Maroof Ahmed v. Director of Immigration

HCAL 359/2023

[2023] HKCFI 1018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LISTNO. 359 OF 2023

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

1.  Extension of time for the application for leave to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 21 October 2022be refused;

2.  The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed; and

3.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 21 October 2022 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after his previous claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all applicable grounds.

2.The Applicant is a 46-year-old national of Pakistan who entered Hong Kong illegally on 22 May 2014 and was arrested by police on 29 May 2014. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Pakistan he would be harmed or killed by his former wife’s family who objected to their marriage and who were said to have subsequently murdered his wife in a honour killing and had also threatened to kill the Applicant as well.

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim

3.By a Notice of Decision dated 10 January 2017 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

4.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his wife’s family upon his return to Pakistan as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that his wife’s father had since passed away and it was doubtful that his wife’s family would still pursue their threats against the Applicant or would still have any adverse interest in him after all these years since he left the country, that in any event it was a private personal dispute between them without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Pakistan with a large population of 201 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 796,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Karachi where it would be difficult if not impossible for his wife’s family to locate him.

5.The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decision was dismissed by the Board on 5 January 2018 after hearing him in evidence and submissions and upon finding no merits in his claim or his appeal, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decision.

6.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was also refused by this Court on 13 November 2019 upon finding none of the proposed grounds for his intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in his intended application (HCAL 400/2018 [2019] HKCFI 2367).

7.The Applicant’s subsequent appeal against the Court’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 20 April 2021 (CACV 267/2020 [2021] HKCA 509).

8.The Applicant’s Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 30 June 2021 ([2021] HKCA 925), and then by the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal on 31 May 2022 under Rule 7 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules, Cap. 484A.

Request To Make Subsequent Claim

9.Less than 2 months later on 27 July 2022 the Applicant in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that his wife’s family are still looking for him and have also filed false charges against him to the local police of certain criminal offences committed by him in 2015, 2017 and 2021 in Pakistan, and that he also faces new risk from his own family in Pakistan for having subsequently married a non-Muslim Chinese wife in Hong Kong that his family have threatened to kill him for bringing shame to the family that he still fears of being harmed or killed if refoueld to his home country.

10.There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

11.Accordingly, on 11 August 2022 the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of his request within 14 days, which he subsequently did via his own lawyers.

12.By a Notice of Decision dated 21 October 2022 the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that the basis thereof was essentially the same as that of his previous claim, and that he failed to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was determined, or that those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of his previous claim would give his subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success as any new threat from his own family over his marrying a non-Muslim Chinese wife is similarly a private personal dispute without any official involvement which as found by both the Director and the Board in his previous claim would be negated by state/police protection and internal relocation, while his claim of new threats arising from those alleged false charges made against him were considered as highly doubtful given the fact that he had earlier in 2014 already left the country and was all along in Hong Kong and hence could not have committed those offences in Pakistan that the authenticity or credibility of such claim is wholly rejected, and that even if they were authentic that on the basis of the relevant COI that the Applicant would be able to successfully defend himself with such proof in any court in Pakistan.

13.On 9 March 2023 the Applicant filed a Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, and put forth the following grounds for his intended challenge:

(1)  That the Director failed to attain the high standards of fairness required by Wednesbury test in his decision which should be considered unreasonable in the scope of public law;

(2)  That the Director erred in concluding that the State would be able to provide protection to the Applicant instead of determining that reasonable protection has in fact been provided to the Applicant as a result of the wrong test being applied arising from an unreasonable understanding of the Applicant’s basis of claim;

(3)  That the Director failed to properly reflect the current true situation of interfaith/inter-ethnic marriages in Pakistan in assessing the real risk of harm to the Applicant due to his marriage of a non-Muslim Chinese wife in Hong Kong;

(4)  That the Director erred in concluding that there has been no significant change of circumstances since the Applicant’s previous claim was determined when in fact the risk of harm would significantly increase in the Applicant’s current situation of facing honour killing upon his return to Pakistan;

(5)  That the Director failed to properly consider the extremely serious incompetency of the Pakistani police as evidenced by the produced documents of police abuse published by human rights organizations when implying in the decision that the police would be able to conduct investigations of those false charges made against the Applicant in an effective and just manner.

14.The Applicant was by then however out of time with his application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made.

15.As the last day of the 3-month period for him to file his Form 86 fell on 21 January 2023, the Applicant was therefore more than 6 weeks late with his application, and in considering whether to extend time, the court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration; AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.

16.In the Applicant’s case, a delay of more than 6 weeks must be considered as very substantial and inordinate, for which he did not provide any explanation either in his Form or affirmation, and at the hearing of his application he claimed to have been so busy taking care of his wife who was ill at that time that he had forgotten about the deadline to file his application until it was out of time.

17.The record shows that the Director’s decision was sent on the same day of 21 October 2022 to his then solicitors without being returned through undelivered post, and in the absence of any further details or documentary evidence to corroborate the Applicant’s bare assertions, and given the fact that he also had legal assistance with his present application as he co conceded at the hearing, I am unable to find any justification for his such serious delay with his application.

18.As for the merits, if any, of his intended application, those grounds put forward by the Applicant as noted above are just all vague and bare assertions without any details or particulars or elaboration as to how they apply to his case, or in what way did the Director or immigration officer err in the decision, or how did the Director fail to apply high standards of fairness in his determination of his claim or in the assessment of the availability of state protection and internal relocation to negate those alleged new risks in his subsequent claim when such findings were never challenged in his previous claim. As such I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge, nor do I find any merits in his intended application.

19.In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request for subsequent claim, and as I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, in the absence of any good reason for his serious delay, I refuse to extend time and accordingly dismiss his leave application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

20.Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal dated 31 May 2022, but that the Applicant was still trying to re-litigate his case by making this subsequent claim based on essentially the same facts and basis as before, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against him.

21.Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1) The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a) it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b) it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3) An order made under subsection (1) –

(a) may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

22.Relevantly, Section 27A also provides:

“(1) Leave for the institution or continuance of any legal proceedings by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under section 2791) shall not be given unless the Court of First Instance is satisfied that –

(a) the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court in question; and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings.

(2) No appeal lies from a decision of the Court of First Instance granting or refusing leave required under this section, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of First Instance.”

23.In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section.

24.His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] – [10]).

25.In the subsequent jointly heard appeals of Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration, CACV 420/2021 and Reza Sahin v Director of Immigration, CACV 422/2021 ([2022] HKCA 327, 28 February 2022), Poon CJHC in giving judgment of the Court of Appeal also held that where a judge of the Court of First Instance (“CFI judge”) makes a RPO, he may where appropriate properly exercise his power under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to also make a restrictive order against vexatious appeals under which the non-refoulement claimant concerned cannot appeal without first obtaining leave from him or another CFI judge designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court upon observing procedural fairness by putting the non-refoulement claimant concerned on notice and giving him or her the opportunity to address the court before making the restrictive order ([38] –[40]).

26.In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate his non-refoulement claim without viable grounds amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against him, to which he was unable to answer or raise any valid objection at the hearing, I am convinced that the Applicant will likely continue to do so and/or make vexatious appeals, thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

27.Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to or touching upon or leading to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, or any appeal, including this Order, without the leave of a Judge of the Court of First Instance;

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with his said application for leave;

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)  Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this Order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months;

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave under this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge;

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this Order; and

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

Disposition

28.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

29.A RPO in terms of paragraph 27 be made against the Applicant.

Dated the 25^th day of April 2023

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1