劉孝軒 v. 消防處
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1550/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 18 April 2023.
1. By a Form 86 filed on 20 December 2022, the Applicant sought leave to challenge a decision made by the Fire Services Department (“FSD”).
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HCAL 1550/2022 [2023] HKCFI 784 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1550 OF 2022 ________________________
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_________________ D E C I S I O N _________________ A. Introduction 1.By a Form 86 filed on 20 December 2022, the Applicant sought leave to challenge a decision made by the Fire Services Department (“FSD”). 2.The Form 86 is home-made and the decision identified as the proposed subject of challenge is (original in Chinese)
3.In the field for the relief sought, he said (original in Chinese):
4.That sentence was also repeated in his supporting affirmation, with the characters “回覆” replaced by “回應” which does not result in any change in meaning. Nothing else was said in the affirmation. No documents were exhibited. 5.Until recently, the only other document in the Court file was a letter written by the Applicant dated 21 December 2022 which was received by the Court the next day. The Applicant said (original in Chinese):
6.After about three months had lapsed, apparently the Applicant had not yet applied for legal aid, or the Court would have been notified by memorandum from the Director of Legal Aid in accordance with the usual practice. 7.It seemed that the Applicant was half-hearted at best in pursuing this leave application. I saw no reason why the application should not be dealt with as soon as possible. I did not think the vague suggestion that there might be an application for legal aid, which led to the request for a stay of the proceedings, changed the position. 8.In the circumstances, I considered and prepared a written decision on the materials then available. Notice was given to the Applicant that my Decision would be handed down on 30 March 2023. 9.However, on 28 March 2023, the Court received further materials from the Applicant. They were in the form of a letter addressed to the Registrar, with various enclosures. That is not the correct way of seeking to place evidence before the Court, which should be on affirmation or affidavit with relevant exhibits attached. Nevertheless, in the exercise of my discretion, I considered the further materials, and I postponed the handing down of my Decision to be able take those materials into account. 10.Having done so, this is my Decision. B. The Intended Challenge 11.From the then very limited information as was originally provided by the Applicant, it seemed that the Applicant might have been an employee of the FSD, that he resigned at some point, but that he later on attempted to withdraw his resignation, which was not acceded to by his employer. The Applicant said the employer’s rejection of his withdrawal was based on unreasonable grounds and was unsupported by evidence. But he did not identify or particularize the grounds which he sought to impugn as unreasonable or unsupported by evidence. The Court had no means of knowing the basis of the Applicant’s complaint. 12.Order 53 rule 3(2)(a) of the Rules of High Court mandates an applicant to state in the Form 86 the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought. The Applicant had plainly failed to do so. This alone was sufficient to dismiss the application. 13.As well as the fact that the application in the Form 86 did not set out any real matters as to any alleged public law breach, nor did it even set out any factual matters as might be put forward in support of an application for leave to apply for judicial review. 14.Further, with the very limited facts provided to the Court, it seemed that the complaint relates to an employment dispute between the Applicant as the employee and the FSD as the employer. That seemed to me to be a private law matter which is not amenable to judicial review. 15.In the further materials provided by the Applicant, it is confirmed that the Applicant was employed as a fireman in the FSD, that he had tendered his resignation, and that he had subsequently sought to withdraw his application, which withdrawal was refused. 16.In my summary of them, the Applicant’s further letter and enclosed materials identified certain facts, and he made the following points:
17.The Applicant did not provide a copy of CSR 321(b) itself, but he provided (part of) the ‘Guidelines on Processing Applications from non-directorate offices for Withdrawal of Notices of Resignation under CSR 321(b)’. 18.The relevant Guideline provides as follows:
19.Also included in the materials provided by the Applicant was a Memo dated 25 November 2022 from the Station Commander to the Applicant, with the FSD’s reply to the Applicant’s statements dated 22 November 2022, and two emails of the same date of a similar nature. The replies were as follows:
C. No Merit in Intended Challenge 20.Notwithstanding the provision of further materials, the Applicant has still failed properly to identify any alleged public law failures on the part of the FSD. Doing my best with materials, it seems that the Applicant has three complaints: (1) the decision was unreasonable; (2) the decision was not explained; (3) the decision was not supported by proof or evidence. 21.Merely asserting that a decision is “unreasonable” does not properly identify why it is unreasonable in the public law sense. In any event, I see no arguable basis for asserting unreasonableness in that public law sense. Whether or not to accept the withdrawal of resignation was a matter for the FSD, and the weighing of the various factors which it might take into account was also a matter for the FSD. There is no basis on the materials to suggest that the FSD failed to take into account the relevant considerations, and indeed the FSD’s response to the Applicant expressly identifies that it took into account all relevant factors (including the Applicant’s stated reasons for wishing to withdraw his resignation, which traversed or mapped some of the “other factors” the Guideline says should be taken into account). 22.The Applicant also seems to have based his complaint upon an assumption that the starting presumption for a consideration of possibly approving a withdrawal of resignation is that approval should be granted, unless there is some good reason to the contrary. I do not think that is the correct starting point. Indeed, I doubt that there is any starting presumption, and the question is simply an open question as to whether or not to approve the withdrawal of resignation. But if there were a starting point, it would more likely be that the resignation having been tendered (and in effect accepted), it would fall to the person seeking to withdraw that resignation to persuade the FSD that the withdrawal should be approved. 23.Secondly, sufficient explanation and/or reasons were given to the Applicant for the non-approval. He was told that, after weighing the relevant factors (including his own points made in support of his withdrawal application), the withdrawal application was nevertheless not approved in accordance with CSR 321(b). The necessary extent of any reasoning for a decision is context dependent. In this context, I see no reasonable argument that further explanation or reasoning was required. 24.Nor is it reasonably arguable that it was necessary for the FSD to furnish “proof or evidence” in support of its discretionary decision. Again, the Applicant’s suggestion otherwise might stem from his apparent view as to the starting point of any consideration for withdrawal of resignation (see above). There is no reasonable argument or basis to conclude that the FSD did not have the appropriate matters in mind when deciding whether or not to approve withdrawal of resignation in line with CSR 321(b) and the Guideline. 25.Further, I remain of the view that – despite the reference to “public interest” in the Guideline – the Applicant’s complaint arises out of a private law employment dispute, of the sort not ordinarily amenable to judicial review (even where the employer is a government department). 26.The Applicant’s complaint also appears to be based on a misunderstanding or mis-statement of some of the underlying facts, notwithstanding that was pointed out to him by the FSD in its response to his various communications. 27.Ultimately, it seems that the Applicant tendered his resignation, even within the probationary period of his employment as a fireman; he did so in order to seek better or better-paid employment elsewhere; but when that failed to materialise, he sought to withdraw his resignation. It may be thought, therefore, that the change in circumstances surrounding the requested withdrawal was not beyond the Applicant’s control (one of the factors to weigh). Be that as it may, it may be unfortunate for the Applicant that his application for withdrawal of resignation was not approved, but there is no arguable basis to suggest that the non-approval was the result of any public law error. 28.For these various reasons, the Applicant’s application fails to identify or raise any public law grounds which are reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. D. Result 29.The application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed, with no order as to costs.
The applicant, acting in person | ||||||||||||||||||