Re Heni Wahyuningtias
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 256/2022 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 8 March 2023.
1. This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 4 April 2022 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 15 March 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”), dismissing the appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dat
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CAMP 256/2022 [2023] HKCA 296 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 256 OF 2022 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 905/2019) ____________________
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 4 April 2022 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 15 March 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”), dismissing the appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 27 July 2018 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim (“the Director’s Decision”). Background 2.The applicant is a national of Indonesia. She entered Hong Kong on 22 November 2012 as a foreign domestic helper, but after the premature termination of her contract, she overstayed and was arrested on 14 September 2017. On 18 September 2017, she lodged a non-refoulement claim. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on a fear of being harmed or killed by one Mr Irawan, a loan shark. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at [4] and [5] of his decision (“the CALL-1 Form”)[1]. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 27 July 2018, the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s Decision covered the torture risk[2], the persecution risk[3], the BOR2 risk[4] and the BOR 3 risk[5]. 5.The applicant appealed to the Board. After a hearing on 25 February 2019, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal by its Decision. The Board found that there was no merit in the applicant’s claim, and that, inter alia, no serious injuries had been inflicted on the applicant by the loan shark. In any event, internal relocation was a viable option for her, and state protection was also available to her. The Judge’s decision 6.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 2 April 2019 seeking to judicially review the Board’s Decision, and her grounds were summarised by the Judge at [13] of the CALL-1 Form as follows:
7.In her supporting affirmation, she repeated the dangers she may face if she returned to Indonesia, and repeated her complaints regarding the lack of legal representation at the hearing before the Board. 8.After summarising the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the Board’s and the Director’s Decisions, the Judge refused to grant leave for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [14] to [26] of the CALL‑1 Form:
The present application for extension of time to appeal 9.The applicant’s address as stated in her Form 86 was at Tougha Mansion, 502 Nathan Road (“the Address”). According to the court’s record, a copy of the CALL-1 Form and a sealed copy of the Judge’s order were sent by post to the applicant at the Address on 4 April 2022, and was not returned undelivered. 10.Pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(4), the applicant had 14 days to lodge an appeal. The applicant did not file a Notice of Appeal within 14 days of the Judge’s decision dated 4 April 2022. 11.The applicant thereafter took out a summons in the Court of First Instance on 11 May 2022 seeking extension of time to appeal, in which her address was stated to be the Address. In her supporting affirmation filed on the same date, she deposed that she “did not get court letter in time”. 12.The applicant’s application to appeal out of time was dismissed by the Judge on 22 June 2022[6]. 13.By a summons filed on 18 July 2022, the applicant renewed her application for an extension of time to appeal before this court. In the summons and in her supporting affirmation, the applicant stated that she disagreed with the Judge’s “decision”. 14.In her written submissions lodged on 1 August 2022, the applicant submitted that her “claim is very very special”, and that she “did not get justice from the High Court”. Discussion 15.Having considered the papers, we are satisfied that this application can properly be dealt with on the papers without the need for an oral hearing. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed. 16.As noted above, the Judge’s Decision was sent to the last known address of the applicant and was not returned undelivered. The inference to be drawn is that she has received that letter from the court, and she has had knowledge of the Judge’s decision within the period in which she should have lodged her intended appeal. 17.There is no explanation on the part of the applicant as to how and when she came to learn of the Judge’s decision dated 4 April 2022. 18.In the circumstances, we reject the applicant’s explanation for the delay in lodging her intended appeal. 19.We have nonetheless proceeded to consider the merits of the intended appeal. 20.The applicant has not condescended to any particulars, in the Form 86 or otherwise, as to on what basis the Board is said to have acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its Decision, or how such Decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable. That being the case, the application for leave for judicial review was hopeless and rightly dismissed by the Judge. 21.The applicant has failed to identify any arguable error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was wrong. Nor can we discern any such matters. 22.Regarding the applicant’s complaint that she did not have the benefit of legal representation, it does not follow that the high standards of fairness applicable require that a non-refoulement protection claimant be absolutely entitled to legal representation at all stages of the screening process or the legal proceedings ensuing therefrom. See Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15, Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17, Re Lopchan Subash [2018] HKCA 37 and Re Ahmed Syed Rafiq [2018] HKCA 178. In this regard, we note that the applicant was assisted by a lawyer in submitting her non-refoulement claim form, and presenting her case, to the Director. 23.It is well-established that an appeal against a refusal to grant leave for judicial review is not a fresh application for leave, and that an applicant must point to errors on the part of the Judge. This has clearly not been done here. 24.For these reasons, we do not see any prospect of success in the intended appeal. This court will not grant an extension of time for a hopeless appeal. The summons filed on 18 July 2022 is accordingly dismissed.
The applicant acting in person [2] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [3] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [5] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. |
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