Re Zamora Rowel Espiritu
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 194/2022 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 30 December 2022 before Barma JA and Au JA.
Administrative law – judicial review – leave to apply for judicial review – extension of time – non-refoulement claim – Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) s.37ZT(3) – Torture Claims Appeal Board – late filing of notice of appeal – four days out of time – whether Board properly considered merits of intended appeal – whether applicant has any realistic prospect of success – Wednesbury unreasonableness – procedural unfairness – error of law – applicant's failure to notify change of address – inference of receipt of court correspondence – applicant acting in person – deemed abandonment of right to file written submissions – application determined on the papers – application for extension of time to appeal dismissed
Legal issues: Extension of time to appeal against refusal of extension of time to apply for leave for judicial review
Outcome: Application for extension of time to appeal dismissed.
Cited by 9 cases · Cites 9 cases
|
CAMP 194/2022 [2022] HKCA 1883 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 194 OF 2022 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 224/2019) ____________________
____________________ Before: Hon Barma JA and Au JA in Court Date of Judgment: 30 December 2022 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 31 December 2021 refusing to grant an extension of time to the applicant to apply for leave for judicial review. The intended judicial review was purportedly against (i) the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 14 May 2015 (“the Director’s 1st Decision”) and 27 October 2017 (“the Director’s 2nd Decision”) rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim; and (ii) the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non‑Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 28 July 2015 (“the Board’s Decision”) refusing the applicant’s application for late filing of a notice of appeal against the Director’s 1st Decision. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Philippines. He entered Hong Kong on 30 June 2012 as a visitor, and he was arrested by the police on 29 July 2012 for overstaying. He raised a non-refoulement claim on 17 August 2012. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on a fear of being harmed or killed by a Mr Arnel due to a marital dispute. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at [4] and [5] of his decision (“the CALL-1 Form”)[1]. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 14 May 2015 (i.e. the Director’s 1st Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s 1st Decision covered the torture risk[2], the persecution risk[3] and the BOR 3 risk[4]. 5.The applicant sought to appeal against the Director’s 1st Decision to the Board, but filed his notice of appeal/petition (“NoA”) out of time (by 4 days). The Board, after considering the applicant’s reasons for the delay and the merits of his claim with reference to the Director’s 1st Decision, dismissed the applicant’s application to file the NoA out of time on 28 July 2015 (i.e. the Board’s Decision”). 6.By a Notice of Further Decision dated 27 October 2017 (i.e. the Director’s 2nd Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim based on the BOR 2 risk[5]. The applicant did not appeal to the Board against the Director’s 2nd Decision. The Judge’s decision 7.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 23 January 2019 purportedly seeking to judicially review the Director’s and the Board’s Decisions. In accordance with the principles set out in Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549, the Judge rightly treated the intended review as against the Board’s Decision (see CALL-1 Form at [11]). The application for leave for judicial review was more than 3 years out of time. 8.In his affidavit filed on 23 January 2019, the applicant deposed:
9.After summarising the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the Board’s and the Director’s Decisions, the Judge refused to grant an extension of time for the applicant to apply for leave for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing to grant an extension of time at [13] to [26] of the CALL‑1 Form:
The present application for extension of time to appeal 10.The applicant’s address of correspondence had changed numerous times since the filing of his Form 86 in 2019. The court was informed, on 22 December 2021 by the Immigration Department, of his last known address, which was at 10-20 Whitty Street, Sai Ying Pun (“the Whitty Street Address”). According to the court’s record, a copy of the CALL-1 Form and a sealed copy of the Judge’s order were sent by post to the applicant at the Whitty Street Address on 31 December 2021. This letter was not returned undelivered. 11.Pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(4), the applicant had 14 days to lodge an appeal. The applicant did not file a Notice of Appeal within 14 days of the Judge’s decision dated 31 December 2021. 12.The applicant took out a summons in the Court of First Instance on 4 March 2022 seeking extension of time to appeal, in which his address was stated to be at Percival Street, Causeway Bay. In the summons and his supporting affirmation, he claimed that he did not receive “the order and judgment within 14 days”. 13.The applicant’s application to appeal out of time was dismissed by the Judge on 20 April 2022[6]. 14.By a summons filed on 15 June 2022, the applicant renewed his application for an extension of time to appeal before this court. In the summons and his supporting affirmation, the applicant claimed that he did not receive the Judge’s order dated 31 December 2021 “due to the order being lost in post”. 15.In breach of the directions by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, the applicant failed to lodge written submissions with the court. He is thus deemed to have abandoned his right to rely on written submissions. 16.Having considered the papers, we are satisfied that this application can properly be dealt with on the papers without the need for an oral hearing. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed. Discussion 17.As noted above, the Judge’s decision dated 31 December 2021 was sent to the last known address of the applicant (which was at the time the Whitty Street Address) on the same day, and was not returned undelivered. The inference to be drawn is that he has received that letter from the court, and he has had knowledge of the Judge’s decision within the period he was permitted to lodge the intended appeal. 18.In any event, it is incumbent upon the applicant to notify the court of any change of address as soon as possible, and any consequences of having failed to do so lie with him. 19.The applicant has also failed to state the date on which he became aware of the Judge’s order, and he has also failed to proffer any reasonable explanation or reason for his delay in lodging his intended appeal. 20.The extension of time application before the Judge was taken out by the applicant around 7 weeks after the expiry of the 14-day period within which he was permitted to appeal against the decision of the Judge. There was a further delay of 6 weeks in respect of his present renewed application for extension of time before this court. The delay is not insignificant, and the application could be dismissed on this basis alone. 21.We have nonetheless proceeded to consider the merits of the intended appeal. 22.The applicant has not condescended to any particulars, in the Form 86 or otherwise, as to on what basis the Board’s Decision was said to be not in accordance with the law, procedurally unfair or Wednesbury unreasonable. That being the case, the application for leave for judicial review (and an extension of time to apply for such leave) was hopeless and rightly dismissed by the Judge. 23.Section 37ZT(3) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) provides that the Board may allow the late filing of the NoA if the applicant provided sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy the Board that (i) he had exercised all due diligence to file the NoA within the prescribed time; and (ii) his failure to do so was due to circumstances beyond his control. 24.Regardless of procedural breaches committed by the applicant and the lack of explanation therefor, it is incumbent on the Board, in exercise of its discretion to extend time for appeal, to consider the merits of the applicant’s claim. See Re Khan Kamal Ahmed [2019] HKCA 377 at [20]; Re Qasim Ali [2019] HKCA 430; Re Castillo Raquel Adona & anor [2022] HKCA 1053. 25.In this case, although the consideration by the Board of the merits of the applicant’s case was set out in brief in the Board’s Decision at [8] to [9], we are satisfied that the Board accorded due attention to the Director’s 1st Decision and had duly considered the substantive merits of the applicant’s claim before refusing his application for extension of time to lodge the NoA. 26.In any event, the applicant has failed to identify any arguable error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave to bring judicial review proceedings was wrong. Nor can we discern any such matters. 27.It is well-established that an appeal against a refusal to grant leave for judicial review is not a fresh application for leave, and that an applicant must point to errors on the part of the Judge. This has clearly not been done here. 28.For these reasons, we do not see any prospect of success in the intended appeal. This court will not grant an extension of time for a hopeless appeal. The summons filed on 15 June 2022 is accordingly dismissed.
The applicant acting in person [2] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [3] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under CAMP 194/2022