tripartite agreement as alleged is a triable issue. If so, the second issue would be whether the bona fide of the transaction is triable.

26.First, there is no documentary evidence of the same – no written agreement, no text message, not even any handwritten note. The amount involved is a sum of substance. The agreement involved three parties, two of whom, namely, Ng and Chan (or Lam), did not know each other. It is inherently unbelievable that if there did exist such tripartite agreement, there would not be any document evidencing the agreement. It is still so inherently unbelievable even assuming that Ng, Chan (or Lam) and the 2nd defendant were on good terms as alleged and that it was not uncommon that purchase prices would be paid via third parties for PRC transactions, in particular in the light of the fact that the 2nd defendant would still issue invoices to Ng in respect of the cucumbers sold and delivered to Ng.

27.Second, the 2nd defendant provides no particulars of the tripartite agreement. It is striking that not even the date of the tripartite agreement is provided, let alone the venue and the time.

28.Third, the 2nd defendant has changed its case without good reason. In particular, initially, the 2nd defendant alleged that it was Chan who was in urgent need of RMB, but now alleges that it was Lam himself who was in need of RMB. This is not a clerical error as the 2nd defendant alleges now. This is, in my view, change of the 2nd defendant’s case. This undermines the credibility of the defence.

29.Fourth, none of the main role players (Lam, Chan and Ng) of the tripartite agreement has made any affirmation or even a written statement to corroborate the 2nd defendant’s evidence. No explanation has been proffered for their absence. Such unexplained absence only undermines the credibility of the 2nd defendant’s defence.

30.Finally, the 2nd defendant has adduced evidence to show that it is a company of substance and still actively carrying out its business, so as to demonstrate that it is inherently improbable that such a business of substance as the 2nd defendant would not receive payments without good reason. The background of the 2nd defendant provides evidence of background against with the credibility of the other evidence is to be assessed. A shiny background itself does not automatically or necessarily mean that its defence must be more credible. The Court still has to assess all the evidence globally.

31.Having considered the above, I find that the 2nd defendant has failed its burden to raise a triable issue as to the existence of the tripartite agreement. This tripartite agreement being the main plank of the 2nd defendant’s defence, it follows that the 2nd defendant has failed to raise any valid defence to the plaintiff’s cause of action of unjust enrichment. I shall grant summary judgment against the 2nd defendant.

32.The above is sufficient to deal with the 2nd defendant’s defence. For the sake of completeness, Mr Jonathan Lee, counsel for the plaintiff, submits that even assuming that there did exist the tripartite agreement, the agreement was not bona fide because of its illegality in that the transaction under the tripartite agreement would in effect amount to foreign currency exchange with RMB which is prohibited under the PRC law except via authorized institutions. In my view, even if Mr Lee is correct about the nature of the transaction, this submission would not help him in the summary judgment application because the authorities on whether such illegality would amount to absence of bona fide are conflicting, and thus at least for the summary judgment application purposes, such defence is an arguable defence: see Lesnina H DOO v Wave Shipping Trade Co Ltd [2022] 2 HKLRD 727 per DHCJ Dawes SC at §§51 – 60.

THE 3RD DEFENDANT’S DEFENCE

33.According to the 3rd defendant, on 25 September 2020, the 3rd defendant made an online offer to sell the cryptocurrency Tether (“USDT”) on an online cryptocurrency trading platform called Binance, to sell 12,540.12 units of USDT at HK$7.90/USDT, that is, HK$99,067.99. Zheng took up the offer, and transferred HK$99,067.00 to the 3rd defendant’s bank account. This sum did not come from the plaintiff. The reason for the 3rd defendant to mention this transaction is apparently to show that the 3rd defendant had this as the first dealing with Zheng.

34.The 3rd defendant avers that on 30 September 2020, the 3rd defendant made another online sale offer, this time 21,368.22 units of USDT also at HK$7.90/USDT, that is, HK$168,809.00. Again, Zheng took up the offer, and transferred HK$168,809 to the 3rd defendant’s bank account.

35.It happened, the 3rd defendant further avers, that on the same day, that is, 30 September 2020, the 3rd defendant’s brother CK Wong also made an online sale offer to sell 28,734.18 units of USDT at HK$7.87/USDT, that is, HK$226,138.00. Again, Zheng took up the offer, and transferred HK$226,138 to CK Wong’s account.

36.The 3rd defendant alleges that the next day, on 1 October 2020, CK Wong transferred HK$100,000 to the 3rd defendant claiming it to be for the latter’s usual daily expenses.

37.Based on the above, the 3rd defendant puts the plaintiff to strict proof that D3’s First Sum and D3’s Second Sum are the plaintiff’s monies paid to Zheng, and also runs the defence of bona fide change of position and bona fide purchaser without notice.

THE 3RD DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE

38.The 3rd defendant herself filed an affirmation. She deposes that she was a beautician in early 2020 and started to learn and engage in investment in cryptocurrencies.

39.Her evidence supports, with documentary evidence, her allegation about the online offers made by her and CK Wong, as well as receiving the monies from Zheng and CK Wong.

ANALYSIS OF THE 3RD DEFENDANT’S DEFENCE

40.In the light of the evidence of the existence of the online offers and the transfers of the monies, there is no dispute that the transactions did take place as alleged. The issues between the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant are:-

(1)  Whether D3’s First Sum and D3’s Second Sum (collectively, the “D3’s Sums”) came from the plaintiff’s monies paid to Zheng; and

(2)  If so, whether these transactions were bona fide.

(A) Source of D3’s Sums

41.In respect of the source of the D3’s Sums, the plaintiff relies on the bank statements of Zheng’s bank account obtained under HH Judge MK Liu’s Order made on 7 September 2021 mentioned in paragraph 12 above. The statements show that in late September and October 2020, Zheng’s account only had meager sum of money, peaking at HK$60.75 only on 30 September 2020, with the sum of HK$395,000 paid into it as mentioned in paragraph 8 above, and two sums of respectively HK$168,809.00 and HK$226,138.00 paid out on the same day, exactly the amounts received by the 3rd defendant and CK Wong for their respective sales of the USDT. On such evidence, it is clear that the Sums came from the plaintiff through Zheng.

42.However, Mr Esmond Wong, counsel for the 3rd defendant, objects to the plaintiff’s reliance on the bank statements, for the technical point that the bank statements had not been properly adduced as evidence, and that the plaintiff applied for leave to rely on the bank statements by way of Summons filed just the day before the hearing. I have no hesitation in dismissing such objection for the following reasons:-

(1)  In paragraphs 14A of the Amended Statement of Claim (of course verified by the Statement of Truth), it has already been pleaded that the bank statements disclosed pursuant to HH Judge MK Liu’s Order dated 7 September 2012 shows, inter alia, that the D3’s Sums came from the plaintiff’s money.

(2)  Further, given the timing of the payments and the receipts, namely, the plaintiff’s payments to Zheng’s account on 30 September and Zheng’s payments also made on 30 September with the exact amounts being the amounts of D3’s First Sum and D3’s Second Sum, the plaintiff at least has a strong prima facie case that the D3’s Sums did come from the plaintiff.

(3)  In response, in her Amended Defence and in her affirmation, the 3rd defendant simply puts the plaintiff to strict proof. In other words, the 3rd defendant does not have any positive case to traverse the plaintiff’s case in this regard.

(4)  It was in the light of Mr Wong’s skeleton submissions that out of abundant caution, the plaintiff made the application for leave to rely on the relevant bank statements.

(5)  The application is undeniably late. However, the bank statements were disclosed pursuant to HH Judge MK Liu’s Order dated 7 September 2021, and there cannot be dispute over its authenticity and the accuracy of its contents. The evidence is to reinforce the already strong prima facie case.

(6)  Thus, in my view, there is no prejudice to the 3rd defendant at all, a fortiori when the 3rd defendant does not have any positive case in this regard.

43.Thus, at the outset of the hearing, I granted leave to the plaintiff to rely on the bank statements, with costs in the plaintiff’s summons.

44.In the light of the evidence mentioned above, I am satisfied that the D3’s Sums came from the plaintiff’s monies paid to Zheng.

(B) Bona fide

45.The second issue is whether the 3rd defendant’s receipt of D3’s First Sum on the sale of the USDT and of D3’s Second Sum from CK Wong was bona fide.

46.To prove bona fide, the burden lies on the 3rd defendant to prove a triable issue as to (1) whether a reasonable person with the attribute of her would not have appreciated on facts available to him that a proprietary right probably existed; or (2) whether she had already made inquiries or sought advice which would have revealed the probable existence of such a right: see Ling Weixian v Tsoi Ai Tong [2022] HKDC 967 at §21 per DDJ Rebecca Lee. Further, the nature and extent of the inquiry called for depends on the circumstances of the particular case: see at Globenet Droid Ltd v Hong Kong Hang Lung Electronic Co [2016] 3 HKLRD 863 §54 per DDJ Gary CC Lam.

47.In the present case, the 3rd defendant has not adduced any evidence as to the market value of the USDT at and around the time of her offers. If the sale price was much higher or much lower than the market value at the time, and given that Zheng had only had one transaction with her prior to D3’s First Sum, then she was fixed with notice and she should have made proper enquiries.

48.If the sale price was more or less the same as the market value at the time, then the question would be how the 3rd defendant in the first place had been able to acquire so many USDT especially in the light of the fact, with no disrespect, that the 3rd defendant was a beautician whose income would on the face of it not be sufficient for her to acquire such an amount at such a price. This may well go to the 3rd defendant’s understanding of the trading of such cryptocurrency, which may in turn be indicative of the 3rd defendant’s bona fide.

49.With appropriate evidence, the 3rd defendant may be able to raise triable issues as to bona fide. However, there is no evidence as to the market value of the USDT at the time. Nor is there any evidence as to the costs of the USDT acquired by the 3rd defendant. Nor is there any evidence of the 3rd defendant making any sort of enquiries with Zheng about the source of money. Nor is there any evidence as to why, if it were the 3rd defendant’s allegation, not knowing the market price of the USDT, she did not see any problem in earning a quick sum of HK$160,000 odd with a few clicks in a short time. The only substantive evidence she adduces is that she made the sale offer online which was then quickly take up by Zheng, not even like a mere allegation that she had done this many times before and thus the transactions with Zheng looked as normal as in the past (like the 2nd defendant’s mere allegation at the very least that it was not uncommon for third parties to pay the purchase price of its sea cucumber).

50.The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to CK Wong’s transaction with Zheng. Worse, CK Wong did not make any affirmation or any written statement. Absent any evidence of bona fide of CK Wong, the 3rd defendant receipt of D3’s Second Sum from CK Wong on the alleged reason that it was given to her as her usual daily expenses was equally, if not more, lacking in bona fide, especially when CK Wong was so generous and kind to give HK$100,000 to the 3rd defendant for her usual daily expenses but was not so in preparing any written statement, let alone an affirmation, in support of the 3rd defendant’s case. It is a fortiori when there is no evidence that it was the usual practice of CK Wong to give the 3rd defendant money or such a substantial amount of money for her usual daily expenses.

51.On the above (lack of) evidence, I am not satisfied that the 3rd defendant has raised any triable issue and/or arguable defence as to bona fide.

52.Thus, I shall grant summary judgment against the 3rd defendant.

CONCLUSION

53.In the circumstances, I make the following order:-

(1)  The 2nd defendant do pay the plaintiff HK$1,000,000 with pre-judgment interest thereon at 1% above HSBC prime rate, accruing from 1 October 2020 until today;

(2)  The 3rd defendant do pay the plaintiff HK$168,809 with pre-judgment interest thereon at 1% above HSBC prime rate, accruing from 30 September 2020 until today;

(3)  The 3rd defendant do pay the plaintiff HK$100,000 with pre-judgment interest thereon at 1% above HSBC prime rate, accruing from 1 October 2020 until today;

(4)  There be judgment interest on (1), (2) and (3) above at judgment rate until payments.

54.I also make a costs order nisi that the 2nd defendant shall pay 50% of the costs of whole action (including P’s Order 14 Summons and any costs reserved) to be summarily assessed, with certificate for counsel, and that the 3rd defendant shall pay 50% of the whole action (including P’s Order 14 Summons and any costs reserved) to be summarily assessed, with certificate for counsel.

55.Upon the costs order nisi becoming absolute, the plaintiff shall lodge and serve the statement of costs (as well as the statement of costs in respect of D2’s Amendment Summons) within 7 days, and each of the 2nd and 3rd defendants shall lodge and serve a List of Objection within 7 days thereafter. I shall then conduct the summary assessment on paper.

  ( Gary C.C. Lam )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Jonathan Lee, instructed by Fairbairn Catley Low & Kong, for the plaintiff

Mr Roy Chui, instructed by TITUS, for the 2nd defendant

Mr Esmond Wong, instructed by Henry Yu & Associates, for the 3rd defendant



[1]  In his Skeleton Submissions filed on behalf of the plaintiff, Mr Jonathan Lee, counsel, makes it clear that the plaintiff does not pursue proprietary claim or declaratory relief of proprietary interest in the present application.

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